A multi-agent systems approach to construction claims negotiation by Zhaomin Ren (7180340)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
A MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS APPROACH TO 
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS NEGOTIATION 
ZHAOMIN REN 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
of Loughborough University 
for degree of doctor of philosophy 
March 2002 
ABSTRACT 
Claims negotiation plays an important role in construction claims settlement and disputes 
resolution. However, claims negotiations are normally conducted inefficiently. Although 
many research projects have been undertaken on human behaviours in negotiation (e. g. 
negotiation planning, documentation and negotiation strategies) and computer-aided 
negotiation, there is not an effective approach to solving such problem. The development 
of multi-agent systems provides an innovative approach to facilitating claims negotiation, 
where intelligent agents can negotiate with each other for the real world parties that they 
represent. The significance of multi-agent systems lies in the fact that they match the 
fragmented nature of the construction industry. 
This thesis describes the work of developing a multi-agent system for construction claims 
negotiation (MASCOT). The objectives are to create an architecture for the agent system, 
and develop a negotiation mechanism for agent interaction. A conceptual MASCOT 
model is designed based on a thorough analysis of the nature, characteristics and 
problems of construction claims negotiation, multi-agent systems negotiation 
mechanisms, and negotiation theories. A modified Monotonic Concession protocol and 
the related negotiation strategies which are based on the integration of Zeuthen's risk 
evaluation model and Bayesian learning model were developed. A prototype was built 
using the ZEUS agent building toolkit and Java. 
The system was then assessed in terms of the quality of the negotiation mechanism and 
prototype using critical evaluation criteria and prototype evaluation. The result revealed 
that the MASCOT system could significantly enhance the efficiency of construction 
claims negotiation. Furthermore, it is recognised that multi-agent systems have a great 
potential to solve the fragmentation problem in other construction areas such as 
scheduling, concurrent engineering; and collaborative design, particularly when the 
project team members are geographically distributed. This research not only contributes 
to the improvement of construction claims negotiation, bdt also provides an effective 
approach for the development of multi-agent 'system negotiation mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a general overview of the thesis consisting of a brief introduction 
and description of the subject matter of the research as well as the specific problems 
being studied. It also sets out the hypothesis, aims and objectives, the manner in which 
the research was carried out, a summary of its achievements and the structure of the 
thesis. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Claims appear, indeed, to be an integral part of almost all civil engineering and building 
contracts, and arise from the many uncertainties which are an inherent part of the industry 
(Bramble and Callahan, 1992; Sykes, 1999). Very few, if any, construction contracts can 
ever be completed without claims being made for additional payment, or for extra time in 
which to compete the work. The reason for this is the extremely complex, dynamic and 
fragmented nature of the construction industry. It is genuinely difficult to recognise fully, 
at the commencement of a project, all the uncertainties of one kind or another in spite of 
all efforts to the contrary or project management. This leads to an increasing number and 
amount of claims in the industry. For example, Keane (1994) reported that £1.2 billion 
could be the subject of construction claims or disputes at any one time, and that more 
than 83% of contractors in the UK claimed for one or more time extensions during 1992- 
1994, whilst 84% of them were dissatisfied with the result. 
Claims management therefore has gained more attention in construction project 
management. Various efforts have been geared towards reducing claims, facilitating 
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claims settlements, and controlling the incidence of claims, which includes the 
development of contractual/legal issues, the introduction of risk management in contract 
analysis, the adoption of new procurement systems, the improvement of the claims 
management process (particularly project documentation systems), the application of 
information technologies, and the adoption of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms. On the other hand, industrial evidence shows that there is a tendency for 
construction claims and disputes to increase at an alarming rate (Keane, 1994). Therefore, 
more studies on various aspects of claims need to be explored further. 
Negotiation is an important stage in construction claims management process. It plays a 
vital role in claims settlement, disputes prevention and resolution. However, claims 
negotiations are normally conducted inefficiently (Hu, 1997). Although this problem has 
been widely recognised, claims negotiation has seldom been thoroughly analysed. Proper 
solutions for the problem are rare. This is because claims negotiation often involves 
problems like diversity of intellectual background, many variables, complex interactions, 
and inadequate negotiation expertise of construction participants. The improvements for 
claims negotiation, thus far, normally focus on the human aspects such as: planning 
negotiation, preparing adequate negotiation documents, or adopting proper negotiation 
strategies (Smith, 1992; Zack, 1994). 
The revolutionary development of computer science, in the form of information 
technology (IT), in the last two decades has not only changed the concept of engineering 
design, but has also made vital improvements in project construction and management 
with the developments of new communication tools, planning and scheduling methods, 
documentation systems, expert and decision systems, and knowledge management. These 
systems also play an important role in facilitating claims management. However, none of 
the existing tools have essentially improved the claims negotiation process, although 
expert systems and decision support systems have been adopted. The reason is that these 
systems can only provide suggestions to the human negotiators. 
Multi-agent systems (MAS) is a fast developing information technology, where a number 
of intelligent agents, representing the real world parties, co-operate or compete to reach 
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their desired objectives. There is no central controlling agent within the group. Each 
agent is characterised as having the following attributes (Nwana, 1996): 
" Autonomy: Agents can operate on their own without the need for human guidance. 
Agents have individual internal states and goals, and act in such a manner as to meet 
their goals. 
" Co-operation: Co-operation with other agents is paramount and is the reason for 
having multiple agents in the first place. In order to co-operate, agents need to possess 
the ability to interact with other agents and possibly humans. 
" Learning: For agent systems to be truly `smart', they would have to learn as they 
react and/or interact with their external environment. A key attribute of any intelligent 
being is its ability to learn. 
The distributed-collaborative characteristics of multi-agent systems make it an ideal tool 
to simulate and resolve many industrial problems such as: traffic control, collaborative 
design, business negotiation, e-commerce, and supply chain management. Meanwhile, 
the significance of multi-agent systems is likely to increase with the developing 
communication language, and the successful applications in different industries. Since 
negotiation is one of the major interests of multi-agent systems, this research aims to 
adopt multi-agent systems to resolve the existing problems in construction claims 
negotiation. 
Despite its advantages, the introduction of information technology into the industry does 
not naturally lead to an improvement to the industrial problems, especially for those 
involving complex human and technical issues. For example, with many powerful 
documentation tools available, documentation is still a major problem in claims 
management. On the other hand, with the application of the Critical Path Method (CPM) 
and related software, construction planning and scheduling has improved greatly. The 
key point is that the application of information technology should be based on a thorough 
analysis of the application scenarios, a full understanding of the IT system, and a properly 
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developed system. This research will follow such an approach in developing a multi- 
agent system for construction claims negotiation (MASCOT). 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION 
Compared with the studies on other aspects of claims management such as: contractual/ 
legal issues, procurement systems and contract administration, the studies on claims 
negotiation are much fewer. Nevertheless, the importance of claims negotiation in claims 
settlement, project relationship facilitation and disputes resolution has been recognised. 
Smith (1992) points out that negotiation has been labelled as a basic survival skill for 
today's project manager. 
On the other hand, many key technical, professional and academic literature on claims 
negotiation reveal that current claims negotiations are conducted in a heuristic and 
inefficient way (Fenn et al., 1998). According to Hu's survey (1997), most project 
managers respond that claims negotiation is the most time and energy-consuming activity 
which they are involved in during the claims management process. The reasons are as 
follows (Ren et al., 2001a): 
" Claims negotiation items are often arguable. Some items such as loss of productivity 
and overheads, by their nature, are vague and difficult to decide even with much 
evidence; 
0 The claims negotiation preparation and negotiation process is time-consuming; 
" Certain problems, such as the engineer's conflicting roles in claims management 
caused by the construction project organisation structure sometimes become major 
obstacles for claims negotiation; and 
" Most construction participants lack adequate negotiation expertise. Since claims 
negotiation involves complex human factors in addition to pure technical issues, a 
negotiator's personal abilities and attitudes often determine the result of a negotiation. 
Lack of the necessary negotiation expertise, unnecessary concession, and 
stubbornness are common mistakes in claims negotiation. 
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These problems may cause claims, which could be settled otherwise, to develop into 
disputes, or in the worst case, into arbitration or litigation. Moreover, unsuccessful claims 
negotiation often causes an adversarial project environment, which may lead to loss of 
productivity, time extension, and increase in the client's costs (Filed et al., 1993). 
The motivation for this research is twofold: 
" Essentially, the research is motivated from the need to improve construction claims 
negotiation; 
" It also derives from the development of multi-agent systems as a flexible and 
powerful tool to simulate and resolve real world co-operation problems. The 
distributed and collaborative characteristics of multi-agent systems constitute a 
promising approach to solve complicated negotiation problems in a natural way 
(Ferber, 1998). The successful applications of multi-agent systems in other 
disciplines, especially in negotiation fields, provide valuable experience for this 
application. 
Meanwhile, the research also plans to draw some experiences for the application of multi- 
agent systems in other fields in the construction industry. 
1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research is to investigate the applicability of a multi-agent system to the 
construction claims negotiation process, such that the specific problems in current claims 
negotiation can be minimised. To achieve this aim, the following specific objectives were 
set: 
" Explore the role, process, and influence factors of claims negotiation to build a 
conceptual model of claims negotiation; and further identify the nature and 
characteristics of claims negotiation to build the reasoning model on which the multi- 
agent system should be based; 
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" Examine the major principles of multi-agent systems, explore its applications in other 
related disciplines, and identify the key issues to be addressed for application. 
Particular attention is given to agent architectures and negotiation mechanisms; 
" Examine the key negotiation theories and the major theoretic models, and identify 
their possible applications in multi-agent systems; 
" Develop a multi-agent system for the claims negotiation based on the identified 
reasoning model and characteristics of claims negotiation, and the selected 
negotiation theoretic models; and 
" Implement the developed MASCOT model in an agent development environment; 
execute the system and the prototype; evaluate the system and prototype; and identify 
problems and possible solutions. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
To achieve the above objectives, various research methods were adopted. These include: 
literature review, interviews, conceptual modelling, rapid prototyping, and system 
evaluation. Details are discussed below. 
1.5.1 Literature Review 
An extensive range of literature (books, journal papers, industrial and academic reports, 
and Internet information and discussion) was reviewed in this research. The review 
initiated the research; and contributed to three major aspects of the research: 
" It established the general background to the research; 
" It allowed the research issues to be identified; and 
9 It not only provided the historical knowledge of the research topic, but also ensured 
that the most current developments and thinking were considered and included. 
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The critical review of literature mainly focused on three main areas: 
" Various aspects of construction claims management including: current industry 
practice, legal and management principles, risk management, contract administration, 
and IT applications in claims management and dispute resolution. The main focus 
was on claims negotiation including elements involved in negotiation, negotiation 
process, problems, and possible solutions. 
" Key aspects of multi-agent systems including intelligent agent definition, 
classification, development, agent architecture and co-ordination mechanism, the 
essential characteristics of multi-agent systems, working domains, negotiation 
mechanisms, learning approaches, and applications in the construction industry. 
Particular attention was paid to the analysis of the various aspects of negotiation 
mechanisms and learning approaches of multi-agent systems. 
" The major negotiation theories covering game theory, economic theory, and 
behaviour theory. The application scope, assumptions, and major models were 
discussed. Particular attention was paid to the application of these models to the 
development of multi-agent system negotiation mechanisms. 
The review addressed the first three research objectives. It was an ongoing process by 
adding and removing items as new literature highlighted the studies that might be 
applicable. This was particularly important for the literature regarding multi-agent 
systems. There were more than one hundred new papers published on the Internet from 
1999 to 2001. The list of literature was constantly updated and reviewed to ensure that 
the most current, peer reviewed publications were traced and considered in this research. 
1.5.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Due to the very limited number of publications on claims negotiation, a qualitative study 
by means of semi-structured interviews was conducted to gain better understanding on 
construction claims negotiation. A formal interview may be conducted as opportunity 
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permits to the formal, pre-arranged interview; whilst an informal interview demands a 
more probing, spontaneous and unstructured technique governed by the situation rather 
than by the topic of interest. The semi-structured interviews fall between these two 
categories (Gummesson, 2000). 
This method is often used for gathering opinions about a subject. However, the data 
obtained through this research method is not suitable for generalisation to any population. 
Data is obtained from too small a sample and, because of certain attributes, a sample is 
drawn to include specially selected research participants (Babbie, 1986). The aim with 
this kind of research is to gather insight into a problem from an informed group of people 
rather than quantitative data from a sample of research participants. The results of a 
qualitative study can indicate the scope of possible matters on a subject, but does not 
indicate how many people in a population will agree with a certain statement. As the 
objective is to obtain information on the nature of claims negotiation, this qualitative 
method was considered suitable. 
Interviews, based on a scheme of questions, were conducted to obtain information from 
industry participants. Four experienced international project managers (representing the 
contractor) and two quantity surveyors (working for the client) took part in the interview. 
The interviews with the international project managers were undertaken through 
electronic means while the two quantity surveyors were interviewed face to face. The 
questions were based on knowledge obtained through the literature review and the 
author's industrial experience, which indicated the areas where problems could be 
expected in claims negotiation and the application of IT to facilitate claims negotiation. 
The topics covered were: 
" the current status and major characteristics of claims negotiation including: 
application situations, negotiation procedures, documentation required, considering 
factors, and decision criteria (e. g. risk attitude); 
" major problems and the causes of the problems; 
" IT tools currently used in claims management and the perspectives of using IT 
technologies to resolve the problems identified; and 
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" factors needed to be considered in this research and the potential barriers for the 
application of the proposed system. 
The interviews were intended to obtain the participants' opinions regarding the various 
aspects of claims negotiation. Although some participants did not answer all the planned 
questions, they gave more detailed opinions on other aspects that also benefited this 
research. All the responses from the interviews were categorised to obtain a body of 
opinions and remarks. The responses were also compared with the literature review and 
the author's expected results. Finally, the responses were further analysed to make 
meaningful deductions from the data. No statistical analysis was made to avoid the 
temptation to generalise the information to a broader population. 
Also, since there were limited formal publications about multi-agent systems (particularly 
at the beginning of this project), interviews, discussions and correspondence with domain 
experts were also a main source to get a deep insight of multi-agent systems. 
Through these exercises and the literature reviews, it was possible to get a very good 
picture of claims negotiation, build a conceptual model of claims negotiation, address the 
problems, and figure out possible methods for the improvement of claims negotiation. 
Also, a deeper understanding of the essential characteristics of multi-agent systems, and 
how multi-agent systems can be applied in resolving industrial problems was also gained. 
More importantly, the key concepts of negotiation theories were established. Theoretical 
background established at this stage allowed the remaining objectives to be fulfilled. 
1.5.3 Conceptual Modelling 
Based on the knowledge gained at the previous stages, the MASCOT conceptual model 
was developed. The development of the conceptual model followed an interactive 
process, which involved the following: 
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" Thorough analyses of the nature and characteristics of construction claims negotiation 
in terms of the application of multi-agent systems to build the reasoning model and 
identify the problems that need to be resolved by multi-agent systems; 
"A comparative analysis of the principles, application domains, conditions, benefits 
and limitations of the negotiation theories with respect to the specific research 
problem. This study was the breakthrough point of the model development process; 
" Analysis and development of the negotiation mechanism and learning approach; and 
" Development of a process model for the agent-based claims negotiation system using 
the IDEFO methodology; 
The developed conceptual model was further improved by reviewing the following 
sources: discussions with academic staffs involved in the research, suggestions and 
comments from the industry participants, peer reviews from researchers at conferences 
and workshops, and anonymous reviews by referees from academic journals. The 
iterative development of the model resulted in a series of papers at different development 
stages of the project, which are listed in Appendix A. 
1.5.4 Rapid Prototyping 
As part of the research objectives, the development of a prototype for the MASCOT 
model was required to demonstrate the implementation of the model in a multi-agent 
system development environment. Since the development of multi-agent systems is 
relatively new, there were very few mature software development environments to be 
adopted for the implementation of the system. This research adopted the ZEUS agent 
building toolkit developed by BT Plc. Based on the agent generating framework provided 
by the ZEUS toolkit, the negotiation protocol and strategies were fulfilled through the 
external JAVA program. The system input' information and its transformation into the 
computing data were particularly addressed. 
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The overall approach to system development involved rapid prototyping, which entails 
rapid development of subsystems, obtaining feedback from academics and practitioners, 
and refining the system until it works well. 
1.5.5 System Evaluations 
Two different approaches were adopted to evaluate the MASCOT system in terms of its 
negotiation mechanism and prototype. 
" Firstly, a theoretical analysis was conducted to evaluate the major aspects of the 
MASCOT negotiation mechanism, where a number of key criteria were adopted 
which are widely accepted in the multi-agent system community. Three major aspects 
of the system (i. e. efficiency, stability and simplicity) were analysed to ensure that the 
negotiation mechanism is theoretically sound. The suitability of the system was also 
highlighted. 
" Secondly, a prototype evaluation was undertaken to allow the potential end-users to 
assess the system. A group of construction professionals were invited to take part in a 
demonstration of the prototype, where the MASCOT system was first presented to the 
evaluators, then the prototype was executed with an example. Following the 
demonstration, evaluators were requested to assess the effectiveness of the prototype 
by completing a questionnaire. General discussions were also undertaken during the 
demonstration to allow the evaluators to raise any questions which were not included 
in the questionnaire. 
A detailed discussion about the system evaluation methodology is reported in Chapter 8. 
1.6 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Since this research mainly focused on the development of information technology to 
facilitate the claims negotiation, many complex human factors and technical issues were 
not considered. There are two closely linked negotiation stages in construction claims 
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management: negotiations about the entitlement of claims, and negotiations about the 
compensation amount of claims. At the first stage, negotiations are mainly concerned 
with the causes, evidence, responsibilities and the related clauses of the Conditions of 
Contract. Negotiations are essentially qualitative. Once a claim is entitled, negotiations 
are about the amount of the claim (i. e. the focus is on quantitative issues). This research 
is mainly concerned with the negotiations at the second stage, i. e., the quantitative 
negotiations. Those strategies involving strong human factors in quantitative 
negotiations, such as: use of negotiation power, threatening, and relationship 
considerations were not considered. Hence, the MASCOT system provides a relatively 
neutral negotiation environment. 
1.7 CONTRIBUTIONS 
Many construction problems are associated with the fragmented nature of the industry. 
Although different information technologies have been applied, none of them, thus far, 
fully addresses this problem. The development of multi-agent systems provides an 
innovative approach to addressing the fragmented problem. By adopting this approach, 
problems such as the inefficiency of claims negotiation, which is difficult to improve 
through other approaches, is possibly resolved or relieved. However, the performance of 
a multi-agent system is highly dependent on the negotiation protocol and strategies 
adopted, which, in turn, should be developed based on the individual application 
scenario. The poor performance of multi-agent systems has been a major obstacle for 
widespread acceptance of the systems (Krothapalli and Deshmukh, 1999). Thus, 
application of a multi-agent system for claims negotiation needs a thorough 
understanding in both areas. Much creative work has been done regarding these aspects 
within this thesis. The specific contributions of this research can be concluded as: 
" First, this research made a thorough analysis of the nature, process and characteristics 
of construction claims negotiation. Problems underlying the claims negotiation were 
pointed out. Possible solutions for those problems were suggested. 
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" Second, this research examined the major negotiation theories and their possible 
applications in multi-agent systems. This approach goes far beyond any former 
analyses of the theoretic basis of multi-agent systems, where AI researchers focus 
more on the game theory. By following the theoretical analysis in this research, more 
flexible and general theoretic models can be easily identified and developed for the 
further application of multi-agent systems in different application domains. 
" Third, a specific negotiation protocol has been developed which particularly 
addresses the problems of the engineer's conflicting roles and the low involvement of 
the client in claims negotiation. Also, the time issue and the extensive resolution- 
searching process in claims negotiation are also highlighted. 
" Fourth, a new negotiation mechanism has been developed which integrates an 
economic theoretical model: Zeuthen's bargaining model, and a learning approach, 
Bayesian inference approach. The negotiation mechanism particularly addresses the 
contractually obliged self-interested nature of claims negotiation. Meanwhile, it 
ensures the developed multi-agent system is stable and efficient. 
" Fifth, this research contributes a fully functioning multi-agent system implemented by 
using the ZEUS agent developing toolkit. Detailed algorithmic descriptions of the 
agents' behaviour and some of source code are included in the thesis. 
1.8 THESIS LAYOUT AND CONTENTS 
The thesis contains eight chapters illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview to the research undertaken. It first introduces the 
background and incentives of this thesis; then discusses the objectives, methodology, 
scope and contributions of this research; finally it provides a guide to the structure of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2 explores the development of claims management and identifies the procedure, 
influential factors, conceptual models, problems and suggestions for improvement of 
claims negotiation. 
Chapter 3 studies the fundamental principles of multi-agent systems and their application 
in other related disciplines. Particular focus is on individual negotiation mechanisms in 
deferent application areas, and various learning approaches adopted in multi-agent 
systems. 
Chapter 4 investigates the fundamental principles of negotiation theories and various 
theoretical models to establish the foundations for the selection of an appropriate 
theoretical model for the MASCOT model. 
Chapter 5 describes the MASCOT model development process. It first identifies the key 
characteristics of the claims negotiation (especially the reasoning model) on which the 
MASCOT model should be built. It then selects the negotiation theoretical models for the 
MASCOT model based on the identified reasoning model. Finally, the negotiation 
protocol and strategies are developed. 
Chapter 6 presents the implementation of the developed MASCOT model in the ZEUS 
agent developing toolkit. The implementation includes two major stages: the 
implementation design stage and implementation stage. At the first stage, role modelling 
is analysed; roles for each agent are defined; and ontology is defined. At the second 
stage, the MASCOT negotiation protocol and strategies are developed through rulebase, 
primitive task and external Java program. 
Chapter 7 illustrates the execution process of the MASCOT model in a real application 
scenario involving a claim for loss of productivity. A number of the key points of system 
operation are described including: the utility functions, the negotiation preparation, the 
negotiation process, and the comparisons between the MASCOT negotiation mechanism 
with other negotiation mechanisms. 
Chapter 8 describes the system evaluation, and reports on the prototype assessment 
process and results. Firstly, the MASCOT system is evaluated according to several 
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important criteria, which are specifically defined for evaluating multi-agent system 
negotiation mechanism. Secondly, the developed prototype is presented, and evaluated by 
a group of industry experts through the use of a questionnaire. 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of the thesis, draws conclusions from the research, and 
makes recommendations for future research. 
15 
RESEARCH BACKBROUND 
(Chapter 1) 
Introduction, problems, rationale, 
aim & objectives, scope 
a 
MODEL EVOLUTION 
(Chapter 5) 
- ------------------------------------- 
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS Nature and characteristics of 
NEGOTIATION construction claims 
(Chapter 2) negotiation 
Background, process, problems, 
possible solution, conceptual 
model Selection of negotiation 
theoretic model 
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
(Chapter 3) 
Basic principles of multi-agent Development of negotiation 
systems protocol & strategies 
NEGOTIATION 
THEORIES Model testing with examples 
(Chapter 4) 
Nature, characteristics, working 
domains, conditions, and 
theoretical models 
SYSTEM OPERATION MODEL 
(Chapter 7) IMPLEMENTATION 
(Chapter 6) 
JD. - 
SYSTEM EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS & 
(Chapter 8) RECOMMENDATIONS 
(Chapter 9) 
Figure 1.1 Thesis structure 
16 
CHAPTER 2 
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS MANAGEMENT AND 
NEGOTIATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, the construction industry has experienced an increase in 
claims, liability exposures and disputes, along with an increasing difficulty in 
reaching reasonable settlements in an effective, economical and timely manner (Barrie 
and Paulson, 1992). The dynamic, complex and fragmented nature of the industry 
inevitably leads to a situation where conflicts are bound to arise, and claims are 
inevitable. As a result, claims are considered as a way of life for the construction 
industry (Bradley and Langford, 1987; Sykes, 1999), as shown by the following: 
9 World Bank (1990) figures show that for 1627 projects completed between 1974 
and 1988 the cost overrun varied between 50% and 80%; 
" Onyango (1993) found that 52% of all UK construction projects ended up with a 
claim of some type; 
" Semple et al. (1994) identified that more than half of claims constituted an 
additional cost of at least 30% of the original contract value based on their survey 
of construction projects in Canada. In addition, about a third of claims amounted 
to at least 60% of the original contract value. In a few cases, the claim values were 
almost as high as the original contract value; 
" HMSO (1995) reports that the average time overrun for UK government 
construction projects for the period 1993-1994 was 23.2%; and 
" Chung (1998) reports that there are 20,923 claims being received for the 152 
Hong Kong airport contracts. Of these, 6,047 claims have been resolved at a cost 
of HK $2.87 billion, compared with the claimed value HK $10.8 billion up to the 
end of December, 1997. 
17 
Although detailed statistical data is difficult to find in the area due to the obvious 
reluctance of claimants and respondents to publicise such, many researchers (Adrian, 
1988; Bramble and Callahan, 1992; Powell-Smith and Stephenson, 1993; Jergeas and 
Hartman, 1994; Hu, 1997; Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1998) have identified the fact that 
both the number and amount of claims in the industry have increased steadily over the 
past decade. Meanwhile, disputes arise when a claim or assertion made by one party is 
rejected by the other party, and that rejection is not accepted. 
" Bramble and Callahan (1988) reported that one third of the clients of major new 
construction projects are involved in arbitration or litigation of construction 
claims; 
" The construction industry dispute avoidance and resolution task force (DART, 
1995) estimates that more than $60 billion dollars is spent annually on change 
orders in the United States, which is a major cause of construction claims and 
disputes. More indirect costs arise from this epidemic (Ibbs, 1997); and 
" Hartman (1995) also reported the high costs of litigation caused by construction 
claims in the United States, which had reportedly reached as high as 20% of the 
cost of building in the 1980s. 
The reasons for the increasing construction claims and disputes are very complex; 
they can be analysed from social, industrial and project aspects (Ren et al., 2001a). 
" Social factors: the construction industry, as a whole, is under increasing pressure 
from society, which requires the industry to be more competitive in terms of cost, 
time, quality and environmental issues. For example, the pre-tax profit for the 
constructors of heavy utility has dropped from 7-10% to 2-4% in the last two 
decades since the early 1970s (Zack, 1993). The industry is becoming more risky 
than ever. 
" Industrial factors: the wide range of participants often with competitive and 
adversarial attitudes, separation of design from construction, lack of integration, 
the increasing size of projects, enhanced competitive tendering, lack of effective 
communication, increasing technological complexity, uncertainty in construction 
environments, unbalanced risk allocation, and complex and confused 
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interdependent relationships brought about by some project procurement systems, 
also contribute to construction claims and disputes. 
" Project factors: unforeseeable site conditions, unrealistic planning & 
specification, incomplete or ambiguous project contract document, changes by the 
client, acceleration, different understanding and interoperation of project 
drawings, specification and contract, unfulfilled duties by project participants, 
poor documentation system, a deficiency in contracting staff and `force majeure' 
are the direct causes for claims. 
These complex issues contribute to the arising of various kinds of claims in 
construction project which leads to many projects ending up in major disputes. As a 
result, claims management has been developed for claims avoidance and claims 
settlement. The following sections first undertake a systematic analysis of the 
developments of claims management, and highlights the problems in current claims 
management procedures. Then, it investigates the basic principles and status of the 
claims negotiation domain. Finally it makes suggestions for the improvement of 
claims negotiation. 
2.2 DEFINITION 
Two essential terms: claims and claims management are defined here. 
2.2.1 Claims 
The very word "claim", in the context of construction, is not easy to define with 
precision in absolute terms. 
" Arditi and Patel (1989) defines construction claim as "a request by a contractor 
for final compensation for additional work over and above the original agreed 
upon contract sum, or damages supposedly resulting from events not 
included/envisaged in the initial contract. " 
" Powell-Smith and Stephenson (1993) and Jergeas and Hartman (1994) define 
construction claim, in a similar way, as "any application by the contractor for 
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additional payment or time, or both, that arise other than under the ordinary 
contract provisions. " 
" Hughes and Barber (1992) define construction claim in a more specific way as "a 
request, demand or application for payment or notification of presumed 
entitlement to which a contractor, rightly or wrongly at that stage, considers 
himself entitled and in respect of which agreement has not yet been reached". 
These definitions capture the common nature of various construction claims. 
Expressed in general terms, a claim is a request for something "extra" for which no 
provision had been included in the original agreement. There are five general types of 
claims that a contractor can make against a client: 
9 Claims under the contract: arising because some provisions in the contract entitle 
the contractor to get payment for `loss' or `expense' and are made under the 
mechanism provided by the contract itself; 
" Claims for breach of contract: arising out of the damages for breach of contract 
under Common Law; 
" Claims for the breach of Common Law in tort: arising out of the damages caused 
by breaching the civil duty, mainly referred to as negligence; 
" Quasi-contractual claims: claim for the value of services rendered or work 
performed where there is no contractual entitlement to payment; 
" Ex gratia claims: arising out of the kindness of the client, sometimes referred to 
as a sympathetic claim (Powell-Smith and Stephenson, 1993). 
Of these, the greatest number of contractors' claims fall under the first kind of claim 
mainly caused by the client's change orders, design error and different site conditions 
(Diekmann and Nelson, 1985; Bradley and Langford, 1987; Bordoli and Baldwin, 
1998). These claims may be subdivided into categories which individually or 
collectively combined form the subject matter of most contractor's claims (Hughes 
and Barber, 1992): 
" Claims concerning the existence or applicability of the contract, 
" Claims concerning critical time delay, 
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" Claims concerning disruption of the work, 
" Claims concerning payment, 
" Claims concerning contract documentation, 
" Claims concerning default, determination, forfeiture etc. 
There are three general reasons for the institution of claims: default by the client and 
his representative, unforeseeable circumstance and contractor's underestimate. In 
practice, claims are often caused by the problems from the first two areas. For 
example, 
" In the US, Diekmann and Nelson (1985) find that the most common causes of a 
contract claim are design changes and errors. A comprehensive analysis indicates 
that 46% resulted from design errors. An additional 26% are due to either 
discretionary or mandatory changes. The more volatile issues such as delay, 
different site conditions and maladministrations account for only 28% of the 
claims. 
" In the UK, Bradley and Langford (1987) have identified the major reason as 
variations, complexity of project, poor contractual relations, deficiency of 
contracting staff, general recession, weather, and misfortune. This is consistent 
with the findings of Heath et al. (1994); 
" In Canada, Bristow and Vasilopoulous (1995) address the primary causes of 
claims as unrealistic expectations, ambiguous contract documents, and poor 
communications. Semple et al. (1995) identify acceleration, restricted access, 
weather, and increase in scope as the major reason of claims. Bartsch and Jergeas 
(1997) think misunderstand the contract and client's misguided desire to reduce 
costs are the major causes of claims. 
2.2.2 Claims Management 
Construction claims are inevitable in any major construction project (Wilson, 1982). 
Yet, the undesirable consequences of claims can be minimised on projects if proper 
claims management steps are taken throughout the entire construction process. 
Claims management, as defined by Keane (1994), is "the process of employing and 
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co-ordinating resources to progress a claim from identification and analysis through 
preparation, and presentation, to negotiation and settlement. " 
The principle of claims management is to ensure that the client pays a fair price for 
interfering with the contract in the execution of the work, and the contractor gets a fair 
pay for the extra work he has done (Bramble and Callahan, 1992). The essence of 
good claims management should always ensure that the claimant's fullest entitlements 
are identified on a regular basis, and with adequate details to ensure that appropriate 
sums are paid through the interim payment mechanism (Brewer, 1993). Meanwhile, a 
contractor's attempt to make profits from claims should be discouraged. 
To achieve such objectives, an adequate management setup should be built up, which 
can prepare, evaluate, and settle claims effectively. The key points of the management 
setup are (Scott, 1992): 
" The contractual basis for claims; 
" Claim documentation and quantification; 
" Presentation of claims; 
" Negotiations and settlements. 
Claims management is important for three main reasons: 
" Firstly, it complements the contract to ensure a fair benefit share between parties 
to the contract. Almost every construction project contains uncertainties more or 
less, which may cause a change in the work. Claims management is the major 
approach to ensuring that the contractor gets compensation for the extra work he 
has done. 
" Secondly, it facilitates collaboration between project participants and keeps a 
harmonious relationship between project participants, thus, it prevents 
construction productivity dropping or construction work being halted due to 
unsettled claims. 
" Thirdly, it helps to prevent disputes. Any unresolved claim, through the claims 
management process, will become a dispute, often a potentially expensive one, 
and one of uncertain outcome. Most disputes in construction projects are the 
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consequence of claims which have been rejected by the client following 
assessment and appraisal by the engineer. The consequence of this may well lead 
to a hardening of attitudes and to increasing acrimony which may end in 
arbitration or litigation. The unresolved disputes, through negotiation or other 
alternative dispute resolution methods, will finally lead to arbitration or litigation. 
In such a situation, either party may either give up his original position, or spend 
vast amounts of time and money on a legal tussle. 
The effective management of claims is critical for the success of a project. Thus, 
research projects on claim management are of considerable interest to both academics 
and industry participants. To get a whole view of the field, it is necessary to 
investigate the former researches systematically. 
2.3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
To seek answers to the problem, numerous research projects, courses and publications 
on various aspects of claims (e. g. Diekmann and Nelson, 1985; Scott, 1992; Levin, 
1998; Chung et al, 2000) have been undertaken to investigate industrial practices and 
to explore the basic principles and procedures of claim settlements and dispute 
avoidance. Basically, these efforts are of two kinds: those that seek answers from 
principles and contractual legal issues at the pre-construction phase and those that 
attempt to solve the problems through claims management procedures at the 
construction phase (Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1997; Diekmann and Girard, 1995). 
2.3.1 Basis of Claims Management: Starting Right 
Regardless of the background circumstances, construction claims can only arise in the 
context of an existing contract. It is only the contract documents which can become 
the framework within which claims will be made. Thus, many efforts have been made 
on the development of contractual legal principles and other management theories at 
the pre-construction phase, which mainly include standard construction contract forms 
and conditions, risk management, and project procurement systems. The studies of 
these principles and theories are essential for avoiding construction claims and 
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disputes in the first place, and ensuring that claims management starts right if 
claims cannot be avoided. To fully understand claims management, it is necessary to 
explore the development of these theories and principles: 
1) The Standard Contract Forms and Conditions 
The paper, entitled `The Condition of Engineering Contracts', which Rimmer 
published in 1939, led to the publication of the first edition of the ICE Conditions of 
Contract in 1945 (Cottam and Hawker, 1992). The main forms and conditions of the 
contract set up provisions for increasing the time period, and payment of loss and 
expense sums caused by unexpected events, both of which have to be claimed by the 
contractor. Similarly, the other popular standard forms of contracts such as JCT, 
FIDIC, CCDC and AIA1 have also been published with the aim of setting up the legal 
basis and principal claim provisions for claims management. 
Since the end of the 1970's, an obvious change in the construction industry has been 
increasing project size, technical complexity and high risks, which have led to a large 
number of change orders. Moreover, the increasing time value of money, makes time 
extension claims more critical than ever. The old standard forms of contract have not 
changed in line with the development of the industry. According to Zack (1997), 84% 
of the respondents to a survey indicated that specifications of projects often required 
modification; 65% said that documents frequently required modification; and 55% 
stated that contract documents often needed significant changes. Many claims and 
disputes were caused by the ambiguous, incomplete and inadequate understanding of 
the terms of contract forms and conditions. As a result, improving the legal 
framework for claims has been a major focus of the industry for years. The overall 
objective is to (Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1998): 
" get the contractual language right first time in new contracts; 
" increase awareness of the likely construction terms by the courts and arbitrators; 
" encourage the amendment of the standard terms of contract; and 
ICE: The Institution of Civil Engineering 
JCT: Standard Form of Building Contract 
FIDIC: Feddration Internationale des Ingdnieurs-Conseils 
AIA: American Institute of Architecture 
CCDC: Canadian Construction Document Committee 
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" expose popular misunderstanding. 
The current standard contract forms and general conditions have been modified or 
rewritten several times based on the industry's experience and academic research; for 
example, the current FIDIC is the fifth edition and ICE is the sixth edition. Compared 
with the earlier editions, major improvements in the new contracts have mainly been 
on: 
" legal issues in contractual relationships; 
" the obligations of participants; 
" project scheduling requirements; 
" claim procedure; 
" risk clauses; and 
" dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The major clauses of common standard forms of contract include (Wilson, 1982; 
Cyriax, 1982; Trickey, 1990; Powell-Smith and Stephenson, 1993; Jergeas and 
Hartman, 1994): 
" Project scheduling requirements; 
" Shop drawing submissions; 
" Payment terms; 
" Rates for time and material work; 
" Variation in quantities; 
" Authority and obligations of parties; 
" Differing site conditions; 
" Notification of delay; 
" Notification of extra work; 
" Time limit to correct default; 
" Disclaimer; 
" Contractor's status report; and 
" Arbitration. 
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2) Risk Management 
Many researchers (Levitt et al., 1980; Murdoch and Hughes, 1996; Cox, 1997; 
Hartman et al., 1998; Kumaraswamy, 1998; Sykes, 1999) have also identified risk 
allocation in standard contract forms and project contracts as an important factor in 
the occurrence of claims and disputes on projects. In construction projects, both 
parties take many risks, resulting in human error and the unexpected, such as design 
error, different geology condition, and acts of God. Any risk can result in the need for 
a change to the original contract and the contract must make provision for such 
changes to be made. If it does not do so, adequately and fairly, the changes will result 
in claims. Construction contracts are supposed to assign such risks to the parties who 
have entered into the contracts. 
Currently, the contractor, under the pressure of competition, generally prefers to 
assume less risk while the client appears willing to push more risks to contractors 
during the tendering process, which is the major source of claims (Zack, 1997). 
Hartman et al. (1998) point out that the management of changes and claims is the 
management of risks. Project participants, especially, the client team should have a 
fair attitude to risk allocation in selecting the contractor and contract forms, 
estimating, scheduling and making detailed contract provisions. Equity in risk 
allocation in construction contracts and procurement systems will reduce the root 
causes of claims, thereby avoiding construction claims and disputes. 
3) Project Delivery Systems 
To avoid construction claims and to facilitate claims management, new project 
procurement systems, such as partnering, design-build, management contracting and 
construction management (CM), have been adopted in the construction industry since 
early 1990s with aims to build collaborative working relationships between project 
participants. Such approaches were also emphasised in the Egan report (1998) where 
an integrated project process is suggested. 
Generally, it is believed that the design-build procurement system can reduce claims 
and facilitate claims management since it reduces conflicts and engenders closer 
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collaboration between designer and contractor. Similarly, the adoption of partnering 
or partnership also reduces the possibility of claims and disputes because risks are 
shared between project participants. On the other hand, the benefits of CM are often 
doubtful. For example, although theoretically the CM system is believed to be able to 
facilitate claims management, industry practice shows that in most cases construction 
managers are not willing to make decisions regarding claims so as to protect 
themselves against all possible litigation. The claims management process becomes 
more confused and complex under the CM system (Barrie and Paulson, 1992). Brewer 
(1983) notes that "the imported `management' styles of contracting have done little to 
place in the hands of these firms the means to price and control their risks". Keane 
(1994) even states that the evolution of new project delivery systems, including the 
construction management process has done little to reduce the number and amount of 
claims. In fact, the existence of a construction manager has, on occasion, complicated 
the liability and damage issues that accompany a claim. 
2.3.2 Claims Management Process: Staying Right 
In spite of the extensive literature highlighting the above problems, there is little 
evidence of significant improvements in claims management. The continuous 
escalation in claims and disputes prove that the solutions offered by the research at 
initial stages of construction (i. e. standard contracts, risk management and project 
delivery systems) are inadequate in spite of its importance. There is, therefore, a need 
to look for approaches other than the above pre-construction theories and principles. 
The management setup for dealing with claims should also be studied. 
Vidogah and Ndekugri (1997) point out that claims management and `people' issues 
may be, at least, as important as having a clear understanding of contractual terms and 
equitable risk allocation, therefore, there is a need for complementary research into 
the claims management process. Diekmann and Girard (1995) also report, after 
studies of completed projects in the USA, that people and management issues may be 
more influential on the incidence of disputes than risk allocation and project 
characteristics. 
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However, most of the available literature on claims management, by way of defining 
remedial measures, do not go beyond general exhortations to the contractor to clearly 
identify the causes of claims and maintain adequate information to support claims 
(Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1998). Very few research projects are reported, which aim at 
auditing the whole claims management process in terms of precise deficiencies, their 
severity, and specific remedial measures. 
The current framework for construction claims management is based on the industry 
practice of the past few decades. Figure 2.1 shows a typical claims management 
lifecycle based on the requirements of FIDIC (4th Edition). Levin (1998) summarises 
the management process as comprising: 
" recognition and identification of changes or the causes of claims; 
" notification to the Engineer and the Owner; 
" systematic and accurate documentation; 
" analysis of time and cost impacts; 
" pricing; 
" negotiation; and 
" dispute resolution and settlement. 
The current industry practice shows that the main challenge of effective claims 
management is not caused by the management process, but by the ineffectiveness of 
management activity at each step. The key aspects include how to justify a proposed 
claim, how to quantify and present the claim with full and detailed particulars, and 
how to negotiate the claim with the client and his agent successfully (Levin, 1998). 
These are discussed further below: 
1) Claims Justification 
Two factors are crucial to justify a claim. The first is the identification of the cause(s) 
of the claim; the second is the completed documents to support the claim. 
Identification of a claim situation is the first and the most important phase of the 
entire claim process. 
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Construction Contracts (Basis of Claims) 
(Condition of contracts, special provisions, BOQ, drawings, specifications, overheads, 
rate of labour, material and equipment, etc. ) 
ýýýý*ýýýýý5 
.. . ý., 
Events which cause claims 
1) additional work not specified in the contract documents; 2) work different from that specified 
3) work in a particular manner different from that originally anticipated; 4) work resulting from 
changed, amended, or clarified contract drawings or specification; ... ... 
21) strikes; 22) 
force of nature:..... . 
With a copy to the Client 
Contractor 
Continue the 
work, 
documenting all 
the events 
Analyze and 
quantify delays 
and extra costs 
Engineer/ 
Architect Notify the 
possible claim 
Reject, and explain reasons 
Request detailed evidence 
and calculations Agree 
Examine the 
I evidence and Submit the requested costs 
evidence and costing L 
Disagree, explain the reasons 
Inform 
Re-quantify the 
claim and re- 
submit 
Accept inform 
client for paymei 
--------------- - 
I 
-a 
Dispute Join negotiation if necessary 
or litigation 
Negotiation ý-- --- 
Client 
Reach agreement and inform the client for the payment 
Figure 2.1 Claims management procedure 
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Many claim situations arise out of subtle differences in field conditions, from job site 
delays or as a result of differences in contract interpretation. More often than not, 
disputes relate to nothing more significant than the argument about the liability of 
claims and interpretation of contract clauses (Sykes, 1999). Moreover, lack of solid 
supporting documents makes the justification more difficult. The following list shows 
the possible causes of claims identified and emphasised by many researchers 
(Diekmann and Nelson, 1985; Semple et. al, 1994; Cox, 1997; Levin, 1998): 
" additional work not specified in the contract documents; 
9 work different from that specified; 
" work in a particular manner or method that is carried out differently from that 
originally anticipated; 
" work resulting from contract drawings or specifications that have been changed, 
amended, revised, amplified, or clarified; 
" unanticipated work resulting from insufficient details in the plans and 
specifications; 
" work required to be performed in one particular method when specifications allow 
two or more methods; 
" work out of sequence; 
" terminated, disrupted, or interrupted work, wholly or partially, directly or 
indirectly; 
" joint occupancy; 
9 owner furnishing equipment late, in poor condition, or not suitable for the 
intended use; 
9 accelerated performance in any way, to regain schedule, to add men or materials, 
or to work overtime or extra shifts; 
" following a new, different, or shorter schedule; 
" relocating existing work because of lack of co-ordination or information; 
" different site conditions; 
" differences in contract interpretation; 
" defective specifications; 
" delays from the owner's acts or failure to act; 
" unwarranted work rejection; 
" increased inspection requirements, tests or quality control program; 
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" owner's failure to disclose information; 
" strikes; and 
" forces of nature. 
Obviously, there are many events other than those listed above that may cause added 
performance costs or time. The key is to establish a methodology and database for 
systematic identification and tracking of all potential changes and claims from 
inception to resolution. Meanwhile, project personnel, especially site management 
personnel should be familiar with these clauses, contract documents and legal 
concepts so that when unanticipated events occur for which the contractor may not be 
responsible, the personnel will recognise and inform the engineer of the existence of 
the events as well as the causes of the events. Also, it is to the client's best advantage 
to recognise those causes of valid construction claims, and then do whatever possible 
to avoid the cause of the problem. Early identification of issues is important to permit 
timely resolution and to prevent small issues from growing into major project 
problems. 
Documentation is extremely important for the justification of claims as well as the 
whole claims management process although it is time-consuming, and is rarely as 
rewarding as designing the project or supervising the construction (Wilson, 1982). 
Proper records are crucial for justifying the identified claims, analysing the project 
scope change and addressing the cost of the identified claim. This, in turn, will allow 
all parties to negotiate a fair settlement to the claim and dispute. Badger and Gay 
(1996) show that documentation is the first of the top ten lessons learned in 
construction contracting. Table 2.1 lists some of the regularly used documents to 
support claims. 
2) Claims Quantification 
The challenge of quantification in current claims management is not only to value the 
direct costs and delays caused by unanticipated events, but also to price the 
cumulative effects of these events. Ideally, the quantification of direct costs is 
relatively straightforward. With the agreed rates of labour, material and equipment, 
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quantity of impacts and general formulas, the costs of compensation and time 
extensions can be worked out through detailed breakdown analyses. However, 
arguments often arise regarding the rates of claim items and the quantity of the 
impacts of unanticipated events. For example, which rate should be used if several are 
listed in the contract documents, or how long the contractor should be entitled if both 
parties are responsible for a delay? In such cases, the value proposed by the contractor 
and the engineer can be dramatically different. 
Table 2.1 Likely use of documents in claim presentation (Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1997) 
Document Rank order 
Correspondence 1 
Conditions of contracts 2 
Schedules 3 
Claim documentation 4 
Site diaries 5 
Timesheets 6 
Photo 7 
Specification 8 
Minutes of site meeting 9 
Records of delay and disturbance 10 
Day work records 11 
Revised drawing 12 
BOQ 13 
Analysis of tender 14 
Level records 15 
The most difficult task in claims quantification is to evaluate the cumulative effects 
of the events which contractors think they also deserve, such as loss of productivity, 
disruption and indirect costs. These items, by nature, are ambiguous and sensitive. 
Some of them are impossible to quantify with precision even with the best 
information available. Therefore, it is very difficult to reach a satisfactory solution 
between project participants. Part A of Table 2.2 shows that the number of claims for 
indirect costs is higher than for direct costs, whilst Part B indicates that claims for 
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such items are more likely to be disputed (i. e. the quantification of such items is 
highly disputed). The final amounts are often the result of negotiations between the 
contractor and the engineer. 
Table 2.2 Number of claims for direct and indirect costs 
PART A PART B 
Number of claims Rank Heads of claim likely to be 
disputed 
Rank 
Site overhead 1 Cost of preparing claims 1 
Loss of productivity 2 Loss of profit 2 
Loss of revenue 3 Cost of disruption 3 
Financing costs 4 Head-office overheads 4 
Equipment costs 5 Interest and finance charges 5 
Premium time 6 Others 6 
Semple et al., (1994) Vidogah and Ndekugri, (1997) 
3) Claims Negotiation 
Negotiations go on throughout the entire claims management process from the 
justification to the settlement of a claim either formally or informally. Although 
standard contracts like ICE do not suppose that claims will be settled by negotiation, 
in practice, many claims, especially those with greater uncertainty, such as material 
pricing, cost of disruption, and indirect costs are settled through negotiation between 
the contractor and the engineer (Powell-smith and Stephenson, 1993). 
Resolution by negotiation retains the highest level of control because it is the parties 
themselves who determine the terms of the agreement. They decide how the matter 
will be resolved, not some third party. This is the most common and most cost- 
effective method to reach an agreement. Moving from negotiation to mediation to 
arbitration or litigation results in a reduction of control along with an increase in costs 
at each step. Field et al. (1993) summarise the importance of claims negotiation as 
follows: 
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" While change order negotiation is sometimes approached in a haphazard manner, 
an organised negotiation process and consciously selected strategies can minimise 
costs to the owner. From case to case, claims like back charges and change orders 
have a trend of growing larger as time goes by. The early settlement has the 
benefit of eliminating the claim creep. 
" In addition to minimising costs, a successful negotiation program can also provide 
a non-adversarial project environment in which disputes are resolved quickly, 
fairly, and to the satisfaction of all parties, so construction can continue 
unimpacted by the issues that invariably arise. 
" Successful negotiation is also the first line of defence in avoiding more costly and 
time consuming dispute resolution procedures, such as arbitration and litigation. 
Vidogah and Ndekugri (1997) emphasise that negotiation is of paramount 
importance in preventing disputes. In fact, even other alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods all involve some form of negotiation. The intent of 
most ADR is to resolve disputes in forums that allow for negotiation between 
parties most qualified to resolve the technical portions of the dispute. 
Basically, there are two major kinds of claim negotiations: qualitative negotiation and 
quantitative negotiations2. 
" Qualitative negotiations are about the entitlement of the contractor to a claim 
which is mainly regarding the justification of claims based on the identified 
causes, liabilities and contract conditions. Such negotiations are essential and 
highly evidence-oriented with limited room to bargain. 
" Quantitative negotiations are about the amount of compensation for the entitled 
claims, which commonly deal with the amount or the quantity of claim items, 
rates of material or labour, and indirect costs. Quantitative negotiations go into 
much detail and are time-consuming since there is much more room to bargain, 
and both parties try to maximise their benefits through this negotiation process. 
Thus, the current studies on claims negotiation are mainly interested in 
quantitative negotiations. 
2A third kind negotiation involves the items claimed on an "ex-gratia" basis. Such negotiations will be introduced for discussion at the final settlement. 
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Spittler and Jentzen (1992) suggest that claims and disputes are best resolved by 
participants who can gather, exchange, and discuss all relevant information 
objectively, make persuasive arguments that influence other participants to change 
positions, and have the budget latitude to make binding agreements. This ideally 
should occur at the organisational level as close to the claims and dispute as 
circumstances will allow. In practice, negotiations are normally started at a lower 
level between the contractor and the engineer's quantity surveyors. The project 
manager and the engineer will step into the negotiation if problems cannot be solved 
between the quantity surveyors. If agreement still cannot be reached, the contractor 
may contact the client in the hope that the client joins the negotiation directly and 
solves the problems. 
The difficulty of claims negotiation lies in the fact that negotiations are not only 
determined by the work conducted at previous stages of claims management: 
identification of claims causes, interpretation of the clauses of the contract or 
conditions, documentation, and quantification, but also decided by each party's 
expectation, interest and positions. Furthermore, the expertise and domain knowledge 
of the negotiators' personnel also influence the outcome of negotiation. 
According the result of industry survey undertaken in this study, the following general 
guidelines to claims negotiation are emphasised by project managers, which also have 
been discussed in some other researchers' work, such as Smith (1992) and Levin 
(1998): 
" Get enough evidence to support negotiation: negotiation provides a good chance 
for both parties to examine the evidence provided by each party. Sound evidence, 
in turn, will play a unique and crucial role in supporting the argument. 
" Define areas of negotiation: both parties should recognise the issues where there 
is the possibility of an agreement. This sets a tone for the negotiation- the purpose 
is to get a resolution. It also has the benefit of limiting the issues that can be 
brought up as negotiation progresses. 
" Have a plan: both parties should focus on achieving a reasonable financial goal 
and preserving the relationship with the opponent. They should have a settlement 
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range in mind, but be prepared to react to what actually happens in the 
negotiation. 
" Listen to the other side and be ready to make some concessions: although both 
parties' different perceptions on the negotiation items may be supported by their 
own evidence, they should be prepared to compromise. They should also be 
prepared to back off positions that are taken only for the purpose of gaining 
leverage. Furthermore, an appropriate negotiation style is important for both 
parties in negotiation. 
" Have a proper negotiation team: an experienced and reasonable negotiation team 
with clear authority is always important for successful claims negotiations. 
A detailed analysis of these aspects of the claims negotiation will be conducted in the 
next section. 
2.3.3 Computer Supported Claims Management 
The speed of the development of information technology over the last two decades 
has brought about major changes to the construction industry. The applications of 
information technology also provide opportunities for the improvement of 
construction management principles. The developed management principles and 
information technologies strongly support the claims management process. 
2.3.3.1 Management Principles 
The improvement of planning and scheduling technologies in project management, 
especially the application of Critical Path Method (CPM) strongly supports delay 
claims by sorting out the overall impact of unanticipated events on the schedule. 
Delays resulting from unanticipated events can be addressed clearly by analysing their 
effects on the critical path while the effects on non-critical paths are excluded. 
In this approach, an "as-planned" CPM schedule is first built based upon the approved 
project schedule; then a network model known as the "impact schedule" is built to 
superimpose various schedule impacts upon the as-planned schedule including 
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excusable, compensable, non-compensable and concurrent items. Finally, delays in 
the critical path can be identified and the revised overall completion date for the 
project can be calculated. Input to the schedule will involve identifying and 
quantifying the individual delays and determining the responsibility and entitlement 
of the parties. ' This schedule adjusts the As-Planned schedule to reflect the overall 
effect of the impacts and delays (Barrie and Paulson, 1992). 
With the development of information technology and the knowledge transformation 
from other industries, many new management concepts and principles, such as 
concurrent engineering and the application of neural network to support decision- 
making are being adopted in construction management. These applications are helpful 
for claims avoidance and claims management, directly or indirectly. 
2.3.3.2 Engineering Software 
The wide application of information technology in engineering design and project 
management provide more opportunities for the improvement of claims management. 
" The development of various technology software in architecture, structure, 
geology, and building service largely improves the quality of design. Meanwhile, 
the applications of AutoCAD change design from paper to electronic drawing. All 
of these help to reduce design mistake; 
" The application of MS. Word Processing, Excel Spreadsheet and Database 
systems transfer all the old paper documents into electronic documents. This 
strongly supports record-keeping at both site and head office, which help to justify 
and present claims. Keane (1994) has developed a computer-aided systematic 
approach using these essential tools to facilitate time extension claims; 
" MS. Project, Primavera and other management software developed based on 
CPM, are used to plan, monitor and control project progress. Moreover, they are 
also adopted to predict, simulate and quantify the delays and costs of 
unanticipated events; 
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" The Intranet and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) had major impact in 
facilitating communication between project participants in a timely and efficient 
way. They also facilitated record-keeping; 
" Expert systems and decision supporting systems, such as SuperChanges and 
SuperDelay (Diekmann and Kim, 1992a) aim to work as advisors to advise field 
engineers and project managers about the legal consequences of certain contract 
conflict situations. Site engineers have to make many quick decisions, some of 
which are legal, mainly based on their experience. An imperfect decision can lead 
to costly claims and disputes. Without adequate knowledge of contract laws, field 
engineers might be unaware of the accepted legal basis or consequence of their 
decisions. A well-designed expert system can help site engineers improve the 
efficiency and accuracy of decision making. Moreover, a sophisticated expert 
system can also be a good help to project managers in the claims management 
process. Further examples of computer-aided claims negotiation can be found in 
Levitt (1987), Adams (1988), Bubbers and Christian (1992), Diekmann and 
Gjertsen (1992b), and Alkass et al. (1995). 
2.4 PROBLEM 
Despite the extensive studies on claims management theories and practices, the 
increasing incidence of claims and disputes imply that the current claims management 
principles and process are ineffective in meeting industry requirements (Diekmann 
and Nelson, 1985; Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1997,1998). Due to the volatile nature of 
construction projects, it is also unrealistic to expect that claims can be avoided or 
resolved by a single principle or method. The improvement of construction claims 
management will be a long strategic task for the industry. The major deficiencies of 
current claims management practice are in the following areas: 
2.4.1 The Awareness and Interpretation of Contract Terms and Provisions 
Vidogah and Ndekugri (1998) identify inadequate understanding of the terms of 
standard forms as one of the two reasons leading to the non-entitlement of 
contractors' claims which in turn is the top reason for the failure of claims. Keane 
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(1994) also explains that differences in awareness and interpretation of contract terms 
is still a major contributor to problems in claims management. Contractors, engineers 
and clients regularly fail to agree on the basis of a claim and how it should be settled. 
The reasons are: 
" The understanding of the terms of the contract is still inadequate in spite of the 
large volume of information dedicated to interpreting them. Understanding is 
usually based on experience and common sense. Sometimes, what is meant to be 
said may be the determining factor instead of what is actually written in the 
contract. These interpretations may lead to disagreements, disputes, and 
occasionally, litigation (Thomas et al., 1994); 
" Contracting parties frequently interpret contract terms from their own 
perspectives, in an ad hoc manner and for their own benefit. The same contract 
clauses are regularly interpreted differently; and 
" Contracts themselves contain ambiguous or unfair provisions. Contract terms 
alone are insufficient to clearly apportion risks or responsibilities between 
contracting parties. This holds true not only for what is stated explicitly in the 
contract documents, but also for what is implied. 
2.4.2 Inadequate Information and Documentation 
Many researchers have identified inadequate information and poor documentation to 
support claims as major problems in current claims management practice. The earlier 
Wood report (1975) made this very point when it emphasised the lack of factual 
evidence as a prime cause of delayed payment and protracted disputes. Scott (1992) 
points out that perhaps the biggest failing on the part of contractors when dealing with 
claims is the lack of sufficient recorded data on the effects of delaying and disrupting 
events. Wilson (1982) and Badger and Gay (1996) all stress the lack of initial records, 
such as minutes of meetings, correspondence, progress reports, status logs, 
photographs, records of delay and disturbance, and revised drawings, as the major 
reason for the failure of claims. Many contractors' management information systems 
are ill-designed to support claims. Records are kept either in an inaccessible way, 
particularly after project completion, or may be incomplete or designed for other 
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purposes even if available. Vidogah and Ndekugri (1997,1998) conclude that the 
reasons for these problems are: 
"a culture of bias against paperwork on site operations; 
" poor design of recording systems; 
" the paper-based nature of most of the relevant information; and 
" poor resourcing of the claims management role in contracting organisations. 
2.4.3 Lack of Effective Claims Management Tools 
Compared with the number of research projects on the legal bases and principles of 
claims, the efforts seeking to develop effective tools to support claims management 
activities are few. As a result, claims management activities rely on general project 
management techniques. Very few project management tools, especially 
systematically designed, are appropriate for claims management. For example, 
inadequate record keeping has been recognised for a long time as a major problem 
area in claims management. There is virtually no chance of improvement without the 
application of information technology. On the other hand, industry practice shows that 
claim documentation is still perceived to be woefully inadequate in many cases even 
with the support of IT. The increasing power and affordability of information 
technologies do not naturally lead to an improvement of the claims management 
process. There is a lack of systematic analysis on how best to apply these 
technologies; that is more crucial for claims management. 
2.4.4 Inefficient Claims Negotiation 
Although the cases are quite often diverse and project-specific, claims negotiations 
are normally hard and time-consuming. Most project managers consider claims 
negotiation as the most time and energy-consuming activity in claims management 
(Hu, 1997). The reasons for this include the diversity of intellectual background, the 
many variables involved, complex interactions, and inefficiencies in the negotiation 
process (Zack, 1994). For example, 
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" the consequences of negotiations are directly related to financial gain or loss. The 
engineer and the client typically respond in a tough and unyielding manner in 
claims negotiation due to the negative perception of claims; 
" negotiations are influenced by many internal and external factors (see Section 
2.5); 
" the negotiation items, such as loss of productivity and disruptions, are generally 
ambiguous and sensitive 
" negotiation is more a human-oriented process than a pure technical process. A 
negotiator's personal abilities, attitudes and negotiation strategies, in many cases, 
determine the result of a negotiation. Unfortunately, most construction personnel 
do not have enough negotiation expertise. Emotion, irritation, and relationship 
considerations often strongly influence negotiations. 
Besides the above factors, problems such as inadequate negotiating expertise, 
improper negotiation strategies and complex human factors also contribute to the 
inefficiency of claims negotiation. 
Although all the problems identified above are harmful for claims management, some 
of them like the awareness and interpretation of contracts and documentation have 
generated considerable attention in the industry. In contrast, others such as the claims 
negotiation process are seldom being studied. This research, unlike most previous 
research projects, will focus on the study of claims negotiation, and aims to develop a 
system which can improve its efficiency, and resolve other essential problems in 
claims negotiation. 
2.5 CLAIMS NEGOTIATION 
Despite the importance of claims negotiation in claims management, very few studies 
have been done in this field. Most project participants believe that negotiation is only 
a kind of game where people lose and gain through bargaining. The following 
sections provide a detailed analysis of the essential principles of claims negotiation, 
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and cover the generic model of claims negotiation, existing problems and suggestions 
for improvement. 
2.5.1 Generic Model of Claims Negotiation 
The generic model shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates the major characteristics and 
elements of claims negotiations, which human negotiators have to analyse before 
negotiation, to provide necessary background information. The model represents 
negotiation parties, structures, relationships, and attributes involved in claim 
negotiation. It consists of three major aspects, i. e. negotiation elements, negotiation 
process, and negotiation outcome. 
2.5.1.1 Claims Negotiation Elements 
Claims negotiation contains three major elements, i. e. construction project, claim 
items and negotiation participants. In addition to these, some other background 
information also influence the outcome of negotiations. For example, arbitration or 
court decisions related to construction claims will provide perspectives on the likely 
outcome should negotiation fail and the issues ultimately have to be resolved through 
litigation. Such information is useful for project participants if they prefer to end the 
negotiation with a conflict. 
1) Project elements 
The project data provides a background and environment for claims and external 
constraints for the resolution of negotiations. Two kinds of elements are considered 
essential: 
" social-economic and natural environment in which the project is; 
" project contract and procurement system, such as: the standard conditions of 
contract adopted and the organisational structure of the project; and 
" project information, such as: the nature of the project, design quality, and each 
party's expectation, status and requirements for money, time and quality of the 
project. 
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Negotiation Process 
Negotiation Planning 
Negotiation Process 
Negotiation Outcome 
i 
Claims 
" Causes of claim 
" Nature of claim 
" Claim items (time or money) 
" Stage of claim (entitlement or 
quantity) 
" Evidence 
" Possibility of future claims 
Client 
Interests Expectations Attitudes 
" Quality " Functions " Co-operative 
" Value " Cost " Competitive 
" Progress " Time " Punitive 
" Safety " Quality 
" Environment " Less trouble 
Engineer 
Interests Expectations Attitudes 
" Reputation " Low " Competitive 
" Quality responsibility " Co-operative 
" Relationship " Reputation " Combative 
" Progress " New project " individualistic 
" Safety 
Contractor 
Interests Expectations Attitudes 
" Profit " Cost " Competitive 
" Time " Time " Co-operative 
" Relationship extension " Individualistic 
" Reputation " Long term 
benefit 
Figure 2.2 Generic claims negotiation model (Developed from Pena-Mora and Wang, 1998) 
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Negotiation Elements 
Project 
" Nature of work 
" Contract form 
" Procurement system 
" Design 
" Project status 
(Cost estimate via status 
Schedule via progress) 
" Socio- economic condition 
(loan, labour market, material 
& equipment supplier) 
" Natural environment 
These factors decide the possible nature, frequency and future aspects of claims; 
influence project participants' negotiation interests and attitude; and finally affect the 
outcome of negotiation. For example, 
" if labour cost is high in the local labour market, the contractor may assign a high 
weight to the labour cost claims; 
" if the project adopts different contract conditions or procurement systems, the 
claims procedure may be different; 
" if the project is under high time pressure, more weight may be given to time issues 
by the client; or 
" if a party finds that a certain kind of claim may frequently occur in the future, he 
will put more weight to the claim even though it is minor at the current stage. 
2) Claims elements 
Claim factors reveal the nature, causes, stage and scope of claims. They are the hard 
variables of the negotiation, as they are quantifiable and expressible. Examples could 
be monetary compensation, time extension or loss of productivity caused by the 
variation of the thickness of a concrete wall. Claim items are the content of 
negotiation and are typically represented by the offers and counteroffers made by the 
participants throughout the negotiation. These claim items can be classified into two 
kinds: 
" In practice, a significant portion of the difference between the contractor's 
quotation and the engineer's estimate relates directly to factual issues, such as the 
scope of the change, the quantities involved, labour wage rates, material pricing, 
equipment costs, and contractual requirements such as mark-up percentages, unit 
prices, etc. Since these issues are factual in nature, it is relatively easy for willing 
parties to examine the facts together and reach agreement. 
" After agreement is reached on factual issues, the negotiation should proceed to 
issues with greater uncertainty, such as labour productivity, loss of revenue, and 
indirect costs. These items are often the argued points. Moreover, it also reflects 
both parties' expectations of the claims. For example, the contractor may 
exaggerate his demands on these items while the engineer is not willing to accept 
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any reasonable recognition of risk. In practice, the productivity data from standard 
estimating guides often fails to address the real situation, and may need to be 
adjusted when the underlying assumptions do not fit the change. A compromise is 
often necessary as a result of the uncertainties involved. 
Besides the nature of claims items, the supporting evidence for the claims (such as: 
the contract clauses, site records and reasonable cost estimating and schedule review) 
is another crucial determinant of the outcome of negotiation. 
3) Participant elements 
Participant elements represent different interests, expectations and attitudes of project 
participants in the claims due to their different roles and positions in the project. 
0 Interests: In claims negotiation, each participant carries a set of basic interests 
which are simply the underlying need or preference that a negotiator carries with 
him to the negotiating table. These interests are determined by project and claim 
factors, which can be project, professional, or person-specific. Interests are the 
soft variables of negotiations, and represent the more qualitative aspects of the 
participant's overall descriptions. These may or may not be represented by any 
particular set of visible positions. The interests of the negotiator determine his or 
her expectations and attitudes. 
" Expectations: Closely related to interests, expectations are also soft variables of 
the negotiation. Expectations determine which kind of strategy a negotiator will 
adopt in negotiation. The negotiators' expectation can also be identified by the 
utilities which negotiators assign to different negotiating items. 
" Attitudes: Attitudes represent the willingness of the participant to negotiate or 
willingness to reach an agreement. Although such a variable may have no real 
bearing on the facts of negotiation, (i. e. a time extension or change order value), 
they may have a profound effect on the way in which the negotiation is conducted. 
The attitude of the participant may also reflect which kind of negotiator the 
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individual is. The style of a negotiation can be categorised depending on what 
kind of strategies and tactics are used. 
Besides each party's characteristics, a negotiator's personal factors also influence 
the outcome of the negotiation. 
e Negotiator's personal skill: Negotiations, by nature, are highly human-oriented 
activities. Besides the factors discussed above, a negotiator's personal ability, 
information and expertise influences the outcome of negotiation. Ideally, a 
negotiator should have (Hughes and Barber, 1992): 
a) personal capabilities and clear authority; 
b) knowledge of the industry and the project; 
c) necessary information about the specific claims item; 
d) detailed preparation of the negotiation; 
e) a clear objective and negotiation strategies; and 
f) perceptions about his/her opponent's objective. 
" Negotiator authority: Another issue that needs to be addressed for successful 
claim negotiation is that every participant defines his negotiator's authority. It is 
not possible for the contractor and the engineer to participate in all the 
negotiations. Quantity surveyors are often appointed to negotiate on behalf of both 
parties. The empowerment may range from `settle your own way and at any cost' 
through a series of gradations to `do not settle anything but report back'. Two 
points need to be emphasised in this respect: 
a) First, the awarded authority should match the negotiator's position, capability, 
specialist negotiation items, and negotiation circumstances; 
b) Second, while each negotiator should have clear authority and limit, it is also 
highly desirable that those engaged opposite each other in a single phase or 
segment of negotiation should have matching authority (Turner, 1989). It will 
be frustrating for one to have the authority to settle when the other party has to 
report back to a higher authority. 
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2.5.1.2 Individual Roles in Negotiation 
Besides the above factors, each party's negotiation strategies are also determined by 
factors such as responsibility, bargaining power and time issues. These factors, in 
turn, are determined by each participant's role, position and interests specified in the 
contract. 
1) The Client: In most cases, the client does not directly get involved in the 
negotiations. However, when he joins the negotiation, the client, as the employer, 
will normally have more bargaining power than the contractor and the engineer. 
This is especially true in cases where the contractor expects to keep a long-term 
business relationship with the client. The client is generally tough in claiming 
money issues. However, he may make concessions if the unsettled claim delays 
the whole project, or in some other cases, he may just want to keep the contractor 
working more faithfully. 
2) The Contractor: Motivated by the objective to make as much profit as possible, 
the contractor generally will catch all the possible opportunities for a claim. This 
puts him regularly in a passive position in negotiations because of his 
exaggeration of the claim without adequate evidence to support it, or his imperfect 
work with regard to the claim items. On the other hand, if the claim is sound, the 
contractor has a tremendous asset in setting the pace and direction of the 
negotiations since he has a larger degree of freedom in making his proposal and 
accepting a settlement (Levin, 1998). 
3) The Engineer: The roles of the engineer, both as an agent of the client and an 
independent professional expert, puts him in a conflicting position in claims 
management and claims negotiation. As a professional expert, the engineer should 
implement various terms of the contract, and act impartially between the client 
and the contractor in the negotiation. On the other hand, as an agent of the client, 
he has to negotiate for the client and therefore is biased against the contractor. 
Moreover, the engineer's attitude is also influenced by his own benefits. One 
example is that the engineer tends to discourage any claims caused by him. 
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Table 2.3 lists some of the major influential factors for each party summarised from 
the work of the following researchers: Hughes and Barber, 1992; Smith, 1992; Spittler 
and Jentzen, 1992; Scott, 1992; Just and Torone, 1997; and Levin, 1998. 
Table 2.3 Factors influencing negotiations between project participants 
Factors that Hamper Negotiation Factors that Facilitate Negotiation 
" high ambitions; " willingness to maintain a good 
" global claims; relationship; 
" lack of evidence; " willingness to compromise due to 
U 
" wrong calculation; or the weakness in claims 
ö " poor presentation management; 
U 
" concentrating on future prospects 
of work or compensation (new 
claims or items) 
" willingness to protect himself " high expertise in construction 
against any harm; management; 
W " discouraging any claim caused by " consideration of reputation 
the failure or act of the engineer 
" willingness to pay less for more " consideration of the entire project 
work; progress Ü 
" discouraging claims " involvement of client 
Note: besides the factors listed above, some common factors also influence the results 
of negotiations, (e. g. the involvement of senior management in the negotiation, or the 
pressure from senior management) may force the early settlement of negotiations. 
2.5.1.3 Negotiation Process 
The claims negotiation process consists of three stages: negotiation planning, 
negotiation process and negotiation outcome. 
1) Negotiation Planning 
Negotiation preparation is crucial for the success of claims negotiation. Many of the 
problems of current claims negotiation process are related to poor planning and 
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preparation of negotiation (Smith, 1992; Field et al., 1993). Both parties need to spend 
time and effort on collecting data, gathering pertinent prices, establishing objectives, 
identifying the negotiation zone, evaluating the proposal, anticipating and analysing 
the opponent, formulating a definitive and defensible negotiation position, and 
building flexible strategies. According to Field et al., (1993), Levin (1998) and the 
result of the industry survey in this research, the key points include: 
" Make an independent estimate of scope and cost: if it is determined that 
entitlement exists, an independent engineering cost estimate should then be 
prepared by both parties. This will ensure that all issues are identified, including 
those omitted from the contractor's quote. To whatever extent possible, the 
engineer should use the contractor's actual productivity rates for similar project 
work. After the estimation, all significant differences in scope, productivity, and 
pricing are listed for negotiation. 
9 Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of both parties: an honest evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both parties' position is critical before negotiations 
begin. It is advantageous for each party to evaluate the anticipated positions of 
both parties, develop responses, agree upon the responsibilities, presentation 
methods, positions, and tactics which will be utilised, and identify any fallback 
position which may be available should negotiations not lead to agreement. The 
availability of a satisfactory fallback position for each party will ultimately help 
to determine the size of the concessions that the party must be willing to make to 
reach settlement. Two major issues are decided at this stage: 
a) Establish objectives (what is the negotiation zone? ) 
f which objectives cannot be compromised under any circumstances? 
f which can be compromised and to what extent? and 
f which objectives are expected to be compromised or dropped totally? 
b) Anticipate position of the opponent: 
f how bad is the need for the work? 
f is there time pressure for an agreed price? and 
f is there competition for forward priced changes (can this work be 
transferred to another contractor? ) 
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" Consider the social psychological aspects: since negotiations are conducted by 
human beings, thorough preparation for negotiation should include optimisation of 
the myriad of psychological factors involved. In order to prevent intimidation of 
either party, it is desirable to provide an approximate match between the sizes of 
the negotiation teams representing each party at the negotiation and between the 
authority levels of the representatives of the parties. It may also be desirable to 
choose representatives who can work well with the representatives chosen by the 
other party. Also, it is helpful for a party to estimate the other's exaggerated 
amount for certain claim items. 
" Build flexible strategies: based on the above analysis, each party will plan his 
negotiation strategies and alternate strategies in case the primary strategies have to 
be abandoned. 
" Decide on the negotiation form: although periodic negotiation meetings are' 
necessary to ensure that issues are resolved in a timely manner, these meetings are 
not always the best forum for negotiating every issue. Before negotiating, it is 
desirable to select an optimal forum for negotiation and decide whether informal 
discussions with one or more members of both parties would be likely to be more 
productive than formal negotiations. The result of any informal negotiations can 
then be confirmed during a formal negotiation meeting. It may also be desirable to 
manage the timing of negotiations to optimise the productivity of negotiations. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates such a general process and the major factors which negotiators 
need to consider before claims negotiation. It needs to be mentioned that the 
contractor and the engineer may have different interests. The engineer is normally 
more interested in analysing the contractor's claim amount and supporting evidence as 
well as the related contract documents, whilst the contractor focuses more on how 
much he should ask from the engineer. Unfortunately, both Smith (1992) and the 
results of the industry survey undertaken in this research show that project 
participants seldom conduct negotiation preparation systematically. 
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Claims Negotiation Preparation 
What issues will be involved? 
" what should be avoided? 
" what will the opponent ask? 
" how shall we answer these 
questions? 
Who is on the team on both sides: 
" senior or junior person, 
" familiar or new negotiators, 
" soft or tough style? 
Who has what authority? 
Priority of issues: 
" issues essential to the negotiation, 
" issues that are very desirable for 
our side, 
" issues that would be `nice to have' 
Value of each issue 
What kind of 
backup information 
do we have? 
Significance 
and influence 
of the issue 
Settlement range on both sides: 
What are the other side's issues and 
objectives? 
" reservation value; 
" expected value; 
" what questions shall we ask? 
" reservation value; 
" expected value; 
" initial position (how much 
concession can we make? ) 
Which kind of negotiation 
strategy shall we adopt in 
different situations during the 
negotiation? 
Negotiation starts 
Figure 2.3 Negotiation planning process (improved from Smith, 1992; Levin, 1998 
according to the industry survey in this research) 
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2) Negotiation Process 
During negotiation, the contractor looks for the greatest sum possible whilst the 
engineer, despite his contractual position, will be looking to reduce the amount being 
claimed. Moreover, their negotiation styles, strategies and tactics also depend on the 
project situation, claim items, participant's attributes and the personal approach of the 
negotiators. Both the contractor and the engineer try to influence, persuade or press 
the other side to accept his proposal by providing backup evidence, communicating 
information, adopting proper tactics, and making necessary concessions. 
A typical negotiation iteration is: after receiving the contractor's quotation and the 
explanations, the engineer analyses the quotation, explanation and supporting 
evidence. He then tries to point out the problem of the quotation, and re-evaluates his 
own estimate in a reasonable manner as necessary to correct errors, omissions, or 
otherwise adjust the estimate wherever required, or vice versa. Two kinds of reasons 
will push a party to make concessions: 
9a party is persuaded by another, by showing sound evidence, that his original 
estimate about the claim is wrong. This is always easy to handle; or 
9 no obvious mistake is found in both parties' estimate, especially in the 
contractor's. The difference lies in both parties' different perspectives on 
interpretation or quantification. This is the common case in claims negotiation. 
Both parties may make concessions for the purpose of reaching an agreement. The 
concession amount is decided by both the key negotiation features determined at 
planning stage and the situation in the negotiation. 
Scott (1992) describes the contractor's negotiation tactics for large claims as: 
" Initially, the contractor should ascertain the engineer's position, without making 
commitments, to get an idea where he stands on an overall basis. He should then 
study the differences to see where more work can be accomplished, and how 
much work might be needed to get the settlement closer to an acceptable amount. 
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" After strengthening his position with additional data, the contractor is ready for a 
second negotiating session. This time the contractor should make an all-out effort 
to achieve his goal and begin to make compromises on individual items. 
" If a satisfactory compromise cannot be reached, the negotiation sequence must be 
repeated until either an agreement or impasse is reached. 
" Leave some bargaining room and expect some give and take. 
In practice, the success of negotiation is largely dependent on the ability and 
willingness of the parties to work together creatively and constructively to resolve 
claims, even if the initial negotiation has reached a stalemate. If both parties do not 
want to make any concession on a single item, both parties may try to find other 
possible approaches to resolve the problem. Compromises can also be achieved 
through (Ren et al., 2001a): 
" trade-off between different items of the same claim (e. g., the trade-off between 
labour cost and loss of productivity for the same claim); 
" trade-off between different compensation methods (e. g., the trade-off between 
money and time); 
" trade-off between different claims (e. g., the trade-off between claim A and claim 
B); 
9 relieve negotiation constraints (e. g., conditionally agree some items which were 
not accepted at the beginning; or permit a higher level of management, 
empowered with greater authority, from both parties to join the negotiation, thus 
providing a different perspective and perhaps a broader view of the issues); or 
" consider creative solution alternatives (e. g., construction contracts often include 
requirements that, for one reason or another, are found not really necessary during 
construction, but add costs for the contractor. Under specific situations, the 
engineer may give away such items). 
3) Negotiation Outcome (Post-negotiation stage) 
The outcome represents the final settlement determined by the project environment, 
claim elements and each negotiator's individual factors through the negotiation 
process. The outcome can be either an agreement or a conflict deal. For each party, 
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the outcome must be acceptable and reasonable, although it may not be the best one. 
If an agreement is reached, it is compulsory for both parties. Meanwhile, the high 
frequency of claims negotiation allows the contractor and the engineer to learn each 
other's negotiation habits towards different claim items. 
2.5.2 Problems 
Although, ideally, a successful negotiated settlement of construction claims should be 
characterised by fairness, efficiency, wisdom, and stability (Spittler et al., 1992), in 
practice, it is far from true. From case to case, claims negotiation often becomes a 
very long and drawn out process (Botha, 2001). This is caused by a number of 
problems associated with project and claims management, and the negotiation 
process, such as: the client team's negative attitudes towards the contractor's claims 
and the contractor's high ambitious to claim, the complex and ambiguous nature of 
some claim items, improper or unclear contract clauses, and poor documentation 
systems amongst others. This research focuses more on the key problems that directly 
contribute to the inefficiency of claims negotiation, as discussed below. 
1) Problems in the Claims Management Procedure 
The claims management procedures contribute to the inefficiency of claims 
negotiation. For example, the involvement of the client is currently very low in claims 
management (Vidogah and Ndekugri, 1997). The late involvement of the client and 
the engineer's conflicting role as an independent professional and client's 
representative have been recognised as major factors contributing to the inefficiency 
by the European Construction Institute (ECI, 1992). In cases where claims are caused 
by the engineer's failure or inaction, the engineer is likely to discourage the claims, 
and to deal with the claims in a partial manner by taking advantage of the low client 
intervention. This may finally increase the difficulty of negotiation which may, in 
turn, increase the likelihood of disputes. Therefore, ECI (1992) recommends earlier 
and greater client involvement in claims management. Furthermore, the problems 
from the contractor, such as lack of supporting records, unclear causation and 
consequence analysis, and exaggeration of claims also provide opportunities for the 
engineer to behave improperly. 
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2) The Preparation and Negotiation Process 
Currently, both the preparation and negotiation process are rather time-consuming. 
This is caused by the necessary negotiation preparation (evidence-collection, 
opponent position anticipation, and negotiation objective and strategy analysis) and 
bargaining process (offer, evaluation, and counteroffer), as well as many other 
activities, which sometimes take more time than the negotiation itself. For example: 
Before negotiation, claim documents have to be specially presented for negotiation; 
there is quite a substantial delay between document submission and the discussion of 
the claim. Negotiations are seldom held immediately for one claim after the 
documents are submitted. In most cases, the claim will be discussed at a progress 
meeting or special meeting where many claims are discussed; and negotiators need to 
be appointed and brought together for the negotiation. In cases where project 
managers or other key project personnel act as negotiators, negotiations are often 
delayed due to the absence of these people. 
During negotiations, unrelated arguments such as site management, quality or site 
safety are often used to pressurise an opponent; a party may expect to benefit by 
waiting or delaying until the other side is emotionally exhausted; or neither side wants 
to make a concession first or easily. 
Moreover, Smith (1992) identifies improper negotiation styles and lack of planning as 
the main reasons for inefficient construction negotiation. Field et al. (1993), Just 
(1993) and Zack (1994) outline some of the improper negotiation styles as: 
" portraying the other party as unreasonable; 
" adding emotion to meetings and correspondence; 
" negotiation without being in command of the facts; 
" relying on the recollection of people who were involved; 
" psychological intimidation; 
" either win or lose strategy, lack of necessary flexibility; 
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" stubborn negotiation style; 
" making concessions for the sake of a relationship; 
" bargaining instead of negotiating; 
" establishing a fixed objective instead of a range; 
" failing to choose the right negotiation team members; 
" failing to plan negotiation; 
" unclear authority; 
" failing to document negotiation; 
" negotiation team members playing good guy/bad guy game; and 
" requesting sympathy. 
3) Human Factors 
Negotiation involves many human factors in addition to the pure technical issues. A 
negotiator's personal abilities, attitudes, expertise, power and position in negotiation, 
in many cases, determine the result of a negotiation. Unfortunately, most construction 
participants are not very good negotiators for a variety of reasons (lack of expertise, 
lack of time, dislike of the negotiation process, etc. ). They often realise that their 
negotiation skills are not as sharp as they could be (Botha, 2001). By investigating 
claims and disputes resolution in eight countries and areas, Fenn et al. (1998) reports 
that most negotiators get their negotiation knowledge only through the claims 
negotiation practice. Most claim negotiations are conducted in a heuristic way. 
Unnecessary concession and stubbornness are common mistakes, especially when 
negotiations become emotionally charged, which makes the negotiations harder and 
inefficient. 
As a result, there are many individuals and firms working as professional `claims 
consultants' that offer claims and disputes negotiation service in one form or another. 
Unlike a mediator, the claims consultant's duty is to advise project participants how 
they should seek to make money out of the alleged mistakes or shortcoming of other 
participants (Botha, 2001). The typical idea is "with my expertise in your corner, you 
would gain a significant edge in your negotiations to tip the balance of power 
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dramatically in your favour. " On the other hand, project managers, according to the 
industry survey in this research, responded that the involvement of a claims consultant 
could make the negotiation more complex and fierce. 
Zack (1994) points out that "the inefficiencies in negotiation make claims resolution 
much more difficult and adversarial, and may delay resolution or, in the worst case, 
lead to expensive litigation. " Spittler et al. (1992) also warn that if incentives and 
mechanisms that can encourage efficient and effective job site negotiation are not 
made an integral part of the claims management process, disputes will inevitably 
escalate into serious confrontations. Thus, it is necessary to develop a methodology to 
facilitate claims negotiation so as to reduce the tremendous time and human resources 
invested. 
2.5.3 Possible Solutions 
Essentially, since many problems of project management and claims management 
contribute to the inefficiency of claims negotiation, the improvement of project 
management and claims management will be helpful for claims negotiation. Examples 
of these aspects can be: 
" adopting an appropriate contract form, and implementing contract language which 
clearly establishes the parameters under which changes and claims will be 
identified, documented, and negotiated and providing a means by which work may 
proceed; 
" adopting partnering or design-build procurement system to relieve the negative 
attitude of the engineer and the client towards the contractor's claims; 
" improving the documentation system to provide more sound evidence to support 
claims and negotiation; 
" implementing cost control and change order approval procedures, as well as cost 
estimating and schedule review programmes to support claims avoidance and 
negotiations; and 
" developing an issue resolution process, including regularly scheduled weekly or 
bi-weekly identification and issue resolution/ negotiation sessions, in order to 
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prevent an accumulation of unresolved issues and to identify problems that 
experience suggests might become late, surprise issues. 
Besides the improvement of the project and claims management, another important 
approach is to improve the claims negotiation elements, such as: 
" improving negotiation planning; 
" adopting a proper negotiation style; 
" organising a suitable negotiation team with proper empowerment; 
" establishing new negotiation procedures such as step by step negotiation; 
" agreeing on common issues in advance, and establishing and utilising precedents 
to reduce the need for repetition in negotiation; 
9 establishing mutually agreed upon fairness; and 
" educating the industry participants 
Most of the current claims negotiation researchers (Smith, 1992; Filed, et al., 1993; 
Zack, 1994) focus on one or more of the approaches discussed above. However, the 
improvement of these approaches, especially those related to general project 
management and claims management involves complex issues and is hard to achieve 
in practice. On the other hand, the development of information technology provides 
the industry with a simple and effective tool for the improvement of many problems, 
which are difficult to resolve through traditional approaches. This research intends to 
overcome the inefficiency problem of the claims negotiation process through the 
adoption of new information technology. 
Although the reasons may be different, low efficiency has been recognised as a 
common problem of various negotiations. The attempts to introduce information 
technology, such as: expert systems and decision supporting systems, to facilitate 
negotiation have been tried in different areas (Anson and Jelassi, 1990; Samuelson, 
1995; Shell, 1995; Saunders and Lewicki, 1995). However, the functions of these 
systems are limited because they cannot match some of the key characteristics of 
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negotiation, such as communications between negotiators. Instead, these isolated 
systems can only provide advice to human negotiators. 
A technology that has the potential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
claims negotiations involves the use of a multi-agent system (MAS) to facilitate 
negotiations between project participants. Multi-agent systems are network systems 
composed of individual agents which can negotiate for their own benefits. These 
individual agents have the following capabilities and characterises: autonomy, 
facilitating and filtering information, communication, learning, and facilitating 
collaboration. This makes multi-agent systems ideal for supporting claims negotiation 
(for details, see Chapter 3). Unlike any existing negotiation supporting system, agents 
in a MAS, on behalf of the different project participants, can directly negotiate with 
each other regarding a claim item, and reach a desirable solution within a specified 
time frame. This constitutes a promising approach to solving complicated negotiation 
problems in a natural way (Ferber, 1998). Based on a pre-designed negotiation 
protocol, each agent negotiates with others by adopting different negotiation 
strategies, and finally reaches a desirable solution within a specified time frame. 
This research aims to develop a multi-agent system for construction claims 
negotiation (MASCOT) so that the low efficiency problem of claims negotiation can 
be relieved. Importantly, the distributed and collaborative characteristics of multi- 
agent systems also provides an opportunity to resolve some other problems caused by 
the fragmentation of the industry, which are difficult to resolve with other information 
technologies. The resolution of these problems will, in turn, improve both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of claims negotiation. Furthermore, the system also 
provides an environment where other alternative dispute resolution approaches, such 
as the use of a mediator can be involved early in the claims negotiation process. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has investigated the development of claims management and claims 
negotiation through a review of technical, professional and academic literature, 
industry survey (interviews) and analysis of this information. The key features and 
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current status of claims management have been addressed. The applications of 
information technology in claims management were explored. The major problems 
and their causes of construction claims management such as inadequate information 
and documentation, lack of effective claims management tool, and inefficient claims 
negotiation have also been addressed. 
Construction claims negotiation was particularly highlighted. A conceptual model of 
claims negotiation was established where the backgrounds, planning and process of 
claims negotiation were analysed. The problematic issues and difficulties associated 
with the activities of claims negotiations were addressed and possible solutions for the 
problem have been suggested. Such a thorough analysis on various aspects of 
construction claims negotiation set a firm foundation for the further development of 
the reasoning model of construction claims negotiation which is the basis for the 
MASCOT system. Chapter 5 will make a further analysis on the nature and key 
characteristics of claims negotiation. 
The next chapter will provide a detailed analysis on multi-agent systems. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) originates from the real world 
where many cases are inherently distributed in space, function, knowledge, expertise 
or information (Durfee et al., 1989). The notion of DAI provides a natural metaphor to 
match such distribution. It represents a new way of analysing, designing, and 
implementing complex software systems. The key advantage of DAI is its 
responsibility for enacting various components of the business process which is 
delegated to a number of autonomous agents. These agents act collectively as a 
society and collaborate to achieve their own individual goals as well as the common 
goal of the society to which they belong (Ugwu et al., 1999). Agents are inherently 
modular and can be constructed locally for each resource, provided they satisfy some 
high level protocol of interaction. 
The agent-based view in DAI offers a powerful repertoire of tools, techniques, and 
metaphors that have the potential to considerably improve the way in which people 
conceptualise and implement their systems (Jennings et al., 1999). DAI applications 
such as: information access, information filtering, electronic commerce, workflow 
management, intelligent management, and various negotiations are becoming ever 
more prevalent. The common point in these different types of system is the key 
abstraction used - (distributed) agents. The significance of agents is that they provide 
a natural means for performing the above tasks over a distributed environment. 
Multi-agent systems emanate from the traditional field of DAI. In MAS, there is no 
central controlling party. Agents often co-operate to achieve their own individual 
goals, rather than to solve a common problem. MAS are suitable for domains that 
involve interactions between different people or organisations with different (possibly 
conflicting) goals and proprietary information. With the lack of centralised control, 
agents in MAS have to solve the problem of the relationship between each agent's 
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behaviour and goals, and those of the global system or MAS community. Negotiation, 
thus, often plays a central role in agent co-operation. Moreover, agents have reasoning 
abilities to infer the other agents' key features and changes in the environment. 
This chapter explores the common threads that together make up the agent and multi- 
agent systems. The purpose is to provide an in-depth analysis of multi-agent systems, 
and indicate the key issues in the field. Particular focus is on the nature of 
autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, negotiations, and learning issues in 
multi-agent systems. 
3.2 INTELLIGENT AGENTS 
Intelligent agents are the basic cells of multi-agent systems. To understand MAS, the 
starting point is to define and understand the intelligent agent. 
3.2.1 Definition 
There is little agreement on the definition of the terms 'agent' and 'intelligent agent'. 
They should be clearly more than just a program, but where the boundaries lie is not 
clear at all. This is a manifestation of the general problem in Al of defining 
`intelligence' that has led to much discussion. The result is that there are as many 
agent definitions as there are researchers, leading to the term being substantially 
overused. Some examples are: 
" Brustoloni (1991): "Autonomous agents are systems capable of autonomous, 
purposeful action in the real world. " 
" KidSim (1994): "Let us define an agent as a persistent software entity dedicated 
to a specific purpose. 'Persistent' distinguishes agents from subroutines; agents 
have their own ideas about how to accomplish tasks, their own agendas. 'Special 
purpose' distinguishes them from entire multifunction applications; agents are 
typically much smaller. " 
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" Maes (1995): "Autonomous agents are computational systems that inhabit some 
complex dynamic environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, 
and by doing so realise a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed. " 
" Coen (1995): "Software agents are programs that engage in dialogs and 
negotiation and coordinate transfer of information. " 
" Hayes-Roth (1995): "Intelligent agents continuously perform three functions: 
perception of dynamic conditions in the environment; action to affect conditions 
in the environment; and reasoning to interpret perceptions; solve problems, draw 
inferences, and determine actions. " 
0 IBM white paper (1994) "Intelligent agents are software entities that carry out 
some set of operations on behalf of a user or another program with some degree 
of independence or autonomy, and in so doing, employ some knowledge or 
representation of the user's goals or desires. " 
Although different researchers emphasise different aspects of agency, their definitions 
of agents suffer from one or more of these three problems (Ugwu et al., 1999): 
9 Too broad a definition that will include things such as Unix demons; 
9 Too narrow a definition that prescribes a particular AI technique; or 
" Forming a definition in terms of equally vague terms. 
Despite the different definitions, there are several broad qualities that have some 
measure of general agreement. Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) define an agent as "a 
computer system, situated in some environment that is capable of flexible autonomous action 
in order to meet its design objective". There are thus four key concepts in the definition: 
0 Autonomy: agents should operate without the direct intervention of humans or 
others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state. 
" Social ability: agents need to be able to interact with other agents (and possibly 
humans) via some kind of agent-communication language. 
" Reactivity: agents should be able to perceive their environment and respond in a 
timely fashion to changes that occur in it. This environment may be the physical 
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world, a user via a graphical user interface, a collection of other agents, the 
Internet, or perhaps all of these combined. 
0 Pro-activeness: agents should not simply act in response to their environment, 
they should be able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative. 
From this and other definitions, the key feature would appear to be `autonomy'. 
However, this is usually loosely defined; containing words like 'control over their own 
actions' or 'formulate their own goals'. An agent with freewill is a high aspiration 
indeed. For learning agents that deal with different situations in different ways as they 
learn, something that appeared like autonomous behaviour would be possible. 
However, few definitions actually include learning. Non-learning agents ultimately 
only follow the same set of instructions and/or rules at all times during their existence, 
hence for these agents, autonomy must take on a somewhat weaker meaning. A more 
meaningful definition may be to say an agent is autonomous if it operates without the 
need for the direct intervention of humans. 
Nwana (1996) takes Wooldridge and Jenning's definition and reduces it to three 
behavioural attributes, any two of which must be possessed by a software agent. 
These are: 
0 Autonomy: this refers to the principle that agents can operate on their own 
without the need for human guidance. Agents have individual internal states and 
goals, and act in such a manner as to meet their goals. A key element of their 
autonomy is their pro-activeness, i. e. the ability to `take the initiative' rather than 
acting simply in response to their environment. 
0 Co-operation: co-operation with other agents is paramount, and is the reason for 
having multiple agents in the first place. In order to co-operate, agents need to 
possess a social ability, i. e. the ability to interact with other agents and possibly 
humans via some communication language. 
" Learning: for agent systems to be truly `smart', they would have to learn as they 
react and/or interact with their external environment. A key attribute of any 
intelligent being is its ability to learn. The learning may also take the form of 
increased performance over time. 
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Nwana's requirements for agenthood may be neatly shown as a Venn diagram in 
Figure 3.1. 
Smart 
Agents 
Co-operative 
Collaborative 
Agents 
Collaborative 
Learning Agents 
Interface 
Agents 
Figure 3.1: Nwana's requirements for agenthood 
The inclusion of learning is at least an aspiration, it recognises a core quality of the 
intelligent behaviour. The diagram neatly provides a framework into which all 
software agents in this thesis can be currently defined. A number of other attributes 
for agenthood have been cited. Some of these need to be considered for any 
classification of agents; others are better under the category of generally desirable 
qualities. In the next section Nwana's definition will be extended to include some of 
these attributes. Figure 3.2 shows an example of an agent architecture (Sen, 1997). 
ENVIRONMENT 
F Sensors F Effectors 
Interpreter Language Action Generator Language 
Interpreter Generator 
DECISION MECHANISM 
WORLD MODEL Learning 
Module 
Co-ordination 
Agent 1 Agent N 
Planner 
Module 
Inference 
scheme AGENT 
Figure 3.2 An agent architecture (shaded modules represent components particular 
to agents in a MAS) 
Autonomous ý_ Learning 
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3.2.2 Agent Development 
Agents can be understood as an incremental extension of previous -software 
technologies (Table 3.1). In the beginning was the program, a monolithic deck of 
machine instructions and data tied together with tangled `goto' statements that took 
over the complete resources of the computer when the user fed it into the card reader. 
The structured programming movement modularised program code through 
constructs such as subroutines and structured loops. These constructs localised the 
definition of how the program would function, but relied on an external definition of 
the data on which the code would operate and external innovation. The next major 
development, objects, gave software modules local state as well as local code, but 
innovation was still determined externally, by sending a message. Agents add two 
things to (passive) objects: a local thread of control, and local initiative (usually 
expressed as local goals). Together, these enable the agents to monitor and respond to 
their environment autonomously (Parunak et al. 1997). 
Two requirements make agents an attractive technology for a modern design 
environment. 
" First, agents are intrinsically distributed. While their local threads can be 
supported on a single processor, it is also natural to distribute them across a 
network, supporting the distribution requirements. 
" Second, the modularity of agents makes it natural to encapsulate humans as peer 
agents to computer processes using common language and protocols to integrate 
people and machines. In nature, this integration requires people to reduce the 
bandwidth of their communication to a level that computerised agents can handle. 
Table 3.1 Agents in historical perspective (Parunak et al. 1997) 
Monolithic Structured Object-oriented Agent-oriented 
program programming programming programming 
(00) 
How does a unit External Local local local 
behave ? 
What does a unit External External local local 
do when it runs? 
When does a unit External External External Local (thread; 
run? (called) (message) goals) 
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Many researchers appear to confuse the following: agents and objects; distributed 
computing and agent-based computing; object-oriented systems (00), expert systems 
and agent-based systems. 00 computing, and distributed computing do not in 
themselves offer solutions to agent-based problems because distributed computing 
modules are usually passive and dumb. Also, their communications are usually low 
level while agent-based systems require high-level messages (Newell, 1982). 
00 techniques are good in general, but are rather low-level for intelligent 
applications. They can be used, for instance, to implement knowledge representations, 
but they do not themselves provide a knowledge representation. 00 development 
methodologies can, however, be seen as a low-level underpinning for a multi-agent 
methodology. The same might be said of distributed computing methodologies and 
indeed, many agent-based systems are built on top of distributed platforms. However, 
it can be argued that if 00 approaches are still relatively new, agent-based systems 
are even newer and less generally accepted. Again, the knowledge level is wrong. For 
instance, communications protocols do not operate at the high level of Speech Acts as 
one might wish for an agent-based system. More importantly, agent applications 
require a co-operative knowledge level (Jennings and Campos, 1997), while expert 
systems typically operate at the symbolic and knowledge level (Newell, 1982). 
The benefit of an agent-based system would be a reduction of the semantic gap 
between analysis on the one hand, and design and implementation on the other, 
leading to a reduction in the time to design and implement, with the usual trade-off 
between better expandability and losses in execution efficiency and design specificity. 
Current methodologies emphasise top-down design, but agent-based systems adopt a 
different approach: top-down within the agent, and bottom-up in the agent community 
(Wooldridge, 1997). In summary, agent-based systems research can be regarded as 
developing a way of looking at problems rather than a technology. Hence, agent- 
based systems can, and do, use 00 programs, expert systems, and distributed 
computing technologies to implement applications and toolkits that embody this 
approach. 
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3.2.3 Agent Taxonomy 
The use of a taxonomy is an important approach in understanding and designing 
agents. There have been many attempts to produce taxonomies or classifications of 
agents. None of these seem to be complete and most of them become dated quickly. 
For example, Brustoloni's (1991) taxonomy of software agents begins with a three- 
way classification into regulation agents, planning agents, or adaptive agents. A 
regulation agent reacts to each sensory input as it comes in, and always knows what to 
do. It neither plans nor learns, and so on. This yields a two-layer taxonomy. 
There are many other possible classification schemes. Agents might be classified 
according to the tasks they perform such as: information gathering agents or email 
filtering agents. Agents may also be classified by the range and effectiveness of their 
actions, or by the degree of sophistication of their internal state such as: goal driven, 
non-temporal agents to those with a full Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) 
reasoning capability. Another possible taxonomy might involve the environment in 
which the agent finds itself, for example software agents as opposed to artificial life 
agents. 
Most of these taxonomies seem cumbersome and unsuited to classifying many agent 
types. Any taxonomy has to divide agent-space from the top and there seems to be no 
natural top level divisions. Secondly, agents are often an ad hoc collection of 
techniques, and frequently fall into two categories of a taxonomy. Given the 
difficulties of a formal taxonomy, a more pragmatic approach may be to list the 
qualities that designers may wish their agents to have, each as a separate dimension. 
An agent will then be represented by a point in agent-space. Table 3.2 extends 
Nwana's model (1996) with other desirable or useful agent qualities. Nwana's qualities 
are represented as core qualities. There are four agent quality types: 
" Core: at least two need to be present for agenthood. 
" Motivational: this deals with the basis on which an agent interacts with other 
agents, the environment, etc., whether it is acting for itself, a group or a wider 
community. This is really a continuum and a point must be chosen along this. 
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Table 3.2 Agent qualities 
Quality Property Meaning 
Type 
autonomous exercises control over its own actions 
Core co-operative communicates with other agents, perhaps including 
people 
learning changes its behaviour based on its previous experience 
goal- is the classical symbolic AI approach and is based on 
Activity orientated 
the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, where the 
external world can be modelled symbolically and when 
processes are run on this representation the agent has 
its own purpose, and does not simply act in response to 
the environment (Newell and Simon, 1976). 
reactive responds in a timely fashion to changes in the 
environment. In extreme, it represents a rejection of all 
symbolic world models because one method, i. e. 
formal logic, has been found wanting. Such simple 
systems usually involve learning to respond to certain 
inputs in certain ways. 
hybrid allows agents to be able to respond rapidly in a 
reactive and possibly learned way, while maintaining a 
small and consequently manageable symbolic 
representation of the world. 
altruistic does not have private goals, and acts in the interest of 
Motivation fellow agents or a group. These agents are really only 
possible in closed systems. 
self- acts in own self-interest. Many of them are concerned interested 
with task allocation and resource sharing. 
veracious will not knowingly communicate false information. 
mobile able to transport itself from one machine to another 
personalisable easily retrained to perform a task the way a particular Other 
user wants it done (Foner, 1993). 
graceful if failure occurs most of a task can still be 
degradation accomplished, instead of failing to accomplish any of 
the task (Foner, 1993). 
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" Activity: this defines the level of passivity of an agent. Does it actively seek to 
realise its own goals, or does it wait for the environment to change around it? 
" Other. a collection of qualities sometimes seen as necessary for particular agent 
applications. 
Classes of agents can then be defined by some combination of the core qualities, 
motivation, activity and the extra properties. No agent will have all these qualities. 
For example, a poker-playing agent would not want to be veracious. Equally a pro- 
active, autonomous agent within an open system (e. g. the Internet) would not 
necessarily want to be altruistic. Some of these qualities are discussed in more detail 
below. 
3.2.3.1 Activity 
Muller (1998) classifies agents according to the influential threads of agent research, 
i. e. reactive agents, deliberative agents, and interacting agents. Each of these threads 
focuses on one important property of an agent. Reactive agents focus on reactive and 
real-time behaviour. Deliberative agents focus on the ability to act in a goal-directed 
manner. Interacting agents focus on the ability of co-operative social behaviour. 
9 Reactive Agents 
Reactive agents are built according to the behaviour-based paradigm, have no (or at 
most a very simple) internal representation of the world, and provide a tight coupling 
of perception and action. Such simple systems usually involve learning to respond to 
certain inputs in certain ways. Such agents can learn by observation of the user, but 
cannot formulate plans to achieve distant goals. There are two important points that 
the reactive approach has introduced to Al generally and agent research in particular 
(Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995): 
a) Intelligence is not exclusively to be found in large, centralised singular systems, 
but can be an emergent property of the interaction of many unintelligent units. 
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b) Most everyday activity is really routine, once learned it can be accomplished in a 
routine way with little variation. 
Valuable though these insights are, the requirements placed on many agents means 
there has to be some symbolic representation. This is because they usually have to 
interact with humans who will ask explicit questions such as `why? ' and `how? ' They 
are also often expected to interact with a great variety of other agents with vastly 
different requirements. 
" Deliberative Agents 
Deliberative agents are agents in the symbolic artificial intelligence tradition that have 
a symbolic representation of the world in terms of categories such as beliefs, goals or 
intentions, and that possess logical inference mechanisms to make decisions based on 
their world model. In essence this states that the external world can be modeled 
symbolically and when processes are run on this representation (essentially theorem 
proving) it is capable of general intelligent action. Some of the key problems are: 
a) Speed of execution: A logic-based system uses formal rules of inference to deduce 
if some action or event is a logical consequence of its current knowledge/beliefs, 
etc. The theorem proving search process is an NP-complete problem (non- 
polynomial - its time complexity is exponential). The effect of this, even 
in 
moderately dynamic and unpredictable environments, is that the world changes 
faster than a plan-based agent can reason about actions to take to achieve its goals 
and execute those actions. 
b) Common-sense reasoning: This is perhaps the second most important practical 
shortcoming of plan-based agents. In most applications, common-sense reasoning 
involving notions such as time, space, and causality is handled in an ad hoc, 
application-specific manner. Indeed, the issue of common-sense reasoning has 
defied formal treatment in AI, and presents perhaps the major stumbling block to 
the development of reasonably smart agent systems. 
c) Reasoning about other agents' desires and intentions: A reasoning agent in a co- 
operative setting, in addition to the communications overheads to ensure co- 
operation, agents have to reason about the goals, plans and beliefs of other agents, 
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in order, for example, to minimise duplication of effort. This is itself an NP- 
complete problem and, for practical purposes, it dramatically reduces the size of 
the manageable knowledge-base of each agent. 
" Interacting Agents 
Until recently, interacting agents were not classified separately. Interacting agents are 
able to coordinate their activities with those of other agents through communication 
and, in particular, negotiation. Interacting agents have been mainly investigated in 
distributed AI; they may have explicit representations of other agents, and may be 
able to reason about them. So far, the focus has been on the co-ordination process 
itself and on mechanisms for co-operation among autonomous agents rather than on 
the structure of these agents. A detailed discussion about interacting agents is 
contained in Section 3.4. 
Besides the reactive agents and deliberative agents, Ferguson (1992) classifies hybrid 
agents. Hybrid systems allow the agent to be able to respond rapidly in a reactive and 
possibly learned way, while maintaining a small and consequently manageable 
symbolic representation of the world. Its reactive quality means the nuts and bolts of 
how it interacts with the world do not need to be represented symbolically. In this way 
the symbolic system can concentrate on planning, and dealing with unexpected 
situations. Thus, it is still capable of functioning reactively while waiting for symbolic 
decisions to be made. The Touring Machines hybrid (Ferguson, 1992) is a good 
example of this approach. 
3.2.3.2 Motivation 
Agents can be classified as self-interested and altruistic according to their motivation 
for action: 
" Altruistic Agents 
Some domains are inherently suited to the use of altruistic agents. For example a 
single factory scheduling problem where each work-cell is represented by an agent. If 
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the cells do not have private goals the agents will need to act in the interest of the 
company, i. e. altruistically. There are many multi-agent collaboration projects that use 
altruistic agents within the literature, some illustrative examples follow. Negotiation 
in the examples is generally within a small group of 'friend' agents. For example, 
Pleiades: The complete system is designed for a limited environment (called the 
InfoSphere) and is a set of Internet-based heterogeneous information resources by 
Sycara and Zeng (1994). Pleiades has been used to create the Visitor Hosting System 
where the agents co-operate in order to manage a visitor's schedule. Agents arrange 
appointments and meetings with other agents and accordingly formulate plans for the 
visitor. Agent skills include the following: knowledge of how to gather information, 
knowledge of other agents it must co-ordinate with, and strategies for, conflict 
resolution. The architecture has no central planner and hence agents must all engage 
in co-ordination by communicating to others their constraints, expectations and other 
relevant information. 
ADEPT: This project uses collaborating agents to help in business decision making 
where the information needed is often spread through several companies in different 
databases (Jennings et al., 1996). This system attempts to provide access to business 
processes and information on request. Due to the distributed nature of business 
information collaborative agent technology provides a good basis upon which to build 
a system of this kind. The requirements in providing quotations cover such things as 
obtaining credit references, designing the system and costing it. 
" Self-Interested Agents 
There are many examples of self-interested agents. Many of them concern task 
allocation and resource sharing where the agents are self-interested, some examples 
follow: 
a) Electronic marketplaces: Agents representing different enterprises, buying and 
selling (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). 
b) Information retrieval: Information servers can form coalitions for answering 
queries (Tsvetovatyy and Gini, 1996; Fischer et al., 1996). 
73 
c) Air Traffic Control: Aeroplanes belonging to different airlines need to share the 
limited resources at airport, the control mechanism needs to give priority to planes 
with less fuel on board (Sandholm and Lesser, 1997a). 
d) Distribution problems: Package delivery companies may co-operate to reduce 
expenses (Sen and Durfee, 1997). 
In these examples, the agents are self-interested and try to maximise their own 
benefits. They typically involve less than a dozen agents. There has been less work 
done with self-interested agents in open systems. One of the main reasons is that it is 
much harder to negotiate with other agents who might not be telling the truth. Trust 
during negotiation is one of the key issues. The majority of self-interested agents are 
based on Game Theory or Economic Theory. A further discussion of Game Theory 
and Economic Theory is contained in Section 5.1. 
3.2.4 Agent Co-ordination 
Although there are single agent systems like information retrieval agent, most agent- 
based systems contain more than one agent. Therefore, co-ordination is central to 
agent-based systems to ensure a community of individual agents acting in a coherent, 
harmonious and expected way. The approach to agent co-ordination reflects how 
people view the real world problems and model them in agent-based systems. Agent 
co-ordination has been studied by researchers in diverse disciplines such as: 
organisation theory, economic theory, social psychology, anthropology, and 
sociology. Several typical ways of structuring and co-ordinating agents have been 
developed. Here are some examples: 
" Organisational Structuring: This is one of the most common and also the 
simplest interaction mechanisms. It usually exploits a hierarchical structure, 
implemented as client/server or master/slave, where the master could gather 
information from the agents of the group, create plans, and assign tasks to 
individual agents in order to ensure global coherence. A typical use might be for 
resource allocation such as Werkman (1990). A more practical application may be 
an assembly line. Here all agents are set up to interact only with several other 
agents, all sharing the same explicit end goal (i. e. the manufacture of a product). 
74 
However, these types of system allow few of the benefits of DAI as it assumes 
there is one agent with a global view of the full task. In real and complex 
situations agents are likely to possess knowledge that the central agent does not 
know of, and feeding this back to the central agent is difficult. Additionally it is 
very difficult for peer agents with different goals to resolve their difficulties as all 
must go before a central arbiter with imperfect knowledge. 
" Contracting: The Contract Net protocol (Smith, 1980) is one of the most 
commonly used protocols. It is different from a master/slave system in that a 
manager agent will break a problem into the component problems and then 
announce each task. Contractors then table bids to the manager. The manager then 
reviews the bids and awards the contract. Contract nets are best used when the 
problem can be broken down via a well-defined hierarchical nature into a set of 
tasks. This means that the main planning has to be done centrally. 
" Multi-Agent Planning: This usually involves a central arbiter who will review all 
potential plans of individual agents. This agent then checks for conflict and rejects 
or revises as appropriate. An example of this is multi-agent planning for air traffic 
control (Cammarata et al., 1983). It is appropriate to have a central agent with 
ultimate responsibility in such a safety-critical area. The system works because 
within the problem space there are many possible solutions that at most cause only 
minor inconvenience to other aircraft, hence conflict is less common. In other 
domains where there is more chance of a conflict of interests between agents, 
direct negotiation is more efficient. 
9 Peer To Peer Negotiation: All the preceding organisational models can and do 
involve negotiation but it generally plays a minor part, as it will be negotiation 
between agents of differing rank. Peer to peer negotiation effectively means there 
is no structure and agents must communicate directly with other agents to achieve 
its (or the group's) goals. Thus, it is most commonly adopted in MAS systems. 
A detailed analysis of these forms of organisation is discussed in the following 
sections. 
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3.3 MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
Distributed artificial intelligence is designed and implemented as several interacting 
agents. The goal of DAI is clear enough and has been proven in many prototypes: 
creating a system that interconnects separately developed agents, thus enabling the 
ensemble to function beyond the capabilities of any singular agent in the set-up 
(Nwana and Ndumu, 1999). DAI systems have received considerable attention for two 
main reasons (Russell and Norvig, 1995). 
" First, they have useful properties such as parallelism, robustness, and scalability. 
Therefore, they are applicable in many domains which cannot be handled by 
centralised AI systems. In particular, they are well suited for domains which 
require resolution of interest and goal conflicts, integration of multiple knowledge 
sources and resources, time-bounded processing of very large data sets, or on-line 
interpretation of data arising from different geographical locations. 
" Second, they are in accordance with the insight gained in disciplines such as AI, 
psychology, and sociology that intelligence is tightly and inevitably coupled with 
interaction. 
In other words, DAI is ideally suited to representing problems that have multiple 
problem solving methods, multiple perspectives and/or multiple problem solving 
entities. Such systems have the traditional advantages of distributed and concurrent 
problem solving, and also have the additional advantage of sophisticated patterns of 
interactions. Examples of common types of interactions include: co-operation 
(working together towards a common aim); co-ordination (organising problem solving 
activity so that harmful interactions are avoided or beneficial interactions are 
exploited); and consensus (coming to an agreement which is acceptable to all the 
parties involved) (Jennings et al., 1999). It is the flexibility and high-level nature of 
the interactions which distinguishes DAI from other forms of software and which 
provides the underlying power of the paradigm. 
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Traditionally, research into systems composed of multiple agents was carried out 
under the banner of DAI, and has historically been divided into two main camps: 
Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) and Multi-Agent Systems. More recently, the 
term `multi-agent systems' has come to have a more general meaning, and is now 
used to refer to all types of systems composed of multiple autonomous components. 
3.3.1 Distributed Problem Solving 
DPS considers how the task of solving a particular problem can be divided among a 
number of modules (or nodes) that co-operate in dividing and sharing knowledge 
about the problem and about its evolving solutions. In a pure DPS system, all 
interaction strategies are incorporated as an integral part of the system. Agents' 
interactions are guided by co-operation strategies meant to improve their collective 
performance. Conflict among the agents in these environments may arise while each 
tries to achieve its own sub-task, but their overall task is the same. For example, 
9 Air traffic control: Cammarata et al. (1983) develop co-operation strategies for 
resolving conflicts between the plans of a group of agents. They apply these 
strategies to an air-traffic control domain, in which the aim is to enable each agent 
to construct a flight plan that will maintain a safe distance with each aircraft in its 
vicinity and satisfy additional constraints. Agents involved in a potentially 
conflicting situation choose one of the agents involved in the conflict to resolve it. 
The chosen agent acts as a centralised planner to develop a multi-agent plan that 
specifies the conflict-free flight paths that the agents will follow. The decision of 
which agent will do the planning is based on different criteria, for example, `most- 
informationed' agent, or `most-constrained' agents. 
9 The distributed vehicle monitoring task: In this domain, a set of agents is 
distributed geographically, with each being capable of sensing some portion of an 
overall area to be monitored. As vehicles move through its sensed area, each agent 
detects characterised sounds from those vehicles at discrete time intervals. By 
analysing the combination of sounds heard from a particular location at a specific 
time, an agent can develop interpretations of what vehicle might have created 
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these sounds. By analysing temperate sequences of vehicle interpretations, and 
using knowledge about mobility constraints of different vehicles, the agent can 
generate tentative maps of vehicle movements in its area. By communicating 
tentative maps to one another, agents can obtain increased reliability and avoid 
redundant tracking in overlapping regions (Durfee, 1988) 
" Industrial process control: ARCHON, a software platform for building DAI, and 
an associated methodology for building applications, has been developed to 
facilitate industrial process control. The system addresses two major problems. 
One is concerned with providing the necessary control and level of integration to 
help the sub-components of an industrial process to work together. Another is 
concerned with decomposing the overall application goal(s) and with distributing 
the constituent tasks throughout the community. The system has been applied in 
several process control applications such as: electricity transportation management, 
and particle accelerator control. It is one of the world's earliest field-tested DAI 
systems (Cockburn and Jennings, 1996). 
" Further examples of DPS can be found in Georgeff (1983), Huhns et al. (1987), 
Durfee (1988), Lesser and Durfee (1989), Levesque et al., (1990), Lesser (1991), 
Jennings (1995), Grosz and Kraus (1996), (Parunak, 1996), and Tambe (1997). 
3.3.2 Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) 
Research in MAS is concerned with the behaviour of a collection of autonomous 
agents aiming to solve a given problem. There is no global control, no globally 
consistent knowledge, and no globally shared goals or global success criteria among 
these agents (Hewitt, 1985). MAS offer a way to relax the constraints of centralised, 
planned, sequential control, although not every MAS takes full advantage of this 
potential. They offer production systems that are decentralised rather than centralised, 
emergent rather than planned, and concurrent rather than sequential (Parinak, 1996). 
Jennings et al. (1998) summarise the characteristics of MAS as: 
" Each agent is individually motivated and attempts to maximise its own utility; 
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" Each agent has incomplete information, or capabilities for solving the problem, 
thus each agent has a limited viewpoint; 
" There is no global system control; 
9 Data is decentralised; and 
" Computation is asynchronous. 
There is an increasing interest in multi-agent system research because of its ability to 
provide robustness and efficiency; the ability to allow inter-operation of existing 
legacy systems; and the ability to solve problems in which data, expertise, or control 
is distributed. Multi-agent systems have been applied in many cases where the need 
for interaction and negotiation exists, such as WWW searches, e-commerce, supply 
chain management, design/project management, knowledge management, project co- 
ordination, computer networks, operating systems, multi-enterprise manufacturing, or 
multi-robot systems. Here are some examples: 
" Adjusting agent autonomy in supply chain management (SCM): A supply 
chain is a network of suppliers, factories, warehouses, distribution centres and 
retailers. SCM manages the co-operation of these system components, which 
correlate with each other through chain activities to implement system 
functionality. Software agents (Lin et al., 1998; Chen et al., 1999) are introduced 
as an entity with goals, action and domain knowledge situated in the environment. 
Each functionality of the chain is implemented by one kind of autonomous, 
intelligent, proactive and adaptive agent. These agents co-operate in a dynamically 
changing and open environment. A mixed negotiation process is developed for the 
specific problem where SCM's functional agents contain self-adaptive rules for 
their reasoning procedure, meanwhile human involvement is also considered. 
" Agent-based international crisis negotiation: In this case, a strategic negotiation 
model of alternative offers is developed to facilitate the negotiations among the 
three parties of a hostage crisis. In this model, agents are self-motivated, rational, 
and autonomous, each with its own utility function. Both parties can opt out, and 
while one loses over time, the other gains (up to a point). Specific issues are 
79 
conflicting objectives and utility functions of parties, and the impact of each item 
on bargaining behaviour in a crisis. The study provides strategies for a wide range 
of situations, which satisfy the criteria: symmetrical distribution, simplicity, 
instantaneous, efficiency and stability (Kraus, 1993). 
" Agent based project management (IPM): Integrated project management (IPM) 
means that design and project planning are interleaved with plan execution, 
allowing both the design and plan to be changed as necessary. This requires the 
right change to be propagated through plan and design. This study develops a 
Redux model to facilitate the IPM, where agents communicate their goals and 
decisions to the Redux server, uses a set of rules to maintain the consistency of 
goals and decisions, and propagate the effects of design changes in a collaborative 
design environment. The main problems addressed in the Redux server include 
conflict resolution when design constraints are violated, and communicating any 
design changes to appropriate team members whose decisions will be affected by 
such changes. Such timely communication will reduce the impact of making 
design decisions on the basis of obsolete data/information, and this level of 
message propagation involves some reasoning by the agent that generates such 
changes (Petrie et al., 1998). 
" Further examples of MAS can be found in Rosenschein and Zlotkin, (1994), 
Sandholm and Lesser, (1995), Decker et al., (1997), Kraus (1995,1996,1997), 
Jennings et al., (1999), Coen (1995), Nwana and Ndumu (1999) and Shen et al., 
(2001). 
With the wide range of applications, some key aspects of MAS have gained 
considerable attention from researchers such as: interactions between self-interested 
agents, negotiation protocols, and learning approaches of agents. For example, self- 
interested agents interact in a shared environment which represents many real world 
problems. Such domains include both systems where agents are adversarial to each 
other (e. g. bargaining parties) as well as domains where agents are indifferent to each 
other. In the former case, research concentrates on issues like modelling the 
knowledge and behavioural strategies of opponents, learning to exploit an opponent's 
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weakness, and developing interaction rules by which agents can arrive at equilibrium 
configurations (Sen, 1997). In the latter case, the key research problems are designing 
social laws, conventions, and protocols by which each agent can achieve its own goal 
without significantly affecting the chances of others achieving their goals, then the 
whole society exhibits desirable behaviour - in other words, locally good behaviour 
implies globally good behaviour (Jennings et al., 1999). 
The goal is to design a mechanism for self-interested agents such that if agents follow 
this, the overall system behaviour will be acceptable. For example, economic-based 
approaches, and market mechanisms in particular, are becoming increasingly 
attractive to MAS researchers both because of the ready availability of underlying 
models, and their potential applicability in Internet-based commerce. In such 
approaches, agents are often assumed to be self-interested utility maximisers. The 
areas where economic-based approaches have been applied to MAS research to date 
are resource allocation; task allocation and negotiation. The next section will focus on 
the general negotiation mechanisms in multi-agent systems. 
3.4 NEGOTIATION IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
In systems composed of multiple autonomous agents, negotiation is a key form of 
interaction that enables groups of agents to arrive at a mutual agreement regarding 
belief, goal, or plan. Particularly because the agents are autonomous and, in many 
cases, are self-motivated, agents must influence others to convince them to act in 
certain ways (Beer et al., 1999). Negotiation is used more specifically for conflict 
resolution and avoidance (Adler et al., 1989; Cammarata et al., 1983; Sycara, 1988; 
Klein, 1991), task allocation (Davis and Smith, 1983; Durfee and Montgomery, 1990; 
Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994), and resource allocation (Adler et al., 1989; Sathi and 
Fox, 1989; Conry et al., 1991), and hence for the coherence of the agent society. The 
potential benefits of agent negotiation include saving time and money, efficiency for 
computationally intense negotiations searching for optimal results, and the ability to 
incorporate multiple negotiation strategies for changing environments. 
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3.4.1 Overview 
Although negotiation is highly important for the modelling of multi-agent systems, 
there is no clear and common definition of what negotiation is in the agent world, and 
no formal theory of agent negotiations (Muller, 1996). Jennings et al. (1999) describe 
negotiations between agents as: "The main characteristics of negotiation in terms of 
agent applications can be stated as: the presence of some form of conflicts that need 
to be resolved in a decentralised manner, by (self-interested) agents, under conditions 
of bounded rationality, and incomplete information. Furthermore, the agents 
communicate and actively exchange proposals and counter proposals. Conflicts 
between agents may be about the limited available resources, conflict beliefs between 
agents, or disagreements on issues, such as price. In the first case, the negotiation 
becomes an optimisation problem; in the second case, at least one of the agents has to 
change its beliefs; and in the third case, the negotiation is a bargaining situation. It is 
often difficult to see what exactly one wants to achieve when resolving the situation. " 
However, many other researchers like Smith (1980) and Shen (2001) consider 
negotiation as a more general approach to agent co-ordination. It is not necessary that 
there is a conflict between agents as a condition of negotiation. Negotiation could be 
simply for the purpose of a better solution to a problem. Perhaps, a basic definition is 
that of Bussmann and Muller (1992): "... negotiation is the communication process of 
a group of agents in order to reach a mutually accepted agreement on some matter. " 
This section will discuss agent negotiation in a broad sense (i. e. consider negotiation 
mechanisms for both DPS and MAS). 
Despite the ambiguous term and the wide range of negotiations - from situations 
involving task and resource allocation, to situations involving agent to agent 
bargaining - the negotiations are intended to improve the global state of affairs or to 
achieve individual agents' objectives such as: minimising the time to find a solution; 
minimising the total resource usage in doing so; maximising the quantity of the result; 
trying to achieve Pareto optimality (i. e. the outcome maximises the product of the 
agents' utilities), or trying to reach a Nash equilibrium (Shen et al., 2001). 
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To negotiate with one another, each individual agent should be able to make 
proposals, counter-proposals, accept or reject proposals, and generate arguments in 
support of their adopted stance on the negotiating subject. Preist (1999) extends this 
with some points relating specifically to competitive negotiation: 
" First, all parties should be clear about the belief sets of each of the agents involved 
in the negotiation process. At the very least a shared ontology of the domain being 
negotiated over, or a way of establishing one needs to exist. 
" Then they must be able to make contact with potential negotiators and recognise 
the type of "game" in progress. Questions, such as the number of negotiators and 
the bargaining power of individuals, need to be considered and an appropriate 
strategy based on this information selected. 
" During the negotiation, it requires both a means to evaluate the relative value to 
the agent of different offers made during negotiation and a means to estimate the 
relative value to other agents of offers the agent may potentially make. 
" Finally, in some situations, the ability to exchange constraints on acceptable offers 
and to reason with these constraints may make negotiation more efficient. 
The important issues in agent negotiation include the application domain, system 
architectures and infrastructures, interaction protocols, and the architecture and 
strategies adopted by individual agents. Muller (1996) summarises both the agent and 
group negotiation issues into three major categories (Table 3.3): 
Table 3.3 Categories for agent negotiation (Muller, 1996) 
Negotiation language 
category 
Negotiation decision 
category 
Negotiation process 
category 
" protocols " utility " procedure 
" primitives " matching " behaviour 
" semantics " preferences 
" object structure " strategies 
" Negotiation language category: research is concerned with the communication 
primitives for negotiation, their semantics and their usage in terms of a negotiation 
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protocol. This category also comprises the investigation of the structure of the 
negotiation topics. 
" Negotiation decision category: algorithms to compare the negotiation topics and 
correlation functions for them are discussed. The definition of utility functions and 
the representation and structure of the agents' preferences are fixed. Negotiation 
strategies also fall into this category. 
" Negotiation process category: general models of the negotiation process are 
investigated and the global behaviour of the negotiation participants analysed. 
Many other researchers (Jennings et al., 1999; Shen, 2001; Nwana and Ndumu, 1999) 
have different prospects about the major features of agent negotiation. For example, 
Shen (2001) outlines the three main features of agents negotiation as: language used 
by participating agents, protocol followed by agents as they negotiate, and the 
decision process each agent uses to determine its position, concessions and criteria for 
agreement. Nwana and Ndumu (1999) emphasise the importance of a common set of 
speech acts, a common service ontology, and a common set of prescriptive 
conversation policies (i. e. protocols for negotiating agents). 
3.4.2 Agent Negotiation Mechanism 
Many factors need to be considered prior to designing an agent negotiation 
mechanism (Ren et al. 2001b): 
" First, autonomous agents, such as a computer system, work differently from 
human negotiators. Rule based (mechanical) negotiation theories are essential for 
the agent negotiation system, whilst some behavioural theoretical models, like 
learning approaches, are also applicable to the system. 
" MAS negotiation mechanism should consider some highly desirable properties 
such as the ability to guarantee convergence, Pareto-optimality or equilibrium. 
The specific application scenario and objective should be reached. Meanwhile, 
factors like efficiency and symmetry should also be considered. For example, the 
designed negotiation mechanism should prevent agents from spending too much 
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time on negotiation, and therefore not keeping to their timetables for satisfying 
their goals. 
" Finally, many other specific factors will also influence the design and 
implementation of a negotiation mechanism such as: 
a) information source (complete vs. incomplete); 
b) influence processes to change position (rationality in term of value, risk, or 
utility); 
c) level of shared goals among agents (all sharing the same goals vs. self- 
interested agents); 
d) number of agents (a few vs. very large number); 
e) type of agents (automated agents vs. system composed of people and 
automated agent; reactive vs. learning); 
f) communication and computation costs (the availability and costs of 
communication vs. the computation capability and costs); and 
g) agent organisations (peer to peer vs. superintendent to subordinate). 
Different approaches have been adopted to develop agent negotiation systems and 
techniques, which can be categorised as either environment-centred or agent-centred. 
Environment-centred designers ask the question: How can the rules of the 
environment be designed so that the agents in it, regardless of their origin, 
capabilities, or intentions, will interact productively and fairly? Developers of agent- 
centred negotiation mechanisms focus on the question: What is the best strategy for an 
agent to follow, given an environment in which the agent must operate? 
Given the ubiquity and importance in many different contexts, negotiation mechanism 
covers a broad range of phenomena, and encompasses multifarious approaches. 
Despite this variety, agents' negotiations are generally composed of two phases: a 
communication phase where information relevant to the negotiation is communicated 
to participating agents, and a bargaining phase where "deals" are made between 
individuals through relaxation of initial goals, mutual concessions, lies, or threats 
(Adler et al., 1989). Agent negotiation mechanisms mainly address these two aspects 
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which cover three main broad areas: negotiation objects, negotiation protocol and 
negotiation strategy. 
9 Negotiation objects: Negotiation objects are the range of issues over which 
agreement must be reached. Particularly, to what kinds of agreements can the 
agents come? The object may contain single issue, such as price, or multiple 
issues relating to price, timing, quality, etc. Also relevant are the allowable 
operations on these objects. In the simplest case, the structure and contents of the 
agreement are fixed, and negotiation amounts to accepting or rejecting the offer. 
The next level, however, offers flexibility to change the values of the issues in the 
negotiation object, through counter-proposal, changing the structure of the 
negotiation object, and so on. Finally, participant might be allowed to dynamically 
extend the structure of the negotiation objects (Jennings, 2000). 
" Negotiation protocols: Given a set of possible deals, negotiation protocols set the 
rules by which the agents will come to a consensus. In a broad and general sense, 
negotiation protocols cover the permissible types of participants (e. g. the 
negotiators and relevant their parties), the negotiation states (e. g. accepting bids, 
negotiation closed), the events that cause state transitions (e. g. no more bidders, 
bid accepted), and the valid actions of the participants in a particular state (e. g. 
which can be sent by whom, to whom and at when) (Muller, 1996). 
In a more specific sense, negotiation protocols set the stage for the negotiation 
process. They contain the basic rules for a negotiation process and the 
communication. Since negotiation involves exchanges of messages, protocols 
structure what are called conversations, define classes of dialogue. The simplest 
dialogues are found in contract-net approaches where they are limited to exchange 
involving offers, bids, and grants of contract. More complex dialogues are found 
in human types of negotiation, when trying to change other agents' beliefs. Reed 
(1998) identifies five types of dialogue: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, 
deliberation, and information seeking. For example, persuasion dialogue covers 
the case of conflicting beliefs. Negotiation dialogue differs procedurally from 
persuasion in an important respect, in that coherence between beliefs is not 
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demanded, and the relevant beliefs of the participants may well remain at odds 
after negotiation. 
There are two approaches to dialogue. One is an unmediated approach which 
involves bilateral, or multilateral, communication between all of the agents. That 
mechanism may not scale well. In the mediated approach, agents submit messages 
to some institution implementing the mechanism. The process may be iterative, 
with the institution providing some feedback based on previous messages 
received. The process terminates under conditions prescribed by the mechanism 
rules (Wellman and Wurman, 1998). 
" Negotiation strategies: Given a set of possible deals and a negotiation protocol, 
negotiation strategies provide the decision-making apparatus by which 
participants attempt to achieve their objectives. It determines which from possible 
alternative actions the agent will choose at each step. Each agent's strategy will 
strongly depend on the type of application it is involved in. For example, an agent 
may update its local states and perform its function based on certain predefined 
rules if the agent works in a collaborative way. Or it may select to use a rational 
strategy to maximise its utility if the agent works in a competitive way. 
The relative importance of the negotiation protocols and strategies varies according to 
the negotiation and environmental context. In some circumstances, the negotiation 
protocol is the domain concern. For example, the system designer may determine that 
the negotiation is best organised using a particular form of action. This mechanism, 
design choice, constrains the type of operations that can be performed on the 
negotiation object and prescribes the behaviour of the agent's decision-making 
models. In other cases, however, the agent's strategy is the domain concern. The 
protocol does not prescribe an agent's behaviour, and there is scope for strategic 
reasoning to determine the best course of action. In such a case, the relative success of 
two agents is determined by the effectiveness of their individual strategies. 
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3.4.3 Negotiation Models 
To make agent systems work in the complex environment context, different 
negotiation models have been developed from various aspects, either for DPS or for 
MAS problems. For example, negotiation has been examined under a game-theoretic 
approach in which every agent knows all relevant information about other agents 
(Genesereth et al., 1986; Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1989; Kraus and Wilkenfeld, 
1991), and under conditions where agents are hostile and completely unwilling to 
share private information (Sycara, 1988). Various points along the co- 
operation/hostility continuum are examined in (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1989,1990). 
Negotiation can occur among peers (Cammarata et al., 1983; Rosenschein and 
Zlotkin, 1994), through a mediator or arbitrator (Sycara, 1988), or hierarchically 
through an organisation (Davis and Smith, 1983; Durfee and Montgomery, 1990). 
By focusing on the design of a negotiation mechanism, the following section 
examines a few important negotiation protocols and related strategies in both DPS and 
MAS domains. Jennings et al. (1999) classify the current agent negotiation models as 
Al, game theory and psychology-based negotiations. Shen et al. (2001) make a more 
thorough classification, which includes contract, plan, market, game theory, and AI- 
based negotiations. With the quick development of agent negotiation systems, many 
models are particular for their application environments, and thus not easily classified. 
3.4.3.1 Contract-Based Negotiation 
Smith (1980) introduces a simple negotiation mechanism among co-operative agents 
in DPS environment, called Contract Net Protocol (CNP), in which an agent having 
some work to subcontract broadcasts an offer and waits for other agents to send bids. 
After some delay, the best offers are retained and contracts are allocated to one or 
more contractors who process their subtasks. The contact-net protocol provides for 
co-ordination in task allocation, with dynamic allocation and natural load balancing. 
This approach is quite simple, and can be efficient. 
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However, the CNP fails to capture many intuitive and important aspects of the 
negotiation process. For example, bidders cannot counter-propose better options, they 
cannot modify any of the service agreement parameters, and the emphasis in devising 
a complete specification is placed solely with the task manager. Also, when the 
number of nodes is large, the number of messages on the network increases, which 
can lead to a situation where agents spend more time processing messages than doing 
the actual work, or worse, the system stops through being flooded with messages. 
Various improvements and extensions to the basic CNP have been proposed. In the 
most basic approach, the choice of a contractor is done by comparing bids 
corresponding to a particular offer, using whatever mechanisms are relevant to the 
problem. For example, 
" Malone et al. (1988) developed a Distributed Scheduling Protocol (DSP) by 
overlaying CNP with an economic model. They introduce a motivation framework 
in the terms of economic theory, and provide a more theoretical term in which to 
discuss the task-sharing algorithm, while the autonomy agents willingly bid for 
tasks without explicit motivation in Smith's (1980) original work. DSP includes 
two primary dimensions: a) contractors select manager's tasks in the order of the 
tasks' numerical priorities, and b) managers select contractors that satisfy the 
minimum requirements to perform the job. 
" Sandholm (1993) presents a modified version of the CNP for competitive agents 
in the transportation domain. It provides a formalisation of the bidding and the 
decision awarding processes, based on marginal cost calculations based on local 
agent criteria. More importantly, an agent will submit a bid for a set of delivery 
tasks only if the maximum price mentioned in the tasks' announcement is greater 
than what the deliveries will cost that agent. 
"A more general approach proposed by Sandholm and Lesser (1997b) is to develop 
protocols with continuous levels of commitment based on a monetary penalty 
method, where commitment varies from the original bounded to breakable as a 
continuum by assigning a commitment breaking cost to each commitment 
separately. This cost can increase with time, decrease as a function of acceptance 
time of the offer, or be conditions on events in other negotiations or the 
environment. 
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3.4.3.2 Plan-Based Negotiation 
Plan-based negotiation is based on co-operation protocols and strategies for resolving 
conflicts among the plans of a group of agents. As an important negotiation technique, 
it suffers from limitations inherent in centralised or distributed multi-agent planning. 
Durfee and Lesser (1991) developed a Partial Global Planning (PGP) approach, which 
requires agents to exchange descriptions of intermediate situations and results, 
enabling them to check for potential task overlaps, and decide which agent should do 
what work. PGP is a flexible and dynamic approach to co-ordination that does not 
assume any particular distribution of sub-problems, expertise, or other resources. 
Agent interactions take the form of communicating plans and goals at an appropriate 
level of abstraction. These communications enable a receiving agent to form an 
expectation about the future behaviour of a sending agent, adjusting its own local 
planning appropriately, thus improving agent predictability and network coherence. 
Conry at al. (1986) proposed a negotiation protocol called multi-stage negotiation for 
co-operatively resolving resource allocation conflicts. They were specifically 
concerned with negotiation strategies for distributed constraint satisfaction problems, 
where a group of agents have a goal, but each agent has only limited resources. The 
local constraints give rise to a complex set of global and inter-dependent constraints. 
This investigation is done in the context of the monitoring and control of a complex 
communication system. Their implementation involves developing algorithms for 
multi-agent planning, taking the inevitable conflicts into consideration. 
Kreifelt and Von Martial (1991) developed a negotiation approach, where negotiation 
contains two-stages: first, agents plan their activities separately, and then secondly, 
co-ordinate their plans. A separate co-ordination agent carries out the co-ordination of 
all the agents' plans. The negotiation protocol is described in terms of agent states, 
message types and conversation rules. The problem of this approach is that it does not 
actually present a negotiation model but just prescribes one, and it is really left to the 
agents to achieve consensus. 
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3.4.3.3 Market-Based Negotiation 
The goal of market-based negotiation is to resolve a distributed resource allocation 
problem. Agents are classified as producers and consumers of goods and services. 
Equilibrium is reached when the price of goods is such that all resources are being 
used up. A particular agent wants to acquire goods, but is limited by a budget. Thus, it 
will make offers based on the current price of goods and its owns preferences. It has 
an internal utility function, and its goal is to increase utility, which corresponds to the 
hypothesis of rational behaviour. Producers have a specific production technology, 
and seek to maximise their profits. Given a set of prices, the trading process involves 
a sequence of offers in which each consumer states how much of each resource it 
wants to purchase. If the demand differs from the supply, then prices will have to be 
adjusted by the producers (Shen et al., 2001). 
Mullen and Wellman (1996) adopt a market-based negotiation for a digital library 
service. In this approach, an alternative information service is treated as competing 
with economic activities. Given a measure of priorities over the end-user services 
provided, the various agents effectively compete to provide the highest level of 
service using the minimal computational resources. One central capability of the agent 
is thus to be able to reach agreements on suitable compensation. The goal is to 
achieve an efficient overall allocation of resources towards the optimal provision of 
services to users. 
One of the drawbacks of the market-based approach using prices as a primary 
controlling mechanism is that the convergence process may be slow, involving a large 
number of offers (and computations). A new approach focusing on resources rather 
than prices was introduced by Ygge and Akkermans (1998). It appears to be complex 
but efficient. One appealing feature of the new approach is that, in each iteration, the 
computed scheme is feasible although not optimal. In project KASBAH (Chavez et al., 
1997), negotiation is done between one buyer and one seller, there are no globally 
maintained prices and the information that each agent can have is limited, which is 
more in line with actual web applications. Lee (1998) proposes a strategy of risk re- 
distribution, trying to minimise the amount of computation in each agent. Other 
approaches based on probability theory have been proposed by Ekenberg et al. (1995). 
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Considering the natural link between the market-based approach and the contract net 
protocol, contract net protocol has been incorporated with various market-based 
strategies depending on the type of contract an agent can consider such as: the de- 
commitment of contact is discussed by Sandholm and Lesser (1995). Various types of 
strategies exist; some of them have been studied by Matos et al. (1998): time 
dependent, resource dependent, or behaviour development. 
3.4.3.4 Game Theory-Based Negotiation 
Although various negotiation mechanisms have been developed based on the above 
approaches, these negotiation models are mainly used to resolve conflicts in the DPS 
domain. They are far from satisfying the requirements of real world problems. Hence, 
many negotiation mechanisms hence have been developed for MAS. Most of them 
(Roth, 1979; Kraus, 1993,1995; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1991,1994; Pena-Mora 
and Wang, 1998; Ugwu, 1999) are based on game theory3. 
There is a particular match between game theory and agent-based systems. One of the 
major assumptions of game theory is that players are rational. When game theory is 
applied in analysing human negotiation, the problem regularly faced is that human 
beings do not always act rationally and frequently do not have consistent preferences 
over alternatives. On the other hand, agents, being pre-programmed in their 
behaviour, make concrete the notion of "strategy" which plays a central role in game 
theory - the idea that a player adopts rules of behaviour before starting to play a given 
game, and that these rules entirely control its responses during the game (Rosenschein 
and Zlotkin, 1994). Moreover, the game solutions, like equilibrium points, stable 
strategies and Pareto-optimal solutions are also the basis of the MAS negotiation 
solutions. 
Game theory has some other essential assumptions, such as utility maximisation, 
complete knowledge, isolated negotiation, inter-agent comparison of utility, 
symmetric ability, binding commitments, and no explicit utility transfer. These 
Here, the game theory-based negotiation actually covers the economic theory-based negotiation. A detailed discussion is in Chapter 4.1. 
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assumptions are also the basis for game theory-based negotiations. Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein (1991,1994) explain that their work on MAS followed the general 
direction that treats negotiation in the spirit of game theory, while altering game 
theory assumptions which are irrelevant to MAS. The main point is that by 
appropriately adjusting the rules of the game by which the programs must interact, the 
private strategies of agents can be influenced. Certain strategies simply become the 
best for an agent to adopt given the rules of the game (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
1994). A number of examples are presented in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1991) study the problem of incomplete information in MAS 
negotiation where agents need to reach an agreement on task allocation. The 
incomplete information is either about the opponent's goals or about the value of its 
goals. By adopting certain game-theoretic techniques to model communication and 
promises, they introduce a mechanism that they called `one negotiation phase' in 
which agents simultaneously declare private information before beginning the 
negotiation. They also identify situations and protocols where agents have incentives 
to tell the truth in "one negotiation phase" and cases where it is beneficial for agents 
to lie. In their study, the process of negotiation was severally restricted, and it 
assumed that each agent knew the complete payoff matrix associated with the 
interaction. 
Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1994) extend the previous work. They explore various 
situations in different negotiation domains and the possible negotiation protocols and 
strategies where they divide negotiation domains into three: task orientated domains 
(TODs), state orientated domains (SODs) and worth orientated domains (WODs), 
with each domain being a generalisation of the previous. 
" TODs are the simplest case where an agent's activity is defined in terms of the set 
of tasks it has to achieve. It is assumed that all resources are available to the agent, 
the benefit of negotiation being the redistribution of tasks amongst a group of 
agents. There is no possibility of deadlock as all agents can proceed with their 
original task list and be no worse off. This is clearly limited. 
" SODs deal with problems where agents wish to change their environment from an 
initial state to some goal state. The classic Al Blocks World problem is a good 
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example. There is the possibility of conflict and deadlock, as agents may have 
different goals, and to satisfy all may be impossible or require more effort from 
each agent than if they were alone in the world. In this situation agents must be 
able to make concessions. 
9 WODs are domains where agents attach a worth to each potential state. This 
allows much more flexible goals to be set and allows concessions to be made on 
these goals. An example would be agents in an electronic marketplace where the 
goal for a seller may be to obtain the highest price for x within time y. There is 
again the possibility of conflict and deadlock, but now within a more complicated 
bargaining environment. 
Within these domains, Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1994) explore three different types 
of situation: 
" Cooperative, in which the cost to both agents of a joint plan that achieves all goals 
is less than or equal to any individual plan that would achieve a single agent's 
goal; 
" Compromise, in which at least one agent will have to pay more to achieve its goal 
jointly than it would to achieve them individually but, given the inevitable 
presence of another agents, a deal can be made that achieve the goals; and 
" Conflict, in which at least one agent has to pay an unacceptably high cost for any 
joint plan and, therefore, no deal can be made. 
Kraus (1996) studies the multi-interactions among self-motivated agents where agents 
do not have complete information. By adopting different game theory techniques, she 
develops a strategic model that not only takes into consideration the passage of time 
during the negotiation (i. e. time constraints), but also includes belief systems. Using a 
distributed mechanism, agents negotiate, and can reach efficient agreements without 
delays. She also assumes that the set of possible agreements is limited and that there is 
full information, but she makes fewer restrictions on the negotiation procedure. The 
study provides strategies for a wide range of situations, which satisfies the criteria: 
symmetrical distribution, simplicity, instantaneous, efficiently and stability. 
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Although game theory provides a theoretical basis for MAS negotiation mechanism, it 
is not a perfect solution. Problems like complete information assumption, inflexibility, 
and inadequacy or inappropriateness for real world situations are all barriers to the 
application of game theory in MAS. As a result, many researchers have attempted to 
incorporate other negotiation mechanisms like the bargaining theoretic approach, with 
game theory. 
3.4.3.5 Al-Based Negotiation 
Several common Al approaches have been adopted in developing agent negotiation 
mechanisms such as: case-based reasoning (Sycara, 1987), negotiation search (Lander 
and Lesser, 1991,1993) and knowledge-based approach (Werkman, 1990). 
Sycara (1987) presents a model of negotiation, called Persuader, that operates in the 
domain of labour negotiation. It involves three agents (i. e. a union, a company, and a 
mediator), and is inspired by human negotiation. It models the iterative exchange of 
proposals and counter-proposals in order for the parties to reach agreement. Agents 
can modify other agent's beliefs, behaviours and intentions via persuasion. Each 
agent's multi-dimensional utility model is private knowledge. Belief revision to 
change the agent's utilities so that an agreement can be reached via persuasive 
argumentation. A case-based reasoning mediator is incorporated into the model with 
the idea that human negotiators make decisions with reference to past negotiation 
experiences. 
Lander and Lesser (1991,1993) develop a negotiation system, called TEAM, that 
explores negotiation search for conflict resolution among heterogeneous and reusable 
agents in the domain of DPS. In TEAM, an extended search is carried out by an agent 
recognising a conflict in order to find another solution in its local search space that 
avoids the conflict, while relaxation is used to expand the local solution space. In the 
negotiated search, loosely coupled agents interleave the tasks of: local search for a 
solution to some sub-problem; integration of local sub-problem solutions into a shared 
solution; information exchange to define and refine the shared search space of the 
agents, and assessment and reassessment of emerging solutions. A selected solution is 
acceptable if it satisfies the requirements imposed by each agent. 
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Werkman (1990) propose a knowledge-based model of incremental negotiation in 
DPS domain. This scheme uses a shared knowledge representation, which allows 
agents to negotiate in a similar manner to co-operating experts with a common 
background of domain knowledge. Essentially, it explores a blackboard having 
partitions for requested proposals, rejected proposals, accepted proposals, 
communications, and shared knowledge. The negotiation in this model follows a 
procedure of proposal, evaluation and counter-proposal. An arbitrator agent is 
introduced to help agents to resolve possible deadlocks, by reviewing their negotiation 
dialogue and using their mutual information network to generate alternative proposals. 
This is done using issue relaxation techniques or some intelligent proposal generator 
approach. This approach may fail to achieve resolution in which case the arbitrator 
may set time limits or use other techniques. 
3.4.3.6 Psychology-based negotiation 
Behaviour negotiation theory is an important approach in analysing negotiation 
because it reflects the human negotiators' psychological responses during negotiation. 
Soci-psychology aspect is always a central point in analysing human negotiations. 
Bussamnn and Muller (1992) present a cyclic negotiation model in the DPS domain 
based on Gulliver's (1979) eight phases of negotiation process. This model addresses 
the limitation of other negotiation proposals and models such as market, game theory 
and AI approaches. The cyclic nature of the model also addresses the thorny issue of 
conflict resolution. The general strategy is that negotiation begins with one, some or 
every agent making a proposal. Next, the agents evaluate and check the proposals 
against their preferences, and criticise them by listing any of their preferences violated 
by the proposal. The agents then update their knowledge about the other agent's 
preferences and the negotiation cycle resumes with a new proposal or proposals in the 
light of this newly learned information. Conflicts between agents are handled in a 
concurrent conflict resolution cycle. 
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3.4.3.7 Other Approaches 
Besides the above negotiation approaches, many other negotiation mechanisms have 
been developed to address different aspects of negotiation in different environments. 
These include the heuristics approach (Kraus and Lehmann, 1995), the flowchart 
approach (Polat et al., 1993) and the argument-based approach (Sierra et al., 1998). 
One of the more important ideas is the argument-based negotiation. Sierra et al., 
(1998) proposed an argument-based negotiation in the domain of business process 
management. The emphasis is on how agents can justify their negotiation stance, and 
how agents persuade one another to change their decisions. Negotiators provide 
arguments to support their stance. Thus, in addition to generating proposals, counter- 
proposals and critiques, the negotiator is seeking to make the proposal more 
acceptable by providing additional meta-level information in the form of arguments 
for its position. The nature and types of the arguments can vary enormously. 
However, common categories include threats, rewards, and appeals. Whatever its 
precise form, the role of the supporting argument is either to modify the recipient's 
region of acceptability or its rating function over this region. In so doing, arguments 
have the potential to increase the likelihood and/or the speed of agreements being 
reached. In the former case, this is by persuading agents to accept deals that they may 
previously have rejected. In the latter case, this is achieved by convincing agents to 
accept their opponent's position on a given issue (and to cease negotiating over it). 
3.4.4 Negotiations in DPS and MAS 
Although the above discussions have, explicitly or implicitly, addressed the working 
domain of each negotiation mechanism, it is necessary to clarify the differences 
between the negotiation mechanism in these two domains. 
The negotiations in DPS domain are often termed as "co-operative negotiation". They 
are often used in situations where agents have "a global goal/single task envisioned 
for the system" (Smith and Davis, 1983). System designers impose an interaction 
protocol and a strategy for each agent. The main question is what social outcomes 
follow given the protocols and assuming that agents use the imposed strategies. 
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Systems like Contract Net, Distributed Scheduling and some market-based 
approaches are typical examples of negotiation in DPS. 
The negotiations in the MAS domain are often regarded as "competitive negotiation". 
They are often used in situations where "agents of disparate interests attempt to make 
a group choice over well-defined alternatives" (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994). The 
agents are provided with an interaction protocol, but each agent will choose its own 
strategy to maximise its own good without concern for the global good. The protocols 
need to be designed using a non-cooperative strategic perspective. The main question 
is what social outcomes follow given a protocol that guarantees that each agent's 
desired local strategy is best for that agent-and thus the agent will use it. This 
approach is required in designing robust non-manipulation MAS where agents are 
constructed by separate designers and represent different real-world parties. 
Compared with negotiation in DPS, such self-interest naturally prevails in 
negotiations among independent businesses or individuals. In building computer 
support for negotiation in such settings, the issue of self-interest has to be dealt with. 
To improve the quality of the MAS negotiation mechanism, the adoption of proper 
negotiation theoretic models is crucial. Such models should match the nature of 
negotiation objects, suit the application environment, and reflect the characteristics of 
MAS. The negotiation cannot be tackled by technological or economic methods alone. 
Instead, the successful solutions are likely to emerge from a deep understanding and 
careful integration of both. 
3.5 LEARNING IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
A major problem in the development of multi-agent systems is the difficulty for a 
developer to foresee all potential situations an agent could encounter and specify 
agent behaviour optimally in advance. Therefore it is widely recognised in the agent 
community that one of the more important features of high level agents is their 
capability to adapt, to learn, and to modify their behaviours. Weiss (1993) concludes 
that the two important reasons for learning in multi-agent systems are: to be able to 
endow artificial multi-agent systems with the ability to automatically improve their 
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behaviour; and to get a better understanding of the learning processes in natural multi- 
agent systems. 
3.5.1 Overview 
As a group, agents work in an open, complex and dynamic environment, which results 
from a number of factors such as (extended from Prasad and Lesser, 1999): 
" environment uncertainty: it is impossible to define all conditions before the 
systems start to work; 
" dynamic environment: the system exists in an environment whose conditions vary 
over time; 
" communication constraints: every communication link has limited parameters 
such as range and bandwidth and a certain noise level; 
" degree of clustering: in the case of a larger number of agents, it is advantageous to 
divide them into groups according to their functions; however, this functional 
grouping is limited; 
" time stress: the time for decision making is not infinite, especially in real time 
systems the question of quick response plays a vital role; 
" option multiplicity: it represents the number of planning options available to each 
agent; 
" density of the solution space: it represents the ratio of acceptable, conflict-free 
plans to the number of potential plans; 
" complexity of interactions between agents: an agent's activities might lead to a 
change in the other agents' decisions; and 
" varying goals, abilities, preferences, skills and levels of knowledge of individual 
agents. 
Agents in such a system face uncertainties due to their partial views of the other 
agents and the environment. Incomplete information about the progress, 
characteristics, expectations, or preferences of the other agents, and generated partial 
results may lead to global incoherence and degradation in system performance 
(Weiss, 1996). To effectively utilise opportunities, agents need to learn about other 
agents and adapt their local behaviour based on group composition and dynamics. 
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As a result, there has been considerable research on MAS learning for particular 
applications such as: the prisoner's dilemma (Sandholm and Crites, 1995), 
predator/prey (Nagayuki et al., 2000), agent co-ordination (Prasad and Lesser, 1999), 
engineering design (Grece and Brown, 1998), and negotiation (Zeng and Sycara, 
1998), with varying degree of success. The following sections explore the major 
characteristics of, and approaches to agent learning, with a focus on the learning 
during negotiations. 
3.5.2 Issues of Learning 
Learning in MAS can be defined operationally to mean the ability to perform new 
tasks that could not be performed before or to perform old tasks better as a result of 
changes produced by the learning process. In a stronger and more specific meaning, 
"multi-agent learning" refers only to situations in which several agents collectively 
pursue a common learning goal. In a weaker and less specific meaning, "multi-agent 
learning" additionally refers to situations in which an agent pursues its own learning 
goals, but is affected in its learning by other agents, their knowledge, beliefs, and 
intentions (Weiss, 1996). Agents learn in a communal way; their learning is 
influenced by individual goals and preferences, exchanged information, shared 
assumptions, commonly developed viewpoints, environment, social and cultural 
convention and norms which regulate and constrain their behaviours and interaction. 
To conduct effective learning in MAS, several important issues need to be addressed 
before and during the learning process such as: the objectives and focuses of learning, 
the key components of learning, and the approach to learning. 
3.5.2.1 Objective of Learning 
The learning objective is highly dependent on the application domains and the goals 
of each individual agent. An agent in DPS may learn from the others and the 
environment, and adapt its behaviour for better co-operation or solution of a specific 
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problem; whilst an agent in MAS often learns for its own benefit. Therefore, the 
learning objectives and learning approaches in different systems are often different. 
The items which an agent expects to learn from others could be the preferences, utility 
functions, risk attitudes, tasks, strategies, sequences of actions or plans, specific 
domain knowledge, prediction of decisions, types of conflicts, and so on. For 
example, in a MAS negotiation domain, an agent may expect to achieve the following 
objectives through learning: 
" Changing own beliefs and learning about others' beliefs: 
Agents can hold different beliefs about the same fact. As a result of the knowledge 
and information exchanged during the negotiation, an agent can change its beliefs, if 
the new belief is supported by more powerful evidence. The change of beliefs through 
learning can imply significant changes in the proposal generated by an agent. As 
beliefs are seen as directly related to preferences, learning in this direction can 
influence the preferred order of an agent's decisions in a multiple solution situation. 
Assuming that an agent has acquired knowledge from the external environment, it can 
influence other agents to revise their beliefs as a result of the negotiation, and thus 
propagate the external influence (Grece and Brown, 1994). 
Meanwhile, an agent can make inferences about the other agents' beliefs, and analyse 
their intentions and further negotiation strategies, so that it can determine its 
negotiation strategies accordingly. Such learning plays an extremely important role 
for many agents. Generally, the key negotiation features, like agents' utility functions, 
risk attitudes and reservation values represent agents' beliefs. 
" Learning negotiation strategies 
Depending on different negotiating situations, the negotiating agents not only need to 
understand the opponents' beliefs and intentions, but also are urged to know the 
opponents' negotiation strategies. Or in some other cases, both parties' objectives are 
relatively apparent, negotiation results depend on the negotiation strategies taken by 
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the negotiating agents. However, to understand the negotiation strategies is one of the 
most complex problems even if the agent has some knowledge about the opponent's 
beliefs. In multi-step negotiations, agents could change their strategy dynamically, 
and it is very hard to tell whether and when a change of strategy occurs (Cross, 1977). 
By analysing the difference between the predicted response and the actual response, 
an agent can adjust its perceptions about the opponents' strategies. 
Grecu and Brown (1994) emphasise the importance of learning negotiation strategies 
for the learning agent itself. The results of negotiation could be used to evaluate the 
quality of specific negotiation steps. This could reinforce the agent's drive to use the 
same sequence of actions in a similar situation or, alternatively, to weaken that drive. 
More generally, a negotiation history can be used to extract and to compile 
particularly useful sequences of negotiation actions. Agents might recognise the 
applicability of a strategy at moments where the existing commitments prevent the 
execution of the initial steps of that strategy. Otherwise, the strategy might prove to be 
inefficient if used continuously during negotiation. In addition, an agent's observation 
of the other agents' actions, guided by its strategies, may eventually lead to the 
synthesis of new strategies. 
" Learning conflict patterns 
Based on participation in different conflict resolution processes, an agent can learn to 
recognise and classify different types of conflict. This implies learning about the 
context leading to conflicts and learning the characteristics of conflict. The first factor 
is important for avoiding conflicts, the second one for taking negotiation decisions. 
The negotiation model proposed by Klein (1991) uses a hierarchy of possible types of 
conflicts between agents. An inductive learning approach could be used to automate 
the construction of such a classification scheme and to facilitate adding new conflict 
types. 
Although these learning cases, especially the first two, represent some of the essential 
learning objectives in MAS negotiation systems, the learning objectives could be 
various depending on different application domains such as: negotiation issues, 
domain knowledge or environment issues. 
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3.5.2.2 Key Elements in Learning 
Learning in a multi-agent environment can be a very complex process, considering 
that agents learn mutually, and the environment continuously changes. Moreover, 
agents' actions and strategies are often not directly observable, the action taken by the 
learning agent can strongly bias the range of behaviours that are encountered (Grecu 
and Brown, 1998a). However, no matter how complex the learning process is, there 
are always three essential components in the process, on which the learning agent 
bases its learning. These are agents' expectations, feedback information, and credit 
assignment to evaluate the feedback information and decision-making. 
9 Expectations: 
Expectations are the bases for agent learning. In a general MAS domain, expectations 
represent an agent's beliefs that events will occur in a pre-defined way. Expectations 
encode the agent's current knowledge of an event and the global environment in 
which it operates, and represent a basis for action in a partially observable and 
partially computable world (Grecu and Brown, 1998b). Expectations also reflect the 
criteria through which the agent relates to the environment. The expectations of an 
agent guide its decision-making during the operation process. In a negotiation domain, 
an agent's expectations determine what and how much the agent expects to get from 
the others, or what the others will do. 
On the other hand, an agent's expectations are limited in its anticipatory power due to 
the constraints imposed on perceiving the other agents and the environment. During 
the system operation process, an agent plans to perform a task according to its 
expectations, but may fail to do that because an event does not occur or because other 
agents respond in an unexpected manner. It means the agent's expectations are 
violated, either in a good or a bad sense. The violation of the expectation indicates 
that the agent's knowledge about other agents, events, or environment has limited 
validity. If not noticed or taken into consideration, the agent will repeatedly fail in 
outlining and implementing its actions. A continuous learning process makes it 
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possible for an agent to modify its expectations to be more realistic during the 
negotiation process. 
Hu and Wellman (1996) characterise an agent's belief process in terms of conjectures 
about the effect of their actions. A conjectural equilibrium is then defined, in which 
all agents' expectations are realised, and each agent responds optimally to its 
expectations. They present a multi-agent system where an agent builds a model of the 
response of others. Their experimental results show that depending on the starting 
point, the agent may be better or worse than had it not attempted to learn about/from 
the other agents. 
" Feedback 
The availability of information is a primary requirement for the learning process. 
Sound and unbiased feedback information provides a learning agent with resources 
about the other agents' perceptions, the properties of events, and the system working 
environment. Feedback can originate from direct communication with other agents, or 
indirectly, mediated by intermediary agents, or without communication, directly 
through the learning agent's observations of the effects of its decisions and other 
agents' actions. Feedback can be biased by the path to the receiver. Feedback may 
also contain different information or be from several sources, and therefore its effect 
depends on how these sources are used: filtered, independently or in a combined 
manner. Feedback can also be affected and reduced by processes such as conflicts and 
backtracking, or hidden through social decision making schemes. 
" Evaluation Criteria 
Evaluation criteria are closely related to the expectations of the learning agent. A 
basic problem that any learning system is confronted with is how the agent evaluates 
the feedback from the others as a response to the agent's last decisions or actions. In a 
more general sense, it is a problem of properly assigning credit for overall 
performance changes to each of the system activities that contributed to those changes 
(Weiss, 1996). The selection of performance criteria shapes the direction in which the 
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system will evolve. The evaluation problem can be usefully decomposed into two sub- 
problems: the assignment of credit for an overall performance change to external 
actions, and the assignment of credit for an action to the corresponding internal 
decisions. 
3.5.3 Methods of Learning 
The approach to learning is the most essential problem for any MAS learning 
problem. Most current approaches are extended from machine learning methods. A 
few researchers have made detailed analyses: 
" Winston (1997) has drawn a big picture of the existing learning methods in MAS 
(Figure 3.3). Most of the efforts in Al focus on the first two classes of methods, 
with recent emphasis on the second class. 
Model Free, 
Genetic Algorithms 
Memory Based 
Methods Case Based Systems 
Neural Networks 
Machine HFunction 
Approximation Decision Trees learning 
Methods 
H 
Reinforcement Learning 
Structure 
Expert Systems 
(old stuff) 
Oriented Methods 
Novel Methods 
(active research) 
Figure 3.3. The classification of learning methods for MAS (modified from 
Winston, 1997) 
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" Carbonell (1989) makes a summary of the major machine learning paradigms 
which have a high potential of being applied in MAS. They are: 
a) Inductive learning: acquiring concepts from sets of positive and negative 
examples; 
b) Analytic learning: explanation-based learning and certain forms of analogical 
and case-based learning methods, deductive methods, and analytic methods; 
c) Genetic algorithms: classifier systems; and 
d) Connectionist learning methods: nonrecurrent "backdrop" hidden layer neural 
networks. 
" Jennings et al. (1999) conclude that the previous work related to learning in MAS 
is limited and much of this work relied on techniques derived from reinforcement 
learning, genetic algorithms and classifier systems. 
" Grecu and Brown (1998a) list the learning approaches in the MAS engineering 
design domain as: explanation-based learning, concept/induction learning, 
knowledge compilation, multi-strategy learning, case-based learning, 
reinforcement learning, generic algorithm learning, and neural networks. Some of 
these are briefly discussed below: 
a) Reinforcement learning is based on the idea that the tendency to produce an 
action should be reinforced if it produces favourable results, and weakened if it 
produces unfavourable results. It uses few little computation resources per 
example but requires a large number of examples. 
b) The concept learning model developed by Shaw (1996) closely follows the 
paradigm of collective group induction. Agents develop different hypotheses 
of concept description by seeing a set of training instances. Agents differ in the 
rules they use to generate their hypotheses. Hypotheses are periodically 
integrated into group hypotheses that achieve a better accuracy than the 
individual agent hypotheses. 
c) Many multi-strategy learning approaches use an initial learning phase to 
achieve acceptable levels of performance in agents. The agents' knowledge is 
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then used to seed and evolve an agent population with refined performance. 
Gordon and Subramanian (1994) describe an agent learning approach in an 
embedded adversarial multi-agent setting. The first learning phase uses 
compilation to operationalise the agent's task knowledge. The second phase 
refines the rule sets representing the agents' task strategies through a genetic 
algorithm approach. 
d) The genetic algorithm approach has lead to a significant amount of 
experimental and theoretical results. Grefenstetter and Daley (1996) describe 
experiments with co-evolutionary approaches, that are similar to an ecological 
environment where species evolve during the interactions with each other. 
Their goal is to design behaviour strategies for intelligent robots in MAS 
environments. Haynes and Sen (1997) analyse crossover operators and fitness 
functions that allow rapid evolution of agents with good task performance. 
" Weiss (1996) has undertaken a comprehensive study about the possible learning 
approaches in MAS according to the learning method and learning feedback. 
According to the learning method or strategy by a learning entity, the following 
methods are usually distinguished. A major difference between these methods lies 
in the amount of learning effort required by them, increasing from top to bottom: 
a) Rote learning: direct implantation of knowledge and skills without requiring 
further inference or transformation from the learner; 
b) Learning from instruction and by advise taking: operationalisation- 
transformation into an internal representation and integration with prior 
knowledge and skills - of new information like an instruction or an advice that 
is not directly executable by the learner; 
c) Learning from examples and by practice: extraction and refinement of 
knowledge and skills like a general concept or a standardised pattern of motion 
from positive and negative examples or from practical experience; 
d) Learning by analogy: solution-preserving transformation of knowledge and 
skills from a solved to similar but unsolved problem; and 
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e) Learning by discovery: gathering new knowledge and shills by making 
observations, conducting experiments, and generating and testing hypotheses 
or theories on the basis of the observational and experimental results. 
According to the learning feedback that is available to a learning entity, learning 
can be distinguished as: 
a) Supervised learning: the feedback specifies the desired activity of the learner 
and the objective of learning is to match this desired action as closely as 
possible; 
b) Reinforcement learning: the feedback only specifies the utility of the actual 
activity of the learner and the objective is to maximise this utility; and 
c) Unsupervised learning: no explicit feedback is provided and the objective is to 
find out useful and desired activities on the basis of trial and error and self- 
organised processes. 
In all three cases, the learning feedback is assumed to be provided by the system 
environment or the agents themselves. This means that the environment or an 
agent providing feedback acts as a teacher in the case of supervised learning and 
as a "critic" in the case of reinforcement learning; in the unsupervised learning, 
the environment and the agents just act as passive `observers'. 
Also, learning in MAS can also be analysed according to other criteria such as: 
" the purpose and goal of learning (i. e. learning to improve a single agent's skills 
and abilities, or to improve the agent system's coherence and co-ordination as a 
whole); 
" the categories of learning (i. e. only one of the agents gets involved in the learning 
process, or all available agents are involved); and 
" an agent's involvement in a learning process (the involvement of an agent is 
essential or not for achieving the pursued learning goal). 
These learning paradigms emerged from quite different scientific roots, employ 
different computational methods, and often rely on different ways of evaluating 
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success. Some of the learned elements have generality which makes them applicable 
to any type of negotiation partner, some will apply only to agents of a particular type, 
while other learned elements represent information useful only when negotiating with 
specific agents. Furthermore, different agents do not necessarily adopt the same 
learning method or the same type of learning feedback. In the course of learning, an 
agent may employ different learning methods and types of learning feedback. Finally, 
learning can occur not only during the negotiation process, but also afterwards. The 
negotiation history together with some evaluation techniques for the agent's past 
actions can be used to classify agents as more or less successful. 
3.5.4 Challenging Research Issues 
Although agent learning has gained a high interest in the MAS research community, 
the current learning approaches are very limited. For example, most current 
approaches to learning in MAS have been using purely reactive architectures where 
agents base their actions just on the current situation and not on the previous history, 
and there is no notion of deliberate planning towards an explicit goal (Kaelbling et al., 
1996). Such approaches are less than optimal in complex domains where knowledge- 
based planning and complex co-ordination is necessary. In other words, although 
these learning techniques can be successful in restricted domains, they strip agents of 
the ability to adapt in a domain-dependent fashion, based on background knowledge 
of the respective situation. This ability is crucial in complex domains where 
background knowledge has a large impact on the quality of the agents' decision 
making. 
Besides the learning techniques, Weiss (1996) points out some other aspects which 
challenge agent learning in MAS: 
" requirements for learning in MAS; 
" principles and concepts of learning in MAS; 
" models and architectures of MAS capable of learning; 
" extension and transformation of single-agent learning approaches to MAS learning 
approaches; 
109 
" parallel and distributed inductive learning in MAS; 
" multi-strategy and multi-perspective learning in MAS; 
" learning in MAS as organisational self-design; and 
" theoretical analysis of learning in MAS. 
3.6 MAS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
This section addresses two major aspects of the application of MAS in the 
construction industry. One is the necessity, possibility and advantages of MAS in 
solving construction problems. Another is how to apply MAS in the industry. A few 
applications are described. 
3.6.1 Why MAS? 
One of the most important driving forces behind MAS research and development is 
the technology push of a growing standardised communication infrastructure - 
Internet, WWW, KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language), and XML 
(eXtensible Markup Language). The Internet is particularly important as it enables 
separately designed agents, often belonging to different organisations, to interact in an 
open environment in real-time and carry out transactions safely. Another reason is the 
strong application pull for computer support for negotiation at the operative decision- 
making level. 
MAS are not required merely to produce modularity (though they reduce complexity), 
extra speed (though this may be an effect of their inherent parallelism), reliability 
(though they provide redundancy), flexibility or re-usability (Newell, 1982). In the 
same way, they are not required simply because a problem is too large for a 
centralised single agent due to resource limitation, nor because of the sheer risk of a 
centralised system, nor merely for reasons of efficiency, heterogeneous reasoning, etc. 
Problems requiring multi-agent solutions include the following (Sen, 1997; Nwana 
and Ndumu, 1999): 
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" Problems requiring the interconnecting and inter-operation of multiple, 
autonomous, "self-interested" existing legacy systems, e. g. expert systems or 
decision-support systems. 
" Similarly, problems whose solutions draw from distributed autonomous experts. 
Agents in a multi-agent system are often designed based on functionality: such 
systems are modular in design and hence can be easier to develop and maintain. 
" Problems that are inherently distributed in nature (e. g. distributed sensor 
interpretation, co-ordination of self-interested agents, etc. ). 
" Problems whose solutions require the collation and fusion of information, 
knowledge or data from distributed, autonomous and selfish information sources. 
A key benefit for the application of MAS in the construction industry is that MAS 
provides a decentralised approach to modelling the fragmented construction 
engineering and management problems. Such fragmented problems, though widely 
recognised, are difficult to be solved using other approaches. The idea of 
incorporating MAS into the construction industry provides a novel approach to 
tackling distributed problems. Some other key benefits could be: effective 
decomposition of large-scale problems; improved collaborative and concurrent 
working; and easier and cheaper access to specialist information. The use of agent- 
based systems is expected to result in increased competitiveness of the construction 
industry as the decentralisation of complex, large-scale problems and the collaborative 
input to their resolution, will lead to better quality, more economic, safer and more 
optimal solutions. 
3.6.2 Some Applications 
Given the potential benefits that MAS could bring to the industry, several research 
projects have been conducted, attempting to resolve the conflicts between project 
participants, to facilitate decision support at various stages of a construction project, 
or to reach a better solution for construction engineering problems. Two main areas 
being addressed are engineering design and negotiations. 
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3.6.2.1 Agent-Based Design 
Much of the work in the area of automated design has been done on building design 
support. Focus is on co-ordinating the activities and information flow between 
designers who are often geographically distributed, and on modelling agents to 
facilitate workflow between architectures and engineering in a collaborative design 
environment. Some of the developed systems are described as follows: 
" Fenves et al., (1994) developed an Integrated Building Design Environment 
(IBDE) project. Agents in IBDE are classified into two groups: generators and 
critics. The generators typically are knowledge-based systems that contribute to 
the development of the emerging design such as the `ARCHPLAN" (developing 
the building design concept), the `CORE `(generating layouts of the service core), 
and the `STRPES' (configuring the structure system). The critics do not contribute 
directly to the design descriptions, but evaluate the current description and make 
recommendations for redesign such as constructibility assessment by the 
`CONSTRUCTION CRITIC' and structure evaluation by the `STRUCTURAL 
CRITIC'. Each generator and critic agent is described according to the role it plays 
in the overall project. As an information-processing unit, each agent is first 
described in terms of its principal inputs and outputs, then is further described by 
the problem-solving paradigm it adopts, and how it transforms inputs into 
solutions. 
" Chiou and Logcher (1996) have implemented an agent-based system for design. 
Agents have areas of specialist knowledge and perform design and checking tasks. 
They interact directly with a user who is responsible for design changes. However, 
there is no provision for direct negotiation between agents during the design 
process, so the number of designs evaluated remains small. Hence, convergence to 
a near optimal design depends on the user and does not make full use of the 
available computational power which can allow for the evaluation of many 
slightly differing designs automatically. 
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" Heckel, et al. (1996) developed an Agent Collaboration Environment (ACE). The 
ACE supports collaboration amongst members of the design team by providing 
the infrastructure for a community of cooperative design agents that assist the 
users. In the framework, agents are organised into business processes to reflect the 
various functional tasks and workflow between different design teams in an 
organisational setting. Agents communicate with each other using libraries of 
design objects such as beams, columns, and footings. Agents are reactive, but 
have the capability to run in the background and advise users on design issues 
such as code violations. Heckel (1996) metaphorically described the ACE as "a 
gathering place of several `experts' represented as agents. Each agent has 
particular expertise in a relatively narrow domain, but the groups of agents are all 
working on a common problem" with each agent embodying a particular expertise 
that must be acquired from source. The primary role of an ACE agent is as 
"design assistants that use heuristic rules and a powerful checklist facility to 
automate routine design tasks, enhancing productivity and design quality". 
" Radeke (1997) describes the GENIAL project (Global Engineering Network 
Intelligent Access Libraries). The objective of the project is to facilitate large- 
scale collaborative engineering by establishing a common semantic infrastructure 
that will enable heterogeneous software systems to communicate and exchange 
information. An example of such system-system communication is automated 
database transactions at enterprise-level. This will enable enterprises from 
different engineering sectors to combine internal knowledge with engineering 
knowledge accessed on-line and world-wide via the global engineering network. It 
is expected that the project will lead to domain-specific toolkits for acquisition, 
retrieval and presentation of internal and external engineering knowledge. 
" The DESSYS (2000) project is part of a wider research program, Virtual Reality 
Design Information System. DESSYS investigates the deployment of multiple 
software agents to improve collaborative decision-making in multidisciplinary 
architectural design environment. This research covers knowledge modelling for a 
decision support system in geotechnical design. It also investigates some of the 
important issues for decision-support in construction. The first issue is on different 
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techniques of transferring knowledge and how the knowledge is used in the 
process of making decisions in structural-design. The second issue deals with 
formalising expert-knowledge in such a way that it can be used as decision- 
knowledge in the early phases of a multidisciplinary building-process. The final 
phases deal with developing a knowledge-based agent, and validating the 
prototype. 
3.6.2.2 Negotiation 
Negotiation is the core of many MAS in construction because it is often unavoidable 
between different project participants with their particular tasks and domain 
knowledge whilst they interact to achieve their individual objective as well as the 
group goals. Furthermore, the importance of negotiation in MAS is likely to increase. 
One reason is the growth of fast and inexpensive standardised communication 
infrastructures, over which separately designed agents belonging to different 
organisations, can interact in an open environment in real-time, and safely carry out 
transactions. Secondly, there is an industrial trend to be able to respond to larger and 
more diverse orders. Such ventures can realise the resource allocation efficiently and 
are easier to adapt to a dynamically changing economic environment. The following 
are negotiation algorithms developed in construction. 
" Ugwu et al. (1999) developed an ADLIB model in which agents are used to model 
construction design project. Each agent needs to satisfy its minimum specification 
requirement, while it may give up something for the other participants to reach 
their minimum requirements. The relationship between agents lies between fully 
co-operative and fully hostile. Different design teams co-ordinate their 
requirements through negotiations. The monotonic concession protocol (MCP) is 
adopted in their negotiations, whilst each agent adopts a gradient concession 
strategy given the MCP protocol. 
9 Pena-Mora and Wang (1998) develop a CONVINCER model to facilitate the 
negotiation of conflict resolution in large-scale civil engineering projects. 
Essentially, the model is based on game theory, where a player's actions are based 
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on the premise that the decision of any player can affect the payoff of all players. 
Also, the model analyses various conflict situations and settlement solutions. The 
negotiation model contains two steps. First, each negotiator expresses his interests 
in the conflict. Once the interests have been expressed correctly, the influence of 
positions of conflicting interests on the overall negotiation outcome is evaluated 
using game theory. By following this collaborative negotiation approach, they 
build an agent, which facilitates or mediates the negotiation of conflicts in 
projects. 
" Kim et al. (2000) develop a project schedule co-ordination model through 
compensatory negotiation -a framework wherein a project can be rescheduled 
dynamically by all of the concerned project participants based on their resource 
profiles. It is intended to lead to individually rational and globally optimal 
solutions in agent-based project schedule co-ordination domains. The 
compensatory negotiation approach allows an agent to transfer utility to other 
agents for compensation of the disadvantageous agreements through a multi- 
linked negotiation process. In their study, utility is defined as the difference 
between benefit (i. e. profit gain for the task from a possible option) and cost (i. e. 
cost incurred for succeeding task due to the possible option). 
" Oliveira et al. (1997) develop a MACIV model. The project aims to design and 
implement a MAS, enabling decentralised management of the different resources 
in a construction company. In their system, negotiation follows a six-step process, 
i. e. announcing, task evaluation, selection phase, market manipulation and price 
adjustment. The last two steps are repeated until all the agents except one get out 
of the process, or some timeout arrives. Each agent makes decisions according to 
its estimate of the cost for the execution of each task in terms of the travel cost, 
depreciation cost, operation cost, operator cost and profits. A co-ordinator agent is 
introduced in the system. 
A common drawback in these negotiation algorithms is that they often fail to address 
the complex issues of negotiations in construction. For example, although the 
CONVINCER model focuses on the negotiation resolution of construction conflicts, 
115 
each party's decision-making is finally determined by a simple game theory rule, 
which can hardly represent the real negotiation situations. A more sophisticated 
negotiation mechanism needs to be developed for construction claims negotiation - 
the focus of this thesis. 
3.6.3 Problems and Challenges 
Although multi-agent systems provide many potential advantages, they also face 
many difficult challenges such as: the information discovery problem, the 
communication problem, the ontology problem, the legacy software integration 
problem, the reasoning and co-ordination problem and monitoring problem (Nwana 
and Ndumu, 1999). To design and implement MAS for industrial problems, 
developers need to address a number of questions (Gasser and Huhns, 1989; Jennings 
et al. 1999): 
9 How to formulate, describe, decompose, and allocate problems and synthesise 
results among a group of intelligent agents; 
" How to enable agents to communicate and interact. What communication 
languages and protocols to use. What and when to communicate; 
" How to ensure that agents act coherently in making decisions or taking action, 
accommodating the non-local effects of local decisions and avoiding harmful 
interactions; 
" How to enable individual agents to represent and reason about the actions, plans, 
and knowledge of other agents in order to co-ordinate with them. How to reason 
about the state of their co-ordinated process (e. g. initiation and completion); 
9 How to recognise and reconcile disparate viewpoints and conflicting intentions 
among a collection of agents trying to co-ordinate their actions; 
" How to effectively balance local computation and communication. More 
generally, how to manage allocation of limited resources; 
" How to avoid or mitigate harmful overall system behaviour, such as chaotic or 
oscillatory behaviour; and 
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9 How to engineer and constrain practical multi-agent systems. How to design 
technology platforms and development methodologies for multi-agent systems. 
All these questions are concerned with the key points of the development of the 
MASCOT model, and will be addressed (more or less) in this project. For example, 
the first four questions address the critical issues such as how to model the industrial 
problems in a MAS environment, and how to build the agent co-ordination 
mechanism based on the identified industrial problem. These questions need to be 
answered during the conceptual model development process. The answers of the later 
questions are crucial for the quality of the developed system; and ensure that the 
system will work properly. 
Jennings et al. (1999) puts particular emphasis on two major technical impediments to 
the widespread adoption of agent technology: 
" the lack of a systematic methodology enabling designers to clearly specify and 
structure their applications as multi-agent systems; and 
" the lack of widely available industrial-strength toolkits for building MAS. 
The former means that most existing applications have been designed in a fairly ad 
hoc manner - either by borrowing a methodology and trying to shoe-horn it to the 
multi-agent context, or by working without a methodology and designing the system 
based on intuition and past experience. This is the biggest and hardest problem for the 
widespread application of MAS. What is required is a means of analysing the problem 
of working out how it can be best structured as a MAS, and then determing how the 
individual agent can be structured. A clear, non-ad hoc methodology is vital for the 
further development of MAS. 
The latter impediment means that most MAS projects expend significant development 
effort building up basic infrastructure before the main thrust of agent and inter-agent 
development can commence. Again, this is an unsustainable position. The position 
can be alleviated to a certain extent by exploiting existing technologies as, and where 
appropriate - rather than re-inventing the wheel as often happens at the moment. 
However, greater support is still needed for the process of building agent-level 
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features. Thus, a toolkit is required, providing facilities for: specifying an agent's 
problem solving behaviour specifying how and when agents should interact, and 
visualising and debugging the problem solving behaviour of the agents and of the 
entire system. 
Solutions to the above problems are intertwined. For example, a different modelling 
scheme for an individual agent may constrain the range of effective co-ordination 
regimes; different procedures of communication and interaction have implications for 
behavioural coherence; different problem and task decompositions may yield different 
interactions. The application of MAS in the construction industry face all these 
problems, and have the additional difficulties arising form the flexible and 
sophisticated interactions between autonomous problem solving components required 
by the specific industrial problems. The solutions to these problems need to be formed 
in the context of solving real or quasi-real world problems. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the main concepts and characteristics of intelligent agents and 
multi-agent systems. It first presented the definitions, taxonomies, development 
process, and organisations of intelligent agents; it then discussed the major 
characteristics, disciplines, classification, and applications of agent-based systems. 
Both DPS and MAS were introduced, particularly the latter and a number of 
applications were examined. Section 3.4 explored the basic principles of agent 
negotiation and various agent negotiation mechanisms. Section 3.5 analysed the key 
components of agent learning; discussed the major agent learning approaches; and 
pointed out the problems and challenges for developing learning approaches. Finally, 
this chapter discussed the potential benefits, application methods, implementation 
areas, and possible problems for the application of MAS in construction. 
Some of the main points made in this chapter include the following: 
" In general, MAS represent a melting pot of ideas orienting from such areas as 
distributed computing, object-oriented systems, software engineering, artificial 
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intelligence, economics, sociology, and organisational science. At its core is the 
concept of autonomous agents interacting with one another for their individual 
and/or collective good. This basic conceptual framework offers a natural and 
powerful means of analysing, modelling, and resolving many real world problems. 
" Negotiation, the most important agent collaboration mechanism, plays a central 
role in MAS. The development of various agent negotiation mechanisms and their 
applications in different environments reveal the potential and possibility for the 
MASCOT system to facilitate construction claims negotiation. The study of 
negotiation mechanisms provided valuable experience for the development of 
MASCOT negotiation protocol and strategies, and pointed out the direction in 
which the MASCOT system should focus. 
" An agent's learning ability increases its negotiation power in a MAS. The analysis 
of the components and processes of agent learning suggested what and how an 
agent would learn from other agents or the environments. The philosophical 
differences between different learning methods suggested which method was more 
suitable for a particular system, and which had more potential to be applied in the 
MASCOT system. 
" The study of the research projects conducted on the applications of MAS in the 
construction industry to facilitate engineering designs and negotiations indicated 
how MAS have been framed to solve different industrial problems. This is 
particularly important for the development of the MASCOT system in the 
construction industry environment. 
The next two chapters will address the above three aspects of the MASCOT system 
(i. e. the industrial background, agent negotiation, and learning). Chapter 4 first 
explores the major negotiation theories on which the MASCOT negotiation 
mechanism is based. Chapter 5 identifies the reasoning model of the MASCOT 
system by further analysing the nature and major characteristics of claims negotiation; 
selects the theoretical negotiation model; and develops the MASCOT negotiation 
mechanism (e. g. the negotiation protocol and strategies), where a particular learning 
approach - Bayesian learning approach is adopted. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NEGOTIATION THEORIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Negotiation, as an important human co-operation approach, has been studied and defined 
by many researchers in different research domains, such as: economics, society, politics 
and AI systems. For example, 
" Collins Cobuild English Dictionary: Negotiations are formal discussions between 
people who have different aims or intentions, especially in business or politics, during 
which they try to reach an agreement. 
" Zartman (1977): Negotiation is a joint decision process between two or several 
parties or their representatives. Negotiation tends to be a matter of finding a formula 
encompassing the optimum combination of interests of both parties and then of 
working out the details that implement these principles and affect the agreement. 
Negotiation is a dynamic process, on-going, involving moves and countermoves. 
" Hammer and Clay (1977): Negotiation is the interaction that occurs when two or 
more persons attempt to agree on a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation where 
their orders of preference for possible outcomes are negatively correlated. 
" Gulliver (1979): Negotiation is one kind of problem-solving process, in which people 
attempt to reach a joint decision on matters of common concern in situations where 
they are in disagreement and conflict. 
9 Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994): Negotiation is a form of decision-making process 
where two or more parties jointly search a space of possible solutions with the goal 
of reaching a consensus (deal). 
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9 Lesser (1998): Negotiation, the process of arriving at a state that is mutually 
agreeable to a set of agents, is intimately related to co-ordination. 
These definitions provide different views about negotiation objective, nature, scope, and 
elements involved. For example, 
" From a social-psychological perspective, Bartos (1977) concludes that the nature of 
negotiation is to resolve the conflicts between competitive individualism and co- 
operative collectivism. Negotiation often involves dual and mostly conflicting 
motivations: the individual (competitive) desire to maximise one's own utility and the 
collective (co-operative) desire to reach a fair solution. Negotiations can proceed 
smoothly only when they are guided by the collective desire for fairness, or when the 
loss of breaking negotiation is higher than that of reaching an agreement for either 
party even if negotiators are selfishly motivated4. 
. In DAI, as defined by Lesser (1998), negotiation could be a co-ordination approach 
for participants to gain more. There is not necessary any conflict between the 
participants. This is so-called co-operate negotiation. 
In most cases, negotiation participants have power over each other during this process 
s (Young, 1991). There are relatively fixed parties and flexible values in negotiation. 
Value and behaviour are modified to alter divergent positions toward a common 
convergence of values (Spector, 1977). Negotiation normally includes three stages: 
" Negotiation starts from the point where each party tries to maximise his own payoff; 
" By exchanging information, two parties explore the nature and extent of their 
differences and the possibilities open to them, and seek to induce or persuade each 
4 The following study focuses more on this kind of negotiation. Such negotiation is also commonly termed 
as bargaining. 
s At this point, the focus is on the changing value of a negotiator during the negotiation. However, the 
participants of a negotiation could be changed (add or reduce) during the negotiation process. This is true 
particularly when negotiation is conducted between agents in multi-agent systems. 
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other to modify their expectations and requirements, and then search for an outcome 
that is at least satisfactory enough to both parties (Gulliver, 1979). Different strategies 
are adopted by negotiation participants, such as: concession making, contending, 
problem solving, inaction, withdrawal (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). 
" Finally, an agreement is reached, theoretically, at an equilibrium point where the 
opposing interests are balanced. Practically, the final results are inevitably influenced 
by many factors such as: the negotiators' personal capabilities, negotiation strategies, 
time constraints, expectations, and the relationship between the parties. Therefore, the 
outcome of a negotiation could be the victory of one party, a simple compromise, 
win-win result, or a conflict. 
As an important social activity, negotiation involves more complex human interactions 
than simple technical issues. Many important theories and principles have been 
developed to explain various aspects of negotiation. Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) 
summarise three main traditions in the study of negotiation: 
" The first consists of books and manuals providing advice on practical negotiation 
issues (e. g. Fisher and Patton, 1982; Cohen, 1991; Warham, 1993; Fowler, 1996). 
" The second consists of mathematical models of rational behaviour developed by 
economists and game theorists (e. g. Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Young 1975). These 
models are ordinarily limited to a relatively narrow set of tactics, such as concession 
making or third-party recommendations for particular agreements. They focus on the 
various situations, assumptions, outcomes, and bargaining processes of negotiation. 
The two kinds of model are sometimes combined by theorists who use the tools of 
rational analysis to examine the wide range of tactics used by most negotiators and 
third parties (e. g. Schelling, 1960; Raiffa, 1982). 
Rojot (1991), accepted by most of the negotiation theorists, terms the theories 
developed based on these approaches as Mechanical Theory where the distinctions 
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between the classical game theoretical model and the economic theoretical model are 
identified6. 
9 The third, behavioural, tradition seeks to develop and test predictive and practical 
theory about the impact of environmental conditions on negotiator (or mediator) 
behaviour, human behaviours during negotiation, and the impact of these conditions 
and behaviours on outcomes (e. g. Walton and Mckersie, 1965; Rubin and Brown, 
1975; Morley and Stephenson, 1977). The theories developed based on this approach 
are classified as behaviour theory. 
With the aim of developing a MAS negotiation system, this study focuses on the second 
approach since it provides theoretical foundations for computer-based negotiation 
systems. Meanwhile the behaviour theoretical approach is also taken into consideration, 
as the concepts of behaviour models are crucial for computer negotiation systems to 
simulate practical negotiations. 
. Section 2 first reviews classical game theory and its applications in negotiation, 
discusses economic theory, and compares the advantages and disadvantages of these 
two approaches in analysing negotiation. 
Section 3 discusses behaviour theory and a few important behaviour theoretical 
models. 
4.2 MECHANICAL THEORY 
Mechanical Theory includes two closely related approaches: the classical game 
theoretical approach and the economic theory approach. These are discussed below: 
6 Some MAS researchers view the theories developed based on this approach as Game Theory, where the 
economic approach is treated as a branch of the game theoretical negotiation approach termed as strategic 
bargaining approach, whilst the classical game theoretical approach is termed as axiom bargaining 
approach. The problem in this classification is that a confusion is easily generated between the strategic 
(normal) form of game theory and the strategic bargaining approach (for details, see Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1994; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm, 1996; Kraus, 1997). To avoid such a 
confusion, the term classical game theoretical approach is used to distinguish the general game theoretical 
approach. 
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4.2.1 The Classical Game Theoretical Approach 
Game theory seeks to get at the essentials of decision-making and the associated 
strategies in situations where two or more parties are interdependent, and where, 
therefore, the outcome of their conflict and competition must be the product of their joint 
requirements and the interaction of their separate choices (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). 
These parties are in a situation in which there may be many possible outcomes with 
different values to them. Although they may have some control which will influence the 
outcome, they do not have complete control over others. Each party in a game faces a 
cross-optimisation problem. 
Game theory represents the most thorough search for a determinate solution to 
negotiation problems (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). All types of negotiation can be 
conceptualised as different kinds of games (Brams, 1990). It focuses on the logical and 
hypothetical conceptualisation of problems and processes wherein many of the variables 
of the real negotiation are ignored. For example, all game theoretical models are based on 
some important simplifying assumptions which determine how the theory works and its 
scope. According to Nash (1950), the fundamental assumptions are: 
" both the number of players and their identity are assumed to be fixed and known to 
everyone; 
" players are rational and expect others to be rational; 
" players attempt to maximise their own gain or utility; 
" players have complete information on the utility of alternative settlements to 
themselves and their opponents. The payoff function for each player is fixed and 
known at the outset. The utility function of each player is fixed and known. 
Based on these assumptions, game theory places negotiation in the context of a general 
theory of individual choice. Given the mutual dependence relationship in decision- 
making, such choice becomes a strategic issue; that is, a party must assess how to 
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maximise his own gain in the context of potential interference from others (Gulliver, 
1979). The game theoretical models are essentially static models which attempt to deduce 
what strategy a player should take, taking account of the fact that an outcome is the result 
of the interdependent strategies and choices of two or more players. Therefore, the major 
objective of the game theory approach is to offer a set of rules that describe how rational 
actors choose the best strategy most consistent with the bargainers' conflicting interests 
(Shubik, 1975). 
The basic elements of game theory are players, payoffs and rules of action. First, there 
must be a well-defined set of courses of action for each of a number of players. Second, 
there must be well-defined preferences for each player among possible outcomes of the 
game, or mixtures of his outcomes. Third, the relationships must exist whereby the 
outcome is determined by the player's courses of action (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). 
A game can be categorised as zero sum or non-zero sum, depending on whether there is 
a fixed set of available payoffs. In zero sum games, players try to garner as much of this 
fixed pot of rewards as possible. Every player assumes that his opponent will "do his 
worst" (Von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1947). The key point in this analysis is the 
proposition that a rational player in a two-person, zero-sum game can predict the 
preferences of his opponent accurately. There is no strategic interaction in his decision- 
making problem? (Young, 1975). 
In a non-zero sum game, players look to find opportunities such that mutual gains can be 
made, thereby increasing the size of the pot. In this situation, there are strategic 
interactions between players. To eliminate strategic interaction from non-zero sum 
situations, game theory is divided into a number of separate domains distinguished by the 
specific assumptions they employ: 
7 Strategic interaction is simply the set of behaviour patterns manifested by individuals whose choices are 
interdependent in negotiation (Young, 1975). 
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" Nash (1950) has sought to predict outcomes in non-zero sum interactions by 
searching for solutions that seem particularly stable - equilibrium points. Nash shows 
that under some rational behaviour and symmetry assumption, players would reach an 
agreement on a deal that will be individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and will 
maximise the product of the players' utility. 
" Nash (1953) also sought to circumvent the "outguessing" regress by introducing fixed 
decision rules, whose application yielded unique prediction concerning the 
distribution of payoffs between the players. These decision rules were based on 
specific criteria concerning the worth or power of the individual players and/or on 
certain desirable attributes of a solution. Games of this kind are known as co- 
operative games. 
" Harsanyi (1977) has sought to achieve determinate solutions for non-zero sum games 
by introducing the notion that each player may be able to assign "subjective 
probabilities" to the choices of the other players. 
Unlike the competitive games, these models not only use the idea of a solution concept 
where the agents' strategies form some type of equilibrium. Instead, desirable properties 
for a solution, called axioms of the bargaining solution, are postulated, and then the 
solution concept that satisfies these axioms is sought (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; 
1994). 
For example, in the Nash bargaining solution (1950), it is assumed that the space of 
feasible utility vectors is compact and convex. When many deals are individually rational 
(i. e. pay more than the fallback) to both agents, there may be many Nash equilibrium 
solutions. An example is that the agents are bargaining over how to split a dollar, all 
splits that gives each agent more than zero are in equilibrium. If Agent 1's strategy is to 
offer P and no more, Agent 2's best response is to take the offer as opposed to the 
fallback which is zero. Now, 1's best response to this is to offer P and no more. Thus, a 
Nash equilibrium exists for any P that defines a contract that is individually rational for 
both agents, and feasible (0<P<1). Due to the non-uniqueness of the equilibrium, a 
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stronger (axiomatic) solution concept such as the Nash bargaining solution is needed to 
prescribe a unique solution. 
The first axiom is based on the view that the agents' numeric utility functions really only 
represent ordinal preferences among outcomes - the actual cardinality of the utilities do 
not matter. Therefore, the utility function can be transformed, and the resulting game 
should be equivalent to the original game. The second axiom requires symmetry: if the 
agents have symmetric bargaining positions, their outcome utilities should be equal. 
Third, independence of irrelevant is required. The fourth axiom requires Pareto 
efficiency. It turns out that there is a unique solution that satisfies the four axioms. This 
Nash bargaining solution selects the utility pair that maximises the product of the players' 
gains in utility over their fallback utility. 
Game theory provides a useful benchmark and a fundamentally important methodological 
approach to the study of situations involving potential conflict. It provides a device to 
isolate key factors in negotiation with facility (Shubik, 1975). For example, some of the 
most important games such as `the prisoner's dilemma' and `the game of chicken' 
provide deep insight to negotiation. Rapoport (1983) conclude the strength of classical 
game theory as: "The mathematician's elucidation of problems in game theory sometimes 
leads not to a solution but to a clarification, namely of what it is that the problem 
involves, what obstacles stand in the way of solutions, what special cases of the problem 
can be treated by what methods". 
Although classical game theory is expected to provide a scientific framework that would 
allow the prediction of outcomes as well as the explanation of a negotiator's behaviour 
and decisions in real-life negotiation, there does not appear to be any convincing 
formulation that offers reliable explanation or prediction (Gulliver, 1979). The 
assumptions of the theory and its highly abstract mathematical solutions raise general 
problems in regard to their potential validity and applicability (Zartman, 1977): 
" the classical game theory formula presents a static representation of what is 
essentially a dynamic process in which components and their inter-relationships are 
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intrinsically subject to change, thus affecting their contribution to and the nature of 
the outcome; 
" the classical game theory formula includes components that are not measurable nor 
ascertainable even in broadly acceptable approximations8; and 
" the classical game theory is unsuitable for the analysis of the negotiation process 
because its assumptions identify and remove all the obstacles that bargainers have to 
confront. 
4.2.2 The Economic Theoretical Approach 
The economic theoretical approach, in contrast to the classical game theoretical approach, 
seeks to develop dynamic models of process, involving offers and counteroffers and 
interdependent concession making. There is no concern for the discovery of once-for-all 
strategies but rather an intention to examine how the bargainers should interact in terms 
of their expectations of each other. According to Young (1975), this approach is 
principally under conditions of bilateral monopoly which seeks to explain a jointly 
determined outcome in terms of the rational tendencies of the parties to reach an optimal 
point of intersection on their lists of interchangeable preferences. 
Economic theoretical approaches are fundamentally convergence models. They analyse 
the processes through which the demands of the participants converge over time toward 
some specific point on the contract curve. Therefore, the key element of these models is 
the development of a specific concession mechanism that permits the positions of the 
parties to converge in the course of a series of offers and counteroffers (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981). 
The best known economic theoretical approach is Zeuthen's economic welfare under 
condition of bilateral monopoly. In this model, the two players' bargaining problem is 
a This is also the common limitation faced by the mechanical theory (i. e. the adoption of the utility 
functions as the criterion to evaluate a participant's payoffs and determine his negotiation strategies). 
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considered as a one-player decision process under the assumption that if none of the 
players concedes at a particular step, they will reach a conflict. 
" The individual player compares the certain value he can obtain by accepting the other 
side's offer. Based on this offer, his own favoured outcome and the results of conflict, 
he calculates the maximum probability of conflict he would be willing to accept in 
preference to acquiescing on the current offer of the other side. 
" Concession will be made by the side willing to accept the smaller risk of conflict at 
any given moment in time. A player needs only reduce his own demand to the point 
where he is willing to accept a greater risk of conflict than the other (Young, 1975). 
Accordingly, each player must continue to concede until he is willing to accept a 
larger risk of conflict than his opponent. 
Cross's model (1975) emphasises the role of time as an important factor in bargaining, 
and conceptualises the process of making concession in terms of the adjustment of 
expectations through learning. In this model, an individual bargainer starts his 
calculations with his preference ordering for the outcomes in the payoff possibility set; a 
schedule of costs arising from the time that elapses before a specific contract is agree 
upon; and a precise estimate of the other side's concession rate over time. Each bargainer 
proceeds to calculate the optimal level for his own initial demand on the assumption that 
the other player will make all of the concessions by taking into account the trade-off 
between improvements in the final settlement associated with higher initial demands and 
the increased costs which higher demands produce as they extend the time required to 
reach a specific agreement. 
Based on these economic models, some bargaining alternative offering approaches in 
modern game theory have been discussed (e. g. Rasmusen, 1994; Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1990,1994; Kreps, 1990). An example is that one can again think about deciding how to 
split a dollar. With a finite number of offers and no time discount, the last offerer will get 
it all, and the other agent is indifferent between accepting a zero offer or getting a zero 
fallback payoff. With time discount, a finite game can be solved starting from the end. 
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The agent that is to make the first and the last offer gets a payoff that approaches 1/(1+Q) 
as the number of negotiation rounds approaches infinity. The term Q is the discount 
factor. When protocol in a non-discounted setting allows an infinite number of bargaining 
rounds, the solution concept is powerless because any split of the dollar can be supported 
in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, in a discounted infinite round 
setting, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is unique. Specifically, the first offerer 
gets (1-Q2)/(1-Q1Q2), where the first offerer's discount factor is Q1, and the other 
player's Q2 (Rasmusen, 1989). 
Another model of sequential bargaining does not use discounts, but assumes that there is 
a fixed bargaining cost per negotiation round. If the agents have symmetric bargaining 
costs, the solution concept is again powerless because any split of the dollar can be 
supported in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if the first offerer's 
bargaining cost is smaller than the other agent's, the first agent gets the entire dollar. If 
the first agent's bargaining cost is greater than the second's, the first agent receives a 
payoff that equals the second's bargaining cost. The second agent receives one minus 
this. Agreement is reached on the first round. 
The economic theoretical models differ from the models of the classical game theoretical 
approach in several ways: 
First, the economic theoretical models deal only with certain non-zero sum or mixed- 
motive situations. Thus, they focus on interactions in which there is a distinct range 
of possible outcomes within which each of the participants would prefer to reach an 
agreement than to accept an outcome of non-agreement, even though they have 
conflicting interests concerning the precise terms of agreement. Situations involving 
pure conflict and pure co-operation are outside the scope of these models. 
" Second, economic theoretical models treat negotiation as a process of convergence 
over time involving a sequence of offers and counter-offers. Consequently, the 
economic theoretical models are dynamic models which focus on the bargaining 
process as well as on the ultimate outcome of bargaining, whereas the game theoretic 
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models are predominantly static models which concentrate on the ultimate 
distribution of payoffs among the parties. 
" Third, the economic theoretical models tend to emphasise the formation of 
expectations about the behaviour of the relevant other(s) in contrast to the models of 
game theory which stress either conditions that allow each player to make accurate 
predictions concerning the behaviour of the relevant other(s) or characteristics of a 
permissible solution which are sufficient to yield determinate outcomes (Young, 
1975). 
4.3 BEHAVIOUR THEORY 
The applications of classical game theory and economic theory are limited by their 
assumptions which neglect the complex human factors in negotiation. On the contrary, 
behaviour theory attempts to analyse the negotiation processes in which negotiators 
influence each other's expectations, perceptions, assessments, and decisions during the 
search for an outcome, thereby affecting the outcome. Much attention is given to the 
nature of changing expectations and negotiator' tactics, and to the significance of 
uncertainties of information, perception, and evaluation - all matters that tend to be 
ignored by the mechanical theory. All this involves a closer approximation to the real 
world (Zartman, 1977). The major Behaviour models are discussed below: 
4.3.1 Psychological Model 
This approach focuses on analysing the personality or psychological responses of the 
decision-makers themselves rather than the negotiation process. It seeks to explain 
bargaining effectiveness in terms of variables such as the behavioural characteristics of 
the negotiators and their perceived and actual use of interpersonal strategies. It addresses 
the extent to which personality, perception, expectation, persuasion, and interaction of 
these factors within negotiator dyads can adequately describe and explain the process and 
outcomes of bargaining (Spector, 1977). Four factors are analysed in this approach: 
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" Negotiator personality identifies basic predisposition toward the opponent and 
motives for future actions and responses. It shapes one's perspective and expectations 
of particular objects and goals. 
" Perceptions and expectations of the opponent's strengths, weaknesses, intentions, 
commitments, and goals are likely to affect negotiation responses, the tone of 
interpersonal communication, and the learning process. 
" The use of persuasive techniques and their success in modifying negotiator values 
toward initially desired end-states should help to achieve acceptable outcomes. 
" The interaction of psychological and contextual factors address the possibility that 
certain personalities become instrumental in motivating the bargaining process only 
under particular negotiation conditions. 
The advantages of the psychological approach lie in the fact that it focuses on the fixed 
element of the process - the parties - and their ability or propensity to modify the variable 
element- the values at stake. It deals with realistic aspects of negotiation using concepts 
that are possible to operationalise. In many practical negotiations, psychological 
approaches play a very important role in the success of the negotiations. The drawback of 
this approach is that the analysis of the agent rather than the process. It focuses on the 
secondary rather than the primary element of decision-making. 
4.3.2 The Learning Model 
This approach views negotiation as a learning process in which each party is largely 
dependent on his experience of the results of past actions by the two parties. What has 
occurred previously is used as a standard of assessment by which to choose what to aim 
for and what to do next (Gulliver, 1979). The basis of this model is that negotiators' 
strategies are changeable. Negotiation strategies are contingent, contain errors, 
expectations will change, and this will lead in turn to a modification of each party's 
choice of strategy. 
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Negotiators' behaviours are classified as: actual payoff demands and manipulative moves 
such as threats or coercive actions. The latter are not directly related to the payoff, but 
they do affect the overall value of the negotiation because they may influence the 
settlement point and costs of negotiation. The learning process involves identifying the 
other party's real payoff demands and manipulative moves to decide the negotiator's own 
strategy. 
The learning mechanism establishes a dynamic interaction between the two parties' 
behaviours. Supposing Sa is Party A's strategy, Ra is Party B's estimate of Party A's 
strategy under an uncertainty Vb. Sa determines the current course of ra, which is used by 
Party B in the formation of Ra. In response to Ra, Party B selects strategy Sb which 
determines the course of rb, and this in turn is the basis for Party A's estimate Rb. As a 
consequence of learning, S. and Rb may be continually changing, so that what is learned 
in the form of Ra or Rb is a composite of a sequence of strategies rather than a single one 
(Cross, 1977). Such a learning process is expressed in Figure 4.1. 
Party A's Strategy S. re Party B's belief of 
Party A's strategy R. 
Party A's belief of rb 
Party B's strategy Rb 
Figure 4.1 A general learning mechanism 
Party B's Strategy Sb 
The learning model plays an important role in current negotiation theory since it reflects 
and simulates one of the most important characteristics of practical negotiations - the 
inference process of negotiators. For example, its importance has been recognised in the 
game research community as fundamental for understanding human behaviour as well as 
for developing new solution concepts (Cross, 1977; Osborne & Rubinstein 1994; Jordan, 
1992). Various learning mechanisms, such as: Q-learning, collective learning and 
Bayesian learning have been developed for intelligent agents. 
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4.3.3 The Dual Responsiveness Model 
Unlike the learning model, the dual responsive approach shows that negotiator's 
responsiveness can be based on both his own previous concessions and the opponent's 
concessions. A negotiator's response is a function of his own previous pattern of 
concession making as well as the opponent's concession rate (Figure 4.2). His responses 
are mediated by expectations which are adjusted through the course of the conference. 
This approach suggests two types of monitoring functions in negotiation: each negotiator 
monitors the other side for evidence of movement and monitors his own side for evidence 
of preferences. Unlike the learning approach, this approach calls attention to the 
importance of an internal dynamic in bargaining while both emphasise the importance of 
mutual responsiveness. Responsiveness is likely to occur in both directions. 
My previous concession 
process I 
My decisions of concession I 
at next step 
The opponent's previous 
and current concessions 
Figure 4.2 The dual responsive model 
4.3.4 The Joint Decision Making Model 
Zartman (1977) points out that the above models do not correspond to the conceptual 
characteristics that negotiation is a mode of the decision-making process, and do not deal 
with the process as it is actually practised. He concludes that negotiation tends to be a 
matter of finding a formula encompassing the optimum combination of interests of both 
parties and then of working out the details that implement these principles and affect the 
agreement. 
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Negotiators first seek a general definition of the items under discussion, conceived and 
grouped in such a way as to be susceptible to joint agreement under a common notion of 
justice. Once agreement on a formula is achieved, it is possible to turn to the specifics of 
items and to exchange proposals, concessions, and agreements. Details are resolved most 
frequently in terms of the referents which justify them and give them value rather than in 
their own intrinsic values. This means that convergence does not take place by inching 
away from fixed positions toward a middle, but rather by establishing a referent principle 
from which the value of the detailed item will be derived (Zartman, 1977). 
Different from all the others, the joint decision making model views negotiation at a 
macro level, which provides some special advantages. 
" First, it is possible to prescribe a negotiation through the achieved formula which can 
be made in impractical or artificial terms; 
" Second, it leaves room for analysis of power as added value while others are not able 
to do; and 
" Third, it can be used in conjunction with the other models. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter first defined negotiation and explored the nature and major elements of 
negotiation. Then, it discussed the two major negotiation theories: mechanical theory and 
behaviour theory. Section 2 reviewed two major theoretical approaches of mechanical 
theory: classical game theory and economic theory. These approaches are mainly 
mathematical models based on the rational behaviour assumption. The former (e. g. Nash 
solutions, 1950,1953) is mainly concerned with the predictions of outcomes under 
certain assumptions about the players and the outcomes themselves. The latter (e. g. 
Zeuthen's model) focuses on analysing the negotiation process given the rational 
assumption. 
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Although these two theoretical approaches have been criticised as over simplistic; relying 
too much on the assumptions; and ignoring the social norms, relationships between 
negotiators, and group decision processes; these approaches uncover many ambiguous 
problems in negotiation. Furthermore, these approaches (especially the economic 
theoretical approach) provide important theoretical models for the development of the 
computer negotiation systems. 
Section 3 discussed behaviour theory and several important theoretical models including 
psychological model, learning model, dual-response model, and joint decision model. 
Unlike mechanical theory, behaviour theoretical models aim to address the complex 
human responses in negotiation, such as how a negotiator analyses the opponent's 
expectations and psychological changes during negotiations, and the corresponding 
strategies that the negotiator will take to deal with such changes. Although behaviour 
models are normally difficult to simulate in computer-based negotiation systems, they 
represent some important concepts in practical negotiations, which developers of MAS 
negotiation systems need to address in their systems. 
The next chapter will discuss the MASCOT system development process based on the 
previous studies on claims negotiation, multi-agent systems, and negotiation theories. It 
will also address the selection of the most appropriate negotiation theory for the 
MASCOT negotiation mechanism. Furthermore, the learning model will be considered to 
tackle some of the complex human issues in construction claims negotiation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MASCOT CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have addressed three major issues for the development of the 
MASCOT model: construction claims negotiation, multi-agent systems and negotiation 
theories. This chapter builds on these in the development of the MASCOT conceptual 
model. It first analyses some essential characteristics of construction claims negotiation 
and explores the selection of an appropriate negotiation theory for the MASCOT model. 
The MASCOT conceptual model is then presented and its key features outlined. 
Parinak (1996) identifies three essential aspects for the design of a MAS negotiation 
system, i. e. 
" what are the issues over which negotiation takes place? 
" what reasoning model will the agents employ? and 
" what negotiation protocol will be used? 
Besides these issues, this study also focuses on the essential negotiation theoretical 
models on which the MASCOT model is based. As a whole, this chapter conducts three 
major studies for the development of the MASCOT model, which include: 
" Identifying the nature and essential characteristics of construction claims negotiation. 
Based on the identified nature, an essential conceptual negotiation model (i. e. the 
reasoning model) for the MASCOT system is developed. The identified essential 
characteristics are also crucial for the development of the MASCOT negotiation 
protocol and strategies. These issues are addressed in Section 5.2; 
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" Selecting an appropriate theoretical negotiation model on which the MASCOT 
negotiation mechanism will be based, given the nature of construction claims 
negotiation and the characteristics of various negotiation theories. This issue is 
discussed in Section 5.3; 
" Defining the key assumptions and requirements of the MASCOT system, developing 
the negotiation protocol and various negotiation strategies, and developing the 
process model of the system. These issues are presented in Section 5.4. 
5.2 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS NEGOTIATION 
Based on the previous analysis of construction claims negotiation, this section makes a 
further analysis on the nature and characteristics of claims negotiation in terms of the 
application of multi-agent systems. Such an analysis is of paramount importance for the 
development of the MASCOT model. Some of the important characteristics are discussed 
below. 
5.2.1 Contractually Obliged Self-Interested Relationship 
Essentially, construction claims negotiation is different from other business negotiations 
in several essential ways; for example: 
" In common business negotiation, one party may simply draw back from the 
negotiation if the party finds that the negotiation has fallen into a deadlock, or it 
cannot get the expected profits from the negotiation. In construction claims 
negotiation, nobody can easily walk away from the negotiation unless it is ready for 
arbitration or litigation which they can rarely afford to undergo. As a result, both 
sides need to have a certain flexibility and be able to work out solutions to avoid a 
conflict result (i. e. a negotiation ends without an agreement; the claim thus falls into a 
dispute), and to keep the project going. Efficient negotiations are therefore essential 
for construction claims management. 
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" Furthermore, since the participants in construction claims negotiation are legally 
obliged by a project contract, the negotiations are conducted within the framework of 
the contract. Contract documents set promises for the claims negotiation. Factors such 
as the causes of claims and compensations are principally addressed in the contract 
documents. Claim negotiations are conducted within these boundaries. 
" On the other hand, construction project teams are temporary organisations. Each 
participant belongs to a different organisation and aims to get maximum benefits. 
Therefore, each participant will try to maximise its own benefit as long as it does not 
break the co-operative relationship in the project. Such a self-interested competition 
relationship is more evident in claims management and negotiation than in other 
construction activities since claims represent a major approach to ensuring reasonable 
profit sharing between the client and the contractor during the construction process. 
The above can be summarised as a contractually obliged self-interested competitive 
relationship. It represents the basic framework on which the MASCOT system is based. 
5.2.2 Participant-Dependent Information 
Due to the different roles, project participants normally have different perspectives on a 
project. For example, the client may know well the final functional requirements, budget 
and the financial status of the project while the engineer understands well the client's 
requirements, contract documents as well as the contractor's financial situation, progress 
and quality of the work. On the other hand, the contractor often has more detailed 
information about what really happened on site (e. g. schedule, progress, the 
circumstances that led to a claim, and the actual cost of change orders). Besides such 
distributed information, each party also has different expertise. The client might know 
little or nothing about the construction; the engineer (or architect) should be an expert in 
design and project management; the contractor may be a specialist in structural work, 
with mechanical & electrical (M&E) knowledge from its subcontractors. Since 
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construction claims negotiation is evidence-oriented, information plays a critical role. 
Thus, each party will try to use his specific information and expertise to explain, argue 
and persuade the other party to accept its offer. 
More importantly, each party has its own interest, expectation and estimate about a 
certain claim, which will determine its utility function, negotiation strategies and 
preferred outcome. All this information is unknown to the other parties at the beginning 
of negotiation. During the negotiation, each party will seek to obtain such information by 
observing the opponent's offers, counteroffers and supporting arguments. 
5.2.3 Strategy-Influenced Process 
Given the contractually bounded self-interested nature and the participant-dependent 
information barriers, resorting to a predefined strategy is a common occurrence. This 
means that a number of strategies are deployed in an attempt to move the final settlement 
position from the middle towards each party's own end of the opening extremes. 
Incomplete information and different strategies will influence the payoffs of negotiation 
(Kennan and Wilson, 1992; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). For example, the contractor 
may exaggerate his initial claims amount in order to make the engineer's compromise 
point near to his expected outcome. If there is not enough information to identify the 
exaggeration, the contractor's strategy may not be perceived by the engineer. In practice, 
depending on different situations, either or both parties may (Pickavance, 1997): 
" inflate the opening demands; 
" misrepresent their position or interests; 
" withhold sensitive or potentially damaging information; 
" use threatening behaviour; 
" adopt an intransigent stance until the other side is ready to move; 
" secure concessions before giving concessions; 
" concede little and slowly; 
" make a tit-for-tat counter proposal; or 
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re-open negotiation on agreed settlements as a result of "new" information. 
Most of these complex strategies represent the highly psychological aspects of human 
negotiations, and are difficult to be simulated by computer systems. This, in turn, requires 
careful consideration in the MASCOT negotiation strategies to clearly address the key 
aspects of negotiators' decision-making criteria. 
5.2.4 Time - An Important Factor 
The claims negotiation process is time-consuming. Before negotiation, documents have 
to be specially presented; negotiators need to be gathered; and there is often a substantial 
delay between the submission of documents and negotiation meetings. During 
negotiation, neither side wants to make a concession first or easily. A party may adopt a 
time-consuming strategy to expect to benefit from the opponent's time pressure or 
emotional exhaustion. Unrelated issues (such as site management, quality or safety) are 
often brought up to pressurise the opponent. Moreover, most claims cannot be settled in 
one meeting. There are usually a series of meetings, either formal or informal, to allow 
both parties to make offers and counteroffers. 
As a result, many standard contracts, such as FIDIC require the contractor to complete 
the revised work first, regardless of claims for extra payment, disputes, and references to 
arbitration. Negotiations for compensation are conducted long after the work or even the 
whole project has been completed to avoid the potential delays caused by long 
arguments. However, having done the work, the contractor has little negotiating strength 
and becomes a supplicant. This often results in disputes and litigation. On the other hand, 
if compensations are negotiated before the work starts, the client is under the risk of 
delay, especially when the revised work on a critical path. Thus, the time issue will be an 
essential factor in the design of MASCOT to ensure that a negotiation outcome can be 
reached within an expected time scope. 
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5.2.5 Tradeoffs between Negotiation Items 
Construction claims are ongoing processes in a construction project; thus, negotiations 
for these claims are also intensive. Claim/negotiation items can be quite different from 
their nature, amount and importance. Different claim items often influence each other. 
Even for a single claim item, negotiations could be about the money compensation, time 
extension, or technical issues. These aspects are often linked with, and have impacts on 
one another. Tradeoffs between different aspects of a claim, or different claims are 
common in practical claims negotiation. From case to case, such tradeoffs are important 
for resolving claims. 
5.3 NEGOTIATION MODEL IN MASCOT 
The selection of negotiation models is the basis for designing the MASCOT negotiation 
mechanism, which should consider the assumptions, functions and limitations of each 
negotiation theory as well as the important characteristics of construction claim 
negotiation discussed above. Based on the previous studies, the following sections 
discuss the possibility of the application of the classical game theory approach, economic 
theory approach and behaviour theory approach in the MASCOT model. 
5.3.1 Game and Economic Theory Models 
Both the game theoretical approach and the economic (bargaining) theoretical approach 
analyses the technical aspect of negotiation, constructs formal models of negotiation 
environments, and provides clear analyses of various situations and precise results 
concerning the strategy a negotiator should choose. Therefore, they provide general 
theoretical bases for automated negotiations. 
Classic game theoretical models, such as Nash (1950) and Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1964) aim to sort out solutions of game through proper assumptions and 
mathematical equations. Agents' negotiating manoeuvres are expressed using the Nash 
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equilibrium concept without specifying the negotiation process. Since this study intends 
to build automated negotiators, such classic game theoretical models are not suitable for 
the construction of the MASCOT mechanism (However, the concept and the assumptions 
of game theory approach will still be adopted, see Chapter 4). 
In contrast, economic theoretical models, such as Zeuthen (1975) and Cross (1975) 
provide a useful theoretical foundation for designing the MASCOT model. Unlike the 
classic game theory, economic theory focuses on analysing the strategic process to reach 
a final equilibrium point. Genesereth et al. (1986), Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) and 
Kraus (1995,1997) have developed their multi-agent negotiation systems based on such 
strategic economic models. Moreover, construction claims negotiation, in most cases, is 
characterised as bargaining between the contractor and the engineer with the support of 
relevant evidence. Thus, the application of the economic (bargaining) theory as a 
theoretical basis for the MASCOT model matches the nature of MAS and claims 
negotiation. 
Although the economic theoretical approach provides a general framework for modelling 
agent claim negotiations, several important issues need to be addressed for the 
applications. Kraus (1997) summaries these as: 
1) Choosing a strategic economic theoretical approach which is applicable for the 
specific MAS negotiation problem; and matching the MAS scenarios with the 
economic-theoretical definitions of the chosen model 
Considering the nature and characteristics of construction claims negotiation, this study 
adopts the Zeuthen's model as the core negotiation models. Zeuthen's risk evaluation 
model specifically addresses the participants' risk perception in conflict avoidance, which 
matches the obliged self-interested nature of construction claims negotiation. Moreover, 
Harsanyi (1977) has demonstrated that Zeuthen's solution is identical to Nash's method 
(1950); that is, parties will settle at the point that maximises the product of the difference 
between what bargainers get from conflict and what each gets from the settlement point. 
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Meanwhile, the time accounting and learning concepts expressed in Cross's model are 
also very important to make Zeuthen's model work in the claims negotiation 
environment. The former addresses the important time issues in claims negotiation and 
helps to keep the negotiation stable, whilst the latter overcomes the complete information 
assumption on which Zeuthen's model is based. Aspects of the behaviour-oriented 
approach are incorporated by the provision of a learning mechanism for the MASCOT 
agents. 
2) Identifying equilibrium strategies 
Given specific assumptions about different application environments, different concepts 
of equilibrium and strategies that are in equilibrium have been identified, such as Nash 
Equilibrium? (Nash, 1950), Perfect Equilibrium10 (Selten, 1975), Bayesian-Nash 
Equilibrium" (Harsanyi, 1956) and Sequential Equilibrium12 (Kraus, 1996). If agents 
adopt these equilibrium strategies, the interaction among these agents is efficient and 
stable within a certain scope. In order to address equilibrium in the MASCOT model, this 
study formalises several assumptions that are appropriate for the construction claims 
negotiation environment. For example, all agents sustain a loss over time; agents can get 
information about their opponents through a learning approach; there is a finite set of 
agreements, and agents prefer to reach an agreement which may not bring them 
maximum benefits, rather than opting out of the negotiations. These assumptions are 
different from the assumptions in common economic theory or game theory. A detailed 
analysis of equilibrium strategies under these assumptions is discussed later. 
9 See Section 5.4.2. 
10 It can be said that a set of strategies is in perfect equilibrium if the agent's strategies induce an equilibrium at any 
stage of the interaction (Selten, 1975). Perfect equilibrium is stronger than Nash equilibrium. In each stage of the 
negotiation, assuming that an agent follows the perfect equilibrium strategy, the other agent has no strategy better than 
to follow its own perfect equilibrium strategy. 
11 See Section 5.4.2. 
12 When the number of agents is n and the number of possible types is k then a sequential equilibrium is a sequence of 
nk strategies and a system of belief with the following properties: each agent has a belief about its opponent's type. At 
each negotiation step, any agent's strategy will be optimal given its opponent's possible strategies, the history up to the 
given time periods, and the agent's current beliefs (Kraus, 1996). 
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3) Developing low complexity techniques for searching for appropriate strategies 
Development of the negotiation strategies which are in equilibrium can rely on theorems 
proven in advance, but this can be done only when the set of possible agreements can be 
defined. In such situations, there is a need to develop relatively simple computational 
techniques for appropriate strategies adopted by the automated negotiators. This study 
adopts Zeuthen's bargaining model and Bayesian learning approach. Both approaches are 
based on clear concepts with simple computation methods. Also, the other MASCOT 
negotiation strategies such as expanded solution-searching (see Section 5.4.4) are also 
computationally simple. 
4) Providing utility functions 
Both economic theory and game theory assume that each player knows exactly the 
opponent's utility functions. In most cases, the designer of an automated agent is required 
to provide the agents with a utility function. Without doing so, it is often difficult to apply 
these theories to automated agents. Moreover, since the MASCOT model works in a 
worth-oriented domain, utility functions are built to represent agents' worth functions 
(see Section 5.4.1). In the MASCOT model, agents' utility functions are represented as 
linear functions, which are determined by two factors: reservation value and optimum 
value. Since the complete information assumption is not valid in construction claims 
negotiation, these features are expected to be obtained through the learning mechanism 
based on agents' prior knowledge and the opponent's continuing offers during 
negotiation. Thus, an agent can estimate its opponent's utility according to its updated 
information of reservation value and optimum value. 
5.3.2 Behaviour Theory Model 
Both game theory and economic theory focus more on the quantitative aspects of the 
negotiation process, which are suitable for the application of intelligent agents. On the 
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contrary, behaviour theory focuses more on the qualitative aspects of the negotiation 
process (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987), which are difficult to simulate and analyse by 
computer technologies. However, human behaviour aspects are emphasised by most of 
the researchers in construction claims negotiation (Bent, 1985; Zack, 1994). The 
limitation is obvious if the negotiation system does not take into account the human 
negotiation behaviour aspects. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, different learning approaches have been adopted in multi- 
agent systems, such as: reinforcement learning, incentive learning and generic learning. 
This research adopts a different learning approach the "Bayesian learning mechanism", 
which allows a negotiation agent to infer its opponent's key negotiation features during 
the negotiation process. This method, based on the Bayesian rule, provides an effective 
approach for analysing the human risk perceptions and expectations, and mutual 
influence process during the claims negotiation process. An agent can adjust its 
negotiation strategy by analysing the opponent's expectation. Also, since this method is 
based on a mathematical concept, it can be applied in computer systems. 
5.4 MASCOT MODEL 
Based on the identified key characteristics of construction claims negotiation and selected 
negotiation theory models, this section makes a detailed analysis on the system working 
domain, assumptions and requirements, negotiation protocol and strategies, and process 
model of the MASCOT model. 
5.4.1 Negotiation Domain 
Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) classify agent working domains as task-oriented domains 
(TODs), state-oriented domains (SODS) and worth-oriented domains (WODs), with each 
domain being a generalisation of the previous (see Section 3.4.3.4). Different working 
domains will determine different negotiation approaches for agents to achieve their 
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objectives. The agents in the MASCOT model work in the WODs because agents in 
construction claims negotiation cannot always achieve their full goal. On the contrary, 
they often have to make a compromise with other parties. Under this domain, agents 
assign worth to each potential state that represents the agent's desire. The worth function 
allows agents to compromise or release part of their goal. Those states with the highest 
value of worth might be thought of as those that satisfy the full goal. The worth function 
also facilitates the evaluation of different alternatives such as time extension and 
monetary compensation through the utility functions. In this study, utility functions are 
adopted to represent agents' worth functions13 
5.4.2 Assumptions and Requirements 
Since the MASCOT model adopts economic theory model as its essential negotiation 
model, some of the key assumptions on which economic theory is based are made for the 
MASCOT model. Assumptions about construction claims negotiation are also made to 
ensure that only the major problems of the claims negotiation are addressed in the model. 
1) Assumptions 
Initially, a number of simplifying assumptions is made to lay down the foundations of the 
MASCOT model. These assumptions include two aspects: the assumptions about 
construction claim negotiations and multi-agent systems (based on the assumptions of 
economic theory). 
" Quantitative negotiation: the contractor's entitlement to the claim being negotiated 
has been established. Negotiation is only concerned with the amount of compensation 
in the claim. 
" Isolated negotiation: no further change or information comes to agents during the 
negotiation. Moreover, an agent cannot commit itself as part of the current 
13 Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) explain that a worth captures the desire of an agent. Worth functions allow agents to 
compromise on their goals, sometimes increasing the overall efficiency of the agreements. For a detailed discussion of 
the distinctions between utility function and worth function see Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994). 
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negotiation to some behaviour in a future negotiation, nor can it expect that its current 
behaviour will in anyway affect a future negotiation. 
" Rationality: agents are rational, and willing to maximise their utilities, or willing to 
reduce the risk of loss caused by a conflict deal. 
9 Fixed utility functions: each agent's utility function is not changed during the 
negotiation. In other words, agents' risk attitudes (i. e. risk averse, risk taking or risk 
neutral) are consistent during the negotiation. 
" Incomplete information: each agent has complete information about itself, but 
incomplete information about the others (e. g. an agent's reservation value and utility 
function are private information). Other agents can estimate such values and update 
their estimates through a learning process, but they would not know the exact figures. 
" Agreement Preference: agents will prefer to reach an agreement rather than have a 
conflict deal even if the agreement might not bring them the maximum benefits. 
" Partial-symmetry; three agents (i. e. the contractor agent, the engineer agent and the 
client agent) are involved in this model. The negotiations between the contractor 
agent and the engineer agent are symmetrical, whilst the negotiations between the 
client agent and the engineer agent are not. The relationship between the client agent 
and the engineer agent is treated as owner-servant. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
there is no direct negotiation between the client agent and the contractor agent; their 
negotiations are conducted through the engineer agent. However, this would not stop 
direct communications between them. 
2) Requirements 
As discussed in Chapter 3, several requirements should be taken into account prior to 
designing a multi-agent system. In this study, these are: 
" Suitability: the system should best reflect the characteristics of construction claim 
negotiations, and should generate similar or reasonable negotiation outcomes to 
human negotiations. 
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" Simplicity: the negotiation process should be short and consume only a reasonable 
amount of communication and computing resources. 
" Distributed: the decision making process should be distributed. There should be no 
central unit or agent that is managing the problem. 
" Efficiency: agents should not squander resources when they come to an agreement. 
There should not be wasted utility when an agreement is reached. Ideally, agents as a 
group are expected to arrive at the optimal solution or a Pareto Optimality, where no 
agent could derive more from a different agreement without some other agent 
deriving less from that alternate agreement. However, in the MASCOT model, given 
the limitations of the real claims negotiation environment and the lack of complete 
information about each other, it is difficult for the agents to achieve the Pareto 
Optimality like many economic/game theoretical models have addressed 14. Yet, there 
are possible solutions with a flexible range for a claims negotiation that can satisfy 
the negotiators' minimum requirements, and finally settle the claims. In such 
situations, although the solution is not an exact Pareto Optimality, agents would 
prefer to reach such an agreement rather than a conflict. In this study, if the MASCOT 
model can generate such solutions, the system is thought to be efficient. 
" Stability: no agent should have an incentive to deviate from agreed-upon strategies. In 
a pure game situation, with complete information, the Nash equilibrium concept is 
used. If Nash equilibrium is reached, agents will have no incentive to deviate from 
agreed negotiation strategies. However, Nash equilibrium has two problems: 
First, Nash equilibrium is based on the complete information assumption which is not 
true in most practical cases. One solution for this problem is the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium introduced by Harsanyi (1967,1968). This equilibrium includes a set of 
beliefs (one for each agent) and a set of strategies. A strategy combination and a set of 
beliefs form a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if the strategies are in Nash equilibrium 
14 For detailed discussion, see Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) and Harsanyi (1977). 
149 
given the set of beliefs, and the agents update their beliefs, according to Baye's rule. 
This study aims to reach a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. 
Secondly, the use of Nash equilibrium may not be an effective way of analysing the 
outcomes of the models of alternating offers (bargaining problems) (Kraus, 1995). 
There are two major problems. First, in some games there are no strategies that form 
an equilibrium (Sandholm, 1996). Secondly, some games may be in equilibrium only 
at the beginning of the negotiation, but may be unstable at intermediate stages. Nash 
equilibrium puts few restrictions on the outcome and may yield too many equilibrium 
points (Rubinstein, 1982), where one or more agents may prefer to diverge form their 
Nash equilibrium strategies. To avoid such problems, this research formalises the 
assumptions that are appropriate for the environments. For example, all agents suffer 
a loss over time, there is a finite set of agreements, and any agreement reached is 
better for all agents rather than opting out of the negotiations. These assumptions will 
push agents to an equilibrium point. 
5.4.3 Roles of Players in MASCOT 
There are two kinds of agents in the MASCOT model: task agents and utility agents. 
Task agents play the role of the original industry participants involved in construction 
claims negotiation. Utility agents are designed to facilitate negotiation within the 
MASCOT model. 
5.4.3.1 Task Agents 
Figure 5.1a shows a typical contractual relationship between construction project 
participants, whilst Figure 5.1b describes their relationships in claims management and 
negotiation. The relationships shown in these two figures reveal a general problem in 
claims management. That is, although there is no formal contractual relationship between 
the engineer and the contractor, it is the engineer, acting as the agent of the client, who 
directly supervises the contractor's work, negotiates and certifies the contractor's claims. 
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Many problems are created due to the conflicting authority and responsibility, because 
the engineer, in practice, can hardly be an impartial observer, the assumption on which 
the system is based. 
Figure 5.2 shows the relationships between these three agents in the MASCOT model. In 
this model, direct communication between the client and the contractor is provided 
through their agents to avoid the problems caused by the engineer's unbalanced authority 
and responsibility. The interactions between the engineer and the client, and the 
interactions between the engineer and the contractor become more efficient with the 
support of multi-agent systems. This is one of the most important improvements for 
current claims negotiation. It is possible to resolve negotiation deadlocks between the 
contractor and the engineer due to non-agreement by the direct involvement of the client 
himself. Also, the problems caused by the engineer's inclination to cover personal faults 
are also avoided. 
Client 
Contractor ---------------------------- Engineer 
Sub-Contractor Supplier 
Figure 5.1a The contractual relationships between project participants 
Client 
I Contractor Engineer 
I Sub-Contractor Supplier 
Figure 5.1b The common claims negotiation relationships between project participants 
Legend: 
1 Direct relationship 
Indirect relationship 
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Besides the agents representing the major project participants, Figure 5.2 also shows the 
possible involvement of subcontractor and supplier agents. Although these agents are not 
further discussed in this study, their involvement will make the system more realistic. In 
practice, claims negotiation between the contractor and the engineer is often influenced 
by the subcontractors and suppliers because many work packages are actually done by 
specialist subcontractors. 
Contractor 
Mediator 
Interface 
Agent 
Client Client Agent Interface 
Contractor Agent 
Engineer Agent . 
i.. 
_. Engineer 1 4- Interface 
Sub-Contractor Supplier Agents 
Agents 
Figure 5.2 The negotiation relationships in the 
Legend: 
-º Direct relationship 
MASCOT model 
4--*- Not applied in this study 
ý-ýº Delegation and reporting 
relationship 
The involvement of the subcontractor and supplier agents in the MASCOT model is an 
interesting area because the contractor agent has to negotiate with the subcontractor 
agents or the supplier agents before it accepts or rejects the engineer agent's offer. 
Furthermore, the nature of claims and their negotiation between the contractor agent and 
the subcontractor agents (or the supplier agents) are different from that between the 
contractor agent and the engineer agent (or the client agent). In the former, claims and 
their negotiations are often conducted informally and effectively without a third party 
(like the engineer), while the latter are more formal as discussed in this study. Therefore, 
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different negotiation protocol and strategies would need to be developed when the 
subcontractor agent and suppler agent are involved in the system. 
5.4.3.2 Utility Agents 
There are two kinds of utility agents in the MASCOT model: the interface agents and the 
mediator agent15. The interface agents build the necessary links between task agents and 
their owners. The initial information and the data for expanded solution searching are 
input through the interface agents. The mediator agent plays two roles in the model both 
as a facilitator and a case-based mediator. The former role is fulfilled in the 
implementation as the utility agent "Facilitator" (see Chapter 6); the latter, inspired by 
the industrial practice, (i. e. the mediator approach in resolving construction disputes is 
commonly accepted and applied), will be discussed in further study. However, it is still 
beneficial to discuss some of the interesting points for the potential development of the 
mediator agent. 
Like a human mediator, the proposed case-based mediator agent can provide the 
following services to the negotiation system: 
" storing related contract documents, such as Bills of Quantities, labour rates and 
schedules; 
" providing suggestions to negotiating agents about their possible payoffs based on the 
knowledge of previous claims cases; 
" monitoring the negotiation process; and 
" suggesting when the negotiations should break down or stall. 
The involvement of the mediator agent will also change the structure of the current 
negotiation system, and provide a chance to improve the efficiency of the system. Sycara 
15 The other utility agents such as Nameserver, Facilitator and Viewer will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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(1987) has pointed out some of the advantages of a case-based mediator in her study, 
such as: 
9 case-based inference minimises the need for information exchange, thus minimising 
communication overhead; 
" anticipating and avoiding problems through reasoning from past failures helps the 
agents minimise the exchange of proposals that will be rejected; and 
" if the repair of a past failure is also remembered, computation by each agent is 
minimised. 
During negotiation, every negotiating agent can inquire from the mediator agent about the 
possible outcomes of the current claims. After receiving the inquiry from negotiating 
agents, the mediator agent chooses an appropriate previous case from its database, 
identifying differences between that case and the current situation, and then using those 
differences to criticise and modify the previous solution to fit the current problem. Past 
negotiation experience from the former cases is used as a guide to present negotiations. 
When very similar cases are available, agents can make their initial offer or counteroffer 
based on the experience from these precedence cases, and a compromise may be quickly 
reached. 
5.4.4 Negotiation Protocol and Strategies 
The development of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism covers two distinct aspects: to 
define an acceptable protocol for agent interaction; and to formulate strategies for the 
agents participating in the negotiation. The protocol specifies the kinds of deals that the 
agents can make, as well as the sequence of offers and counter-offers that are allowed. 
Given the protocol, a negotiation strategy specifies precisely each agent's reaction to 
every possible course of events (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). 
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5.4.4.1 Negotiation Protocol 
As shown in Chapter 3, there are two major kinds of negotiation protocols adopted in 
MAS negotiation systems: those that facilitate co-operative or co-operative-competitive 
problem solving, which are mainly developed or modified from Contract Net Protocol 
(CNP); and those that facilitate bargaining between different parties (Table 5.1). 
Monotonic Concession Protocol (MCP) belongs to the latter, and is selected as the basic 
protocol of the MASCOT model. This is because most of the negotiation protocols for 
multi-agent systems are developed for specific questions and therefore they are only 
suitable for these situations. On the other hand, MCP as a simple and general negotiation 
protocol is applicable to various situations and can therefore be modified for many 
specific problems. 
5.4.4.1.1 Monotonic Concession Protocol 
In MCP, agents start by simultaneously proposing one deal from the space of possible 
deals; an agreement is reached if one agent matches what the other one asked for, or 
exceeds what the other one asked for. The protocol continues to another round if neither 
agent matches or exceeds the other's demand. An agent is not allowed to offer the other 
agent less than it did in the previous round. If neither agent concedes at a certain step, 
then the negotiation ends and the protocol specifies that a deadlock has been reached. In 
this protocol, agents cannot backtrack, nor can they both simultaneously stand still in the 
negotiation more than once. 
The advantage of the MCP is that it ensures convergence, or puts a stop to the negotiation 
promptly when convergence is not occurring; and it is symmetrically distributed: no 
agent plays a special role. To be able to follow the rules in a standard MCP, each agent 
needs to know the other's utility (i. e. the set of tasks and the cost function) (Rosenschein 
and Zlotkin, 1994). However, this complete information requirement is not true in the 
claims negotiation environment. To make MCP work in claims negotiation, some aspects 
need to be modified. 
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Table 5.1 Some of the important protocols 
Protocol Work domain Author 
Contract net protocol (CNP) Task distribution Davis and Smith, 1983 
Distributed scheduling Task distribution Malone et al., 1988 
protocol (based on CNP) 
Multistage negotiation Resource allocation Conry et al., 1988 
protocol 
Service negotiation protocol Client-server contract Sierra et al., 1997 
negotiation (task distribution) 
Voting protocol Task distribution or resource Ephrati and Rosenschein, 
allocation 1991 
Time counting protocol Task distribution or resource Kraus and Wilkenfeld, 
allocation 1995 
Extended CNP Task distribution (Freight Sandholm, 1993 
dispatch) 
Mediator protocol Conflict resolution Sycara, 1987 
Monotonic Concession Task distribution Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
protocol 1994 
One-step Protocol Task distribution Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
1994 
Unified Negotiation Semi-cooperation Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
Protocols 1994 
Multi-course protocol Agent learning Dubios and Prade, 1994 
5.4.4.1.2 Modified Monotonic Concession Protocol (mMCP) 
Considering the important characteristics of claims negotiation discussed earlier, major 
modifications to MCP have been made as follows: 
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9 Conflict deal 
In the standard MCP, if neither agent concedes at the same step, then the negotiation ends 
with a conflict deal (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). This restriction is relaxed in the 
MASCOT model. Negotiations will not necessarily fall into a conflict deal even if the 
contractor agent and the engineer agent stand still for more than one encounter. Three 
factors reduce the possibility of conflict deals. They are: 
a) the involvement of the client agent; 
b) the expanded solution-searching; and 
c) intervention by the mediator agent 16. 
A conflict deal will be reached if there is no agreement zone existing between the 
contractor agent and the engineer agent. In such a situation, the involvement of the client 
agent provides an opportunity to avoid the conflict deal. The client agent will first check 
whether there is any possible deal within its negotiation zone that could be accepted by 
the contractor and lead to a possible agreement. If such a deal or agreement zone is 
found, the client agent will ask the engineer agent to expand its negotiation zone, and 
push the negotiation forward. If this strategy fails, expanded solution-searching strategies 
will be adopted, which includes searching for possible tradeoffs between negotiation 
items and interacting with the agents' owners to seek for constraint relaxation. 
" Incomplete information 
In MCP, each agent needs to know the other's full information, especially utility 
functions, to monitor whether the other has offered it more (or the same) at each step of 
negotiation. It is mutually verifiable whether the other agent has followed the rules of the 
protocol. In claims negotiation, the contractor agent cannot have exact information about 
the engineer agent's (and the client agent's) final goals, utility functions or risk 
perceptions, and vice versa. Even the engineer agent's utility function is not identical and 
fully transparent to the client agent due to their different positions, interests and attitudes 
16 See Section 5.4.3.2. A further study of the mediator agent will be conducted in future. 
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to a claim. Thus, it is impossible for an agent to know whether the other is following the 
rules of the MCP. 
To overcome this problem, Zeuthen's strategy and a learning mechanism are adopted. By 
following Zeuthen's strategy, agents will make concessions to avoid the loss of conflict. 
In other words, agents cannot offer less or backtrack at the next encounter which the 
MCP addresses. Moreover, the learning mechanism allows an agent to estimate its 
opponent's key negotiation features and update its estimation continuously during the 
negotiation process. Negotiations are conducted based on estimated information rather 
than the complete information. 
9 Time penalty 
The MASCOT model takes the passage of time during the negotiation process into 
account in facilitating convergence. The time taken by each agent during negotiation is 
considered as a penalty element in its utility function. Each agent has a different cost C>O 
for a time unit which it spends during negotiation. The value of C depends on each 
agent's time sensitivity (which varies with the negotiation situation). The time penalty 
can be a fixed amount (e. g. £S per iteration) or a fixed rate of the agent's utility, (e. g. a 
deduction of 1% of utility per iteration). For example, if an agreement is reached in time 
period t (or t iterations), the agent's time penalty will be Ct. As a result, time penalty 
becomes a driving force for agents, especially those with a high time penalty, in 
conceding to reach an agreement. 
" Involvement of the client agent 
In this study, the client agent will get involved in a negotiation when it finds that there is 
no chance for the contractor agent and the engineer agent to reach an agreement. The 
client agent can identify this situation directly by observing both parties' offers (e. g. the 
client agent may think that a party has reached its deadline if it continuously makes very 
small or no concessions after several steps of negotiation. However, the client agent 
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should also be able to distinguish the party's `faked' or `real' reservation amount), or 
indirectly by observing the time penalties of both parties (e. g. when a party's time 
penalties pass a certain threshold, it can be assumed that this party is ready to accept a 
conflict deal because the loss of a conflict deal for it is higher than that of the time 
penalty). In some other cases, the client agent may be invited to get involved in the 
negotiation by one of the parties because a conflict deal is very harmful to that party. 
The involvement of the client agent will not change the negotiation relationship between 
the contractor agent and the engineer agent. That is, the client agent and the engineer 
agent will work together as one negotiator to negotiate with the contractor agent. The 
contractor agent still receives offers or counter-offers from the engineer agent (Figure 
5.3). This facilitates the negotiation process in several ways: 
a) The contractor agent can send its offer directly to both the client agent and the 
engineer agent to ensure that both of them get the same information. The client agent 
can make its judgement independently with the direct information. Thus, the 
problems caused by the engineer agent's attempt to screen the contractor agent's 
information can be avoided. This is especially important for the further development 
of the system, when agents may be able to include arguments with their offers. 
b) In some claims, the client agent may have a different utility function to the engineer 
agent because of their different interests, expectations and attitudes to the claim. If 
the negotiation between the contractor agent and the engineer agent falls into a 
deadlock, and there is a possible deal within the client agent's negotiation zone that 
can be accepted by the contractor agent to reach an agreement, the engineer agent (as 
a representative of the client agent) will be requested to adopt the client agent's offer 
in the next iteration17. 
17 It is assumed that the client agent fully understands the consequences of its offer. 
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------------------------------ 
Client agent ; 
Contractor agent 
Engineer agent 
-------------------------------- Figure 5.3 Tripartite negotiation 
Legend: 
º The offer/counteroffer from contractor agent to client agent and engineer agent; 
--ý The communication line between client agent and engineer agent; 
-0 The offer or counter-offer from the client and engineer agent. 
5.4.4.2 Negotiation Strategies 
Given the above protocol, agents will adopt different negotiation strategies according to 
their evaluations of the possible deals in different situations. The possible negotiation 
strategies that agents may adopt in this circumstance include: 
a) inflate the opening demands; 
b) adopt an intransigent stance until the other side is ready to concede; 
c) secure concessions before giving concessions; 
d) make tit-for-tat counter proposals; 
e) make big concessions for a quick compromise; 
f) join in the negotiation (for the client agent only); 
g) undertake tradeoffs between negotiating items; 
h) search for new solutions outside the current negotiation items; or 
i) request the owner to relax the negotiation constraints. 
Considering these strategies, a) is simple and straightforward, agents may exaggerate 
their initial demands according to their experience; b), c), d) and e) are about issues such 
as when an agent should concede and how much it should concede, which are the most 
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important issues in claims negotiation strategies; f) is about when and how the client 
agent should get involved in the negotiations; g), h) and i) are about expanded solution 
searching. The following discussion will focus on the strategies regarding when and how 
an agent should concede. 
An agent's decision to select a certain strategy depends on how it evaluates a possible 
deal and its position in that deal. In fully cooperative situations, the parties are united by 
the subordinate goal of achieving a globally optimal solution, which often requires 
sacrificing personal benefit in the interest of increased global benefit. In a co-operative- 
competitive negotiation, the agent will evaluate a deal from both individual and group 
perspectives. Decisions are made based on the principle that they maximise both personal 
and group utilities. In the MASCOT model, however, agents are self-interested. Each 
agent is concerned only about its own utility without considering that of the group or 
other agents. On the other hand, agents are contractually obliged by the project contract, 
and the inclination not to break the negotiation. Thus, agents in the MASCOT model 
adopt Zeuthen's negotiation strategy. A detailed discussion of the MASCOT negotiation 
strategies is presented as follows. 
5.4.4.2.1 Utility Maximisation 
In claims negotiation, an agent's utility function is mainly determined by three elements: 
money, time and other issues such as the possibility of further claims and long term 
relationships (Figure 5.4). The utility function can be expressed as: 
U= EWiM; + EWjTj + EWA 
Where, 
U- the utility of an agent [0,1]; 
W- the relative weight assigned to a certain item, EWi+j+k=1; 
M; - the value of sub-item i in monetary terms [0,1]; 
TT- the value of sub-item j in time terms [0,1]; 
Ok. the value of sub-item k in other terms [0,1]. 
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Figure 5.4 The general utility consideration of agents 
Since an agent's utility is multi-faceted, it will be a very complex task to maximise the 
utility in one step whilst considering all the factors involved. Thus, this work can be 
separated into two steps: 
" to maximise every single claim item's utility which is mainly applicable to money 
and time issues; 
" to maximise the agent's overall utility through tradeoffs between different items. 
Since each item may have a different weight to each agent, an agent may prefer to 
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increase the value of highly weighted items and give something from the other lowly 
weighted items to maximise their total utility. Tradeoffs are common in real claims 
negotiation. Both parties may benefit from the tradeoffs. This task can be achieved 
through the expanded solution-searching strategies. 
This study essentially focuses on the first step (i. e. to maximise a single item's utility). As 
stated earlier, it is assumed that the negotiation item is concerned with monetary 
compensation for a claim. Such an approach is also applicable to the claims for time 
extension. 
5.4.4.2.2 Conflict Avoidance Approach 
Unlike the common utility maximisation approach, this study builds a negotiation 
mechanism (for single claim item) based on Zeuthen's strategies because the risk 
avoidance principle in Zeuthen's model reflects project participants' risk perceptions in 
claims negotiation (i. e. both parties try to avoid the losses caused by conflict results). 
Furthermore, Harsanyi (1965,1977) demonstrates that Zeuthen's solution is identical to 
Nash's method (1950); that is, parties settle at the point that maximises the product of the 
difference between what bargainers get from conflict and what each gets from the 
settlement point. 
Zeuthen (1975) argues that each negotiator will assess the gains and losses associated 
with his bargaining strategies at any given point in a negotiation on an expected-utility 
basis. This leads to a two-stage model of the negotiation process. Firstly, the individual 
always compares the certain value he can obtain by accepting the opponent's current 
offer with the expected value of holding out for his own most favoured outcome (that is, 
the expected value of settlement at his preferred outcome together with the expected 
value of a conflict or breakdown in the negotiations). Given specific values for the 
opponent's offer, his own most favoured outcome, and the results of conflict, he then 
calculates the maximum probability of conflict he would be willing to accept in 
preference to acquiescing in the current offer of the other side. 
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Secondly, Zeuthen makes the explicit assumption that the next concession will always be 
made by the party willing to accept the smaller risk of conflict at any given moment in 
time. But in making a concession the negotiator need not gave in entirely; he need only 
reduce his own demand to the point where he is willing to accept a greater risk of conflict 
than the opponent. Accordingly, a situation arises in which each negotiator must continue 
to concede until he is willing to accept a larger risk of conflict than his opponent, at 
which point the relationship is reversed. Under suitable conditions, this interaction 
process leads to a determinate solution at the point where the product of the utility of the 
two sides reaches its maximum value. Thus, the outcome of Zeuthen's bargaining process 
is similar to Nash's solution in game theory, even though the basic features of his model 
differ substantially from those of Nash's model. 
Zeuthen (1975) concludes that "an agent makes its decision of concession based on how 
much it has to lose by running into conflict at that time". If the agent has already made 
many concessions, it will have less to lose from a conflict, and will be less willing to 
concede. Thus, it has a high acceptability to risk conflict. If each agent's willingness to 
risk conflict can be measured, the agent with less willingness to risk will make a 
concession. The criteria for risk evaluation can be formulated into the following 
equations: 
Risk, . 
(the utility agent 1 loses by conceding and accepting agent 2's offer) 
(the utility agent 1 loses by not conceding and causing a conflict) 
or 
U` -U` U` -Ut Pc re re p_ ee ec maz Ucc 
- Uc(C) 
e max U 
ee -Ue 
(C 
(adapted from Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994) 
Where, 
Pcmax- the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the contractor 18 
Pemax- the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the engineer; 
U `cc - the contractor agent's utility based on its offer in t iteration; 
18 For simplicity, P. is often called the maximum risk acceptability 
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U `Ce - the contractor agent's utility based on the engineer agent's offer in t iteration; 
UC(C) - the contractor agent's utility for a conflict deal; 
U tee - the engineer agent's utility based on its current offer in t iteration; 
U `ec - the engineer agent's utility based on contractor agent's offer in t iteration; and 
Ue(C) - the engineer agent's utility for a conflict deal. 
At every step, each agent calculates and compares its Risk; (or Pmax) and that of its 
opponent. If Agent 1's Risk`; (or Pmax) is higher than that of Agent 2, Agent 1 will have 
less to lose from a conflict, and will be less willing to concede, and risk reaching a 
conflict. Therefore, Agent 2 (with smaller risk acceptability) will make the next 
concession. The concession amount is determined by different concession mechanisms. 
The application of the Zeuthen's model is limited by the perfect information assumption. 
To make this model work in the claims negotiation environment where both negotiation 
parties try to keep their private information, a learning mechanism is introduced for 
agents to estimate the opponent's utility function and update their beliefs during the 
negotiation process. The main question here pertains to how an agent uses its beliefs 
during the negotiation, how it updates its beliefs according to the information it gathers 
during the negotiation process, and how an agent influences its opponent's beliefs. 
5.4.4.2.3 Bayesian Learning Approach 
The importance of learning in negotiation has been recognised in the MAS research 
community as fundamental for understanding human behaviour as well as for developing 
new solution concepts. Several learning approaches in MAS have been discussed in 
Chapter 3. Bayesian learning approach is recognised as an extremely powerful learning 
method for artificial intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 1995). Based on Bayesian 
Inference, researchers have developed quite different learning approaches, such as: 
Bayesian learning (Zeng and Sycara 1998; Kellogg and Gmytrasiewicz, 1997), Bayesian 
network learning (Sahin, 1999) and Bayesian classifier learning (Bui et. al, 1996). This 
study focuses on Bayesian learning. 
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In this approach, once an agent receives an offer (or counteroffer) from its opponent, the 
agent will analyse the offer, modify its beliefs about the opponent based on the Bayesian 
learning approach, and adjust its negotiation strategy accordingly. These beliefs about the 
opponent could be: the negotiation strategies; the factual aspects of other agents (e. g. the 
payoff functions); the decision making process of other agents (e. g. the reservation values 
and the most preferred amount); the meta-level issues (e. g. the overall negotiation style 
and risk-taking attitude), and so on. 
The following discussions focus on how the contractor agent modifies its beliefs about 
the engineer agent's reservation value. A reservation value is defined as the maximum 
or minimum amount which a party can offer to or accept from its opponent (Figure 
5.5). Since the negotiation process is identical for the contractor agent and the engineer 
agent, the method can be applied to the engineer agent as well. 
Negotiation zone 
I Labour, material and equipment cost Loss of productivity I Overheads 
Reservation value Optimum value 
Figure 5.5a An example of the contractor's negotiation zone 
Contractor agent's 
reservation value 
Engineer agent's 
initial offer 
Contractor agent's 
initial offer 
Engineer agent's 
reservation value 
Figure 5.5b An example of the agreement zone between agents 
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During claims negotiation, the reservation values are private information. It is impossible 
for an agent to know the exact value of its opponent's reservation value. However, an 
agent could update its beliefs about its opponent's reservation value based on its 
interactions with the opponent and its domain knowledge by using the Bayesian updating 
mechanism. Therefore, the agent could gain a more accurate expectation about its 
opponent's risk acceptability and choose the offer that maximises the expected payoff 
given the information available at this stage. 
For a partition Bj, B2....., Bn of all possible outcomes, Bayesian rule can be expressed as 
(Pitman, 1993): 
P(B. I A) _ 
P(B')P(A I B) 
= 
P(B1)P(A I Br ) 
Ik_1 P(A I Bk)P(Bk P(A) 
Where, 
P(B1IA) - the conditional probability that event B; happens given the occurrence of 
event A; 
P(Bi) - the unconditional probability that event B; happens; 
P(AIB; ) - the conditional probability that event A happens given the occurrence of 
event B;; 
P(A) - the unconditional probability that event A happens. 
Bayesian rule provides a means for agents to improve their beliefs about their opponent's 
reservation value according to the opponent's previous offers. Several elements are 
defined in this study as follows: 
R- the engineer agent's reservation value; 
ej- the engineer agent's offer at encounter i; 
R; - a set of the contractor agent's partial beliefs (hypotheses) about the engineer 
agent's reservation value R (e. g. R1=100; R2 =150... (i=1,2,... n)); 
P(R; )- the probabilistic evaluation over the set of hypotheses {R; }, which are the 
contractor agent's prior knowledge (e. g. P(R1)=0.75, P(R2)=0.85... (i=1,2,... n)). 
JR; *P(R; )- the current estimate of R can be calculated as a mean. 
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The Bayesian learning mechanism is applied when the contractor agent receives a new 
offer from the engineer agent. Based on its domain knowledge about the engineer agent, a 
new offer enables the contractor agent to acquire new insights about the engineer agent's 
reservation value in the form of posterior subjective evaluation over R. The contractor 
agent's domain knowledge about the engineer agent's strategy can be expressed as 
"usually the engineer agent will offer an amount which is 20% lower than its 
reservation value". Such a relationship can be represented by a set of conditional 
statements, for example: 
P(e2IR2)=0.95, where e2 represents ` offerengioeer = 120", and "R2 = 150". 
Given the encoded contractor agent's domain knowledge in the form of conditional 
statements and the engineer agent's offer, the contractor agent can use the standard 
Bayesian rule to revise its beliefs about the engineer agent's reservation value R: 
P(R! I e) _ 
P(R, )P(e I R, ) 
= 
P(RJ)P(e I Rr ) 
., 
k=1 
P(e Rk)P(Rk) P(e) 
Where, 
P(R; 1e) - the probability that the engineer agent's reservation value is R; under the 
condition that his offer is e; 
P(R; ) - the probability that the engineer agent's reservation value is a certain R;; 
P(ejR; ) - the probability that the engineer agent's offer is a certain e under the certain 
reservation value R;; 
P(e)- the probability that the engineer agent's offer is e 
The advantage of the Bayesian learning mechanism is that it provides a simple method to 
update an agent's beliefs about the opponent based on the opponent's offers during the 
negotiation process. The updated belief then becomes the agent's domain knowledge in 
the next updating process. An agent can finally get a relatively accurate estimate about 
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the opponent's reservation value even if its initial domain knowledge is not so accurate 
(Figure 5.6). 
Reservation 
value The real value 
--------------------------------------------------- ---- 
Time 
Prior knowledge 
P(Rj) 
Updated belief 
Prior knowledge PRIc) : 
If P(eIR; ) 
Offer 
............................................. ............................................ i (Likelihood) 
Figure 5.6 Bayesian updating 
For example: 
a) At the beginning, the contractor agent may not have any other additional information. 
Its prior knowledge can be described as: P(R1)=O. S; P(R, )=0.5; 
b) In addition, we suppose that the contractor agent is aware that the engineer agent 
will normally of/ er an amount which is 20% lower t/tan his -eservatio11 part (? f 
which is encoded as: P(eºIRº)=0.95 and P(eºIR2)=0.75, where eº represents the 
engineer agent's offer of'80, for instance. 
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c) Suppose the engineer agent offers 80 for the claim, the contractor agent can estimate 
R from the following equations: 
P(RL I e) = 
P(R, )P(e I RI) 
_ 
0.5 * 0.95 
= 0.56 Yk-1 P(e I Rk)P(Rk) (0.5 * 0.95) + (0.5 * 0.75) 
P(R2 I e) = 
P(R2)P(e I R2) 0.5 * 0.75 
= 0.44 lk=t P(e I Rk)P(Rk) (0.5 * 0.95) + (0.5 * 0.75) 
Prior to receiving the engineer agent's offer (80), the contractor agent would think 
that the engineer agent's reservation value is: R=0.5* 100 +0.5* 150 =125. After 
receiving the offer, its current estimation of the engineer agent's reservation value is: 
R=0.56* 100 +0.44* 150 =122. Therefore, the contractor agent can make its 
counteroffer based on its new estimate of reservation value. 
5.4.4.2.4 Concession Mechanism 
By working out the reservation value, each agent is able to know the opponent's utility 
functions, and therefore, it is possible to compare the maximum likelihood of risk (P.,, ) 
which it can stand and that of its opponent (which it estimates). The agent will make its 
decision on whether to concede or not accordingly. In the case that both agents think that 
their P. x are higher than their opponent's (i. e. both agents stand still), the agent with 
higher time penalty will concede at the next encounter or at the encounter where its Pmax 
is smaller than its opponent's caused by its time penalty. This keeps Zeuthen's strategy 
stable. 
The above discussion addresses the question "who should make a concession at the next 
iteration? " However, it does not specify how much an agent should concede. Two 
different approaches have been studied for the concession step: 
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9A simple approach 
Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) suggest that the step an agent concedes should be the 
minimum sufficient to make its opponent's maximum risk acceptability (P.,, ) smaller 
than or equal to its own. Otherwise, the agent will offer the same deal as the previous 
one. By following this approach, negotiation is simple and straightforward. Agents will 
concede alternately until the maximum risk of conflict for both parties is zero (i. e. the 
settlement point). Agents will surely reach an agreement. However, this approach does 
not reflect the complex nature of real construction claims negotiation. 
"A complex approach 
In practice, it is quite conceivable that an agent will have to make more than one 
concession before the opponent's Pmax becomes lower than its own. Thus, Zeuthen does 
not suggest that Agent 1's concession will invariably be followed by Agent 2's 
concession, but only that this will occur if Agent 1's concession reduces Agent 2's Pmax 
below that of Agent 1. Agents (or their owners) can decide a concession rate. To 
maximise utility, every agent will try to minimise its concession step, for example, an 
agent may prefer 3% (of its utility deduction) rather than 5% as its concession rate. On 
the other hand, the agent has to consider its utility loss caused by time penalty. The agent 
may prefer a 5% concession rate rather than 3% when it suffers a high time penalty. 
For example, in iteration i, the contractor agent concedes 3% (of its utility) which causes 
a loss of £6. In the mean time, the agent also suffers a time penalty of £5. However, the 
contractor agent's maximum risk acceptability Pte,, is still smaller than that of the 
engineer agent after this iteration. As a result, the contractor agent has to make another 
concession at the next encounter. In iteration i+1, the contractor agent will still concede 
3% (which causes a loss of £6), and suffers another time penalty of £5. The total loss of 
the contractor agent is £22 after these two iterations (suppose that its maximum risk 
acceptability is higher than that of the engineer agent at the end of iteration i+1). On the 
other hand, the contractor agent might prefer to concede 5% in iteration i (suppose the 
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contractor agent's loss is £10) to make its maximum risk acceptability higher than the 
opponent's in one encounter because the total loss of the contractor agent is only £15 in 
this situation. The selection of the concession rate will be made according to the agent's 
time penalty. The advantage of this approach is that it is more realistic. The drawback is 
that it is relatively complex. 
To keep the MASCOT model simple and specific, this research adopts the simple 
concession approach. 
5.4.4.2.5 Involvement of the Client Agent 
The above concession mechanism is based on the principle of conflict avoidance; thus, it 
is possible for agents to reach an agreement without the involvement of the client agent if 
there is an agreement zone between the contractor agent and engineer agent. However, 
there are cases where there is no agreement zone between the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent. An agent's offer will be beyond its opponent's reservation value. In these 
cases, if negotiations are only between the contractor agent and the engineer agent, the 
negotiations will fall into deadlock and have to be terminated. To avoid conflict, the 
client agent can get involved in the negotiations. 
For example, suppose the negotiation participants' positions are: 
E1- the engineer agent's initial offer = 100; 
E2 - the engineer agent's reservation value = 200; 
Cl- the contractor agent's initial offer = 500; 
C2- the contractor agent's reservation value = 300 (Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.7 The involvement of the client agent 
Thus, there is no scope for a deal between the contractor agent and the engineer agent. In 
this situation, the client agent may join in the negotiation if it thinks there are some other 
solutions that could bring it more benefits rather than a deadlock. Unlike the peer-to-peer 
negotiation relationship between the contractor agent and the engineer agent, the 
negotiation between the client agent and the engineer agent can be understood as a client- 
servant negotiation in this situation. That is, if the client agent has common negotiation 
zones with both the engineer agent and the contractor agent (e. g. the client agent's 
negotiation zone is (150,350) in this case), the engineer agent will modify its reservation 
value to meet the client agent's (i. e. 350 in this case). Consequently, the negotiation zone 
of the engineer agent is expanded due to the involvement of the client agent. It is possible 
to reach an agreement within (300,350). In the case that both the client agent and the 
engineer agent do not have an agreement zone with the contractor agent, an expanded 
solution searching strategy will be triggered. 
5.4.4.2.6 Expanded Solution-Searching 
The expanded solution searching strategies are highly related to the innovation ability of 
agents and their owners. These strategies can resolve the conflicts which autonomous 
agents themselves cannot solve through the negotiation of a single claim item. Two 
common expanded solution searching strategies are: 
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9 Tradeoffs between different negotiation items 
Agents first check the possible payoffs and weights of all their negotiation items (of the 
same claim). The contractor agent may agree to reduce its reservation value for a problem 
negotiation item to the engineer agent's benefit in order to reach an agreement. As a 
tradeoff, it will ask the engineer agent to give something on other claim items to which 
the contractor agent may have assigned more weight. Therefore, the contractor agent's 
whole utility can still be maximised, and vice versa. This tradeoff strategy can be 
between different items of a claim (i. e. tradeoffs between time and money for a claim 1) 
or different items of different claims (i. e. tradeoffs between items of claim 1 and items of 
claim 2). In the latter case, a new solution may be found outside the current negotiating 
items. This strategy could also be applicable to maximise an agent's whole utility even if 
there is no conflict deal. 
" Relaxation of negotiation constraints 
This strategy requires the involvement of some or all the autonomous agents' owners. 
When an agent finds that it cannot move the negotiation forward by adopting the above 
strategies, it can either terminate the negotiation, or request its owner to input new 
information or to relax some negotiation constraints. If the owners could expand the 
negotiation sets or remove some limitations, it is possible for the negotiating agents to 
reach an agreement. 
5.4.5 Process Model 
Figure 5.8 shows the MASCOT process model based on the IDEFO modelling method. It 
includes three major steps: making an initial offer, evaluating the offer and making a 
counteroffer, and conducting solution-searching. 
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5.4.5.1 Making an Initial Offer 
When the contractor agent (Con-Agent) receives information from its owner and 
identifies that the claim is within its authority, it will calculate the actual claim cost Cl 
based on the input information as well as the related provisions in the contract documents 
(Rule 1 for the actual cost). 
Based on C1, the Con-Agent decides a reservation value C2 for this claim item according 
to factors such as the importance, potential influence and the possibility of winning (Rule 
2 for the reservation value). The Con-Agent also works out an initial offer amount C3 
according to the Cl and C2, evidence, chance of success, and perceptions of the engineer 
agent (Eng-Agent) (Rule 3 for the initial offering amount'9). For example, if the claim is 
minor and clear, the contractor agent may submit an amount which is a little bit higher 
than Cl; however, if the claim is vague and has a high potential influence on further 
claims, the offer amount may be much higher than Cl. 
Alternatively, the contractor can directly input the real cost of Cl. and determine the 
reservation value C2 and the initial offer C3. 
Finally, the Con-Agent submits the C3 to the Eng-Agent, with copies to the client agent 
(Cli-Agent). 
5.4.5.2 Evaluating the Offer and Making a Counteroffer 
9 Engineer agent 
After receiving the claim amount C3 from the Con-Agent, the Eng-Agent calls for all the 
information related to the claim (e. g. code of the claim item, nature of the claim, possible 
influence, and related provisions in contract documents) from its database, and inform its 
19 The factors in rule 2 and rule 3 are determined by the attributes identified in the generic claims 
negotiation model. 
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owner if it is necessary. Like the Con-Agent, the Eng-Agent will calculate an actual cost 
El based on the above information (Rule 4), and work out its reservation value E2 and 
the counteroffer amount E3 (Rule 5,6). 
Alternatively, the engineer can determine the El, E2 and E3. 
The Eng-Agent then sends its counteroffer to the Con-Agent with copies to the Cli-Agent. 
" Contractor agent 
The Con-Agent will update its belief about the Eng-Agent's reservation value after 
receiving the Eng-Agent's counteroffer E3, then calculate the maximum risk acceptability 
of conflict for both parties, compare the result, and finally decide whether it should make 
the next concession and the concession amount. The Con-Agent will make the new 
counteroffer to the Eng-Agent, and inform the Cli-Agent. 
. Engineer agent 
The Eng-Agent will conduct the same operations as the Con-Agent once it receives the 
Con-Agent's new counteroffer, and makes its own new offer with copy to the Cli-Agent if 
it is its turn to make a concession. 
This negotiation process will continue until an agreement or a deadlock is reached. 
5.4.5.3 Conducting Expanded Solution Searching 
" Involvement of the client agent 
Once a deadlock is identified either by the Cli-Agent or by the other agents, it is possible 
for the Cli-Agent to get involved in the negotiation. The Cli-agent may expand the Eng- 
Agent's negotiation zone by searching the new possible deal which can be accepted by 
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the Con-Agent. If such a deal is found, a new offer based on the deal is made to the Con- 
Agent by the Eng-Agent. It is then possible to reach an agreement. 
9 Constraints relaxation 
If the involvement of the Cli-Agent fails to resolve the deadlock, the problem will be 
reported to the individual agents' owners. The owners can either relax some negotiation 
constraints or input some new information to their agents to facilitate negotiation into an 
agreement. Otherwise, a final conflict arises. This may then be resolved by arbitration or 
litigation. 
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5.5 SUMMARY 
Based on previous studies, this chapter presented the MASCOT model. It first addressed 
the nature and essential characteristics of construction claims negotiation. This was 
identified as contractually obliged self-interested negotiation. Furthermore, other 
characteristics of claims negotiation were highlighted such as: participant-dependent 
information, strategy-influenced process, important time impacts, and possible tradeoffs 
between different negotiation items. These characteristics were considered crucial for the 
development of the MASCOT negotiation protocol and strategies. 
This chapter then discussed the negotiation model for the MASCOT model. Zeuthen's 
bargaining model was selected as the MASCOT negotiation model because it reflects the 
contractually-obliged self-interested nature of construction claims negotiation, and 
enables a solution which is identical to Nash's solution. Importantly, the Bayesian 
learning approach was integrated into the Zeuthen's model to keep the negotiation 
strategies stable in the claims negotiation environment. 
Six major aspects of the MASCOT model were then described in detail. These included 
the negotiation domain; the important system assumptions and requirements; and the 
roles of each player, task agents and utlity agents. Also described was an improved 
monotonic concession protocol, which ensures convergence of the negotiation, as well as 
the stablility and effectiveness of the system. Integration of Zeuthen's negotiation 
strategy with the Bayesian learning approach was then described and the expanded 
solution-searching strategies discussed. Finally, the MASCOT process model was 
presented, and illustrated using the IDEFO modelling notation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MASCOT MODEL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Model. implementation is an important stage during the MASCOT model construction 
process. It aims to encapsulate the developed MASCOT model in an agent application 
environment. The specific objectives include: 
" To select a proper agent development toolkit for the implementation of the MASCOT 
model; and 
" To develop a prototype system based on the MASCOT model and the selected 
toolkit; 
Accordingly, the implementation process consisted of five major steps. 
" First, an agent building toolkit, the ZEUS agent development toolkit, is selected. The 
characteristics of the agent building toolkit are examined. 
" Second, the role modelling of the MASCOT model is analysed; 
" Third, the application design is conducted to resolve the problems identified at the 
role modelling stage. A major task is to identify the input information and how to 
transfer this information into the form required by the MASCOT model; and 
" Fourth, the model is implemented through the ZEUS toolkit. 
Although the MASCOT model provides a relatively sophisticated negotiation protocol 
and a number of negotiation strategies, this implementation does not intend to implement 
all the negotiation strategies due to the time limitation. The major interest is to 
demonstrate the key negotiation mechanisms (i. e. the integration of Zeuthen's concession 
mechanism and the Bayesian learning approach, and the involvement of the client agent). 
Other negotiation strategies such as the `extended solution-searching' are not 
implemented. 
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6.2 IMPLEMENTATION ENVIRONMENT 
The implementation environment includes both the hardware and software systems: 
6.2.1 Hardware 
Considering the general applications of the developed agent system, the MASCOT model 
is implemented on a personal computer (PC). Its main technical features are: a 550Mhz 
processor, a 120M RAM, a 13G hard disk and other facilities. The final application of the 
developed system will be applied within a group of computers which are connected 
through a network. 
6.2.2 Software 
In this study, the ZEUS agent building toolkit is selected as the implementation toolkit 
because it provides general and customisable agent development methodologies and 
software engineering tools to facilitate large-scale collaborative agent realisation. The 
ZEUS toolkit allows developers to configure agents of varying functionality and 
behaviour; organise the agents in whatever manner using system-provided organisational 
relationships; and imbue each agent with system-supplied or user-defined communicative 
and co-ordination mechanisms. In addition, it also provides predefined information 
discovery agents and extensive facilities for visualising and debugging societies of ZEUS 
agents. Furthermore, by the time when the MASCOT system was implemented, the 
ZEUS toolkit was one of the very few agent development toolkits which could be 
operated practically. For further information about other agent development toolkits, see 
ECOMAS (2002). 
Besides the ZEUS toolkit, Java programming language is also used to build the external 
classes which are integrated with the ZEUS primitive tasks to fulfil the functions of the 
tasks. The details of these software systems are: 
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" ZEUS Agent Building Toolkit (1.04) is developed by British Telecommunications 
plc. (BT), and is downloaded from URL http: //193.113.209.147/projects/agents/zeus/; 
" Visual Java (6.0) is developed by Microsoft Company. Java JDK 1.2.2 is developed 
by Sun Company, and is available from URL http: //www. java. sun. com/j2se/. 
Meanwhile, computer CLASSPATH is also set according to the requirements of the 
ZEUS toolkit, Java and Java JDK. After this software is installed, the new ZEUS agent 
cases could be created by using the ZEUS Agent Generator (java. zeus. generator. AgentGe 
nerator). 
6.3 THE ZEUS AGENT BUILDING TOOLKIT20 
The notion of heterogeneous autonomous agents collaborating to solve problems is a 
powerful metaphor for the engineering of distributed and interoperable software systems. 
This agent-based approach introduces a new level of abstraction - of knowledge level co- 
operation between autonomous systems - that enhances distributed systems, 
interoperability, scalability and re-configurability (BT, 1999b). However, thus far, the 
promise of the agent approach has been largely unrealised due to a number of factors, 
especially because of the inherent complexity of constructing collaborative agent 
systems. Toolkits are needed to support the development of multi-agent systems. 
The ZEUS toolkit has been developed by BT to facilitate large-scale realisation of the 
collaborative agent approach to distributed software engineering, frameworks, and 
methodologies. It is a culmination of a synthesis of established agent technologies to 
provide an integrated environment for the development of MAS. The toolkit develops a 
MAS design approach and supports it with a visual environment for capturing developer 
specification of agents that are used to generate the Java source code for the agents. 
20 The following discussions about the ZEUS toolkit are mainly abstracted from BT (1999a-g). Thus, 
references are often not particularly listed. 
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6.3.1 Issues for Building of Collaborating Agent Systems 
Collaboration between agents at the knowledge level places significant demands on 
agents. Not least is the need for a mechanism for information discovery through which 
agents discover the existence, network address, capabilities and/or roles of other agents; 
an agent-independent inter-agent communicating language that the agents use to 
communicate with one another; and an ontology that defines the application domain 
concepts being communicated between the agents. Furthermore, for effective and 
coherent problem solving, agents need mechanisms for reasoning about their own and 
other agents' problem solving capabilities and for co-ordinating their activities. In very 
dynamic environments, the problems are exacerbated by the additional requirements for 
data-driven reactive behaviour that integrates with the goal-driven deliberative activities 
of the agents. Finally, in some application domains, agent systems may need to interface 
with legacy systems such as databases. 
The main techniques proposed by ZEUS to address these issues include information 
discovery, communication, ontology, co-ordination and legacy software problems. 
Figure 6.1 is a context diagram illustrating the interplay between the various issues and 
their associated solutions. 
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" The Information Discovery Issue: This is typically handled using special-purpose 
utility agents such as nameservers and facilitators that function as society-wide white 
pages and yellow pages, providing a look-up service for agents' addresses and 
abilities respectively. Thus, agents only need to register their address with a 
nameserver and their abilities with a facilitator to become visible to the society. 
" The Ontology Issue: Agents that communicate in a common language will still be 
unable to understand one another if they use different vocabularies for representing 
shared domain concepts. Therefore, they also need to use the same ontology or 
vocabularies of common concepts. This can be achieved either through general- 
purpose ontology or by creating domain-specific ontology and using inter-ontology 
translators to map between them. 
. The Co-ordination Issue: The main co-ordinating approaches of MAS can be 
broadly classified as organisational structuring, contracting, multi-agent planning, and 
negotiation (see Chapter 3). The ZEUS toolkit provides mechanisms to facilitate co- 
ordination between agents. For example, an auction protocol has been built for the 
Contracting co-ordination mechanism. 
" Integration with Legacy Software: As agents are not intended as replacements for 
legacy software, they must be able to interact with them. Generally, there are three 
possible approaches: the software could be rewritten, but this is a costly approach. 
Alternatively a separate piece of software called a transducer could be employed to 
act as an interpreter between the agent communication language and the native 
protocol of the legacy system. Or thirdly, the wrapper technique could be used to 
augment the legacy program with code that enables it to communicate using the 
inter-agent language. 
6.3.2 Essential Functions of ZEUS 
To provide a relatively general and customisable, collaborative agent building 
environment, the ZEUS toolkit encapsulates the following major principles: 
" Firstly, it delineates between domain-level problem solving and agent-level 
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functionality. The latter covers the application-independent multi-agent issues such 
as communication, co-ordination, task execution monitoring, and exception handling, 
whilst the former covers the acquisition, representation and use of domain-specific 
knowledge in problem solving. With the agent-level functionality provided, the 
developers could concentrate on implementing the domain-specific problem solving 
abilities of their agents. 
0 Secondly, use of the toolkit is based on the 'visual programming' paradigm. Hence 
the toolkit would support the agent creation process by providing structured menus 
and tables that would enable application developers to configure the functionality 
and modalities required of their agents as simply as possible. 
Thirdly, the toolkit supports an open design to ensure it is easily extensible. Thus, 
developers are able to easily add to the library of agent level components, and 
configure new agents using a combination of developer-defined and system-supplied 
components. 
Based on these design philosophies, the ZEUS toolkit allows developers to: 
" configure a number of different agents of varying functionality and behaviour; 
" organise the agents using system-supplied organisational relationships; 
" imbue each agent with selected system-supplied and/or developer-defined 
communicative and co-ordination mechanisms; 
" supply each agent with the appropriate application-specific problem solving code; and 
" automatically generate the executables for the agents. 
In addition, the ZEUS toolkit also provides predefined information discovery agents such 
as nameserver, facilitator, and extensive facilities for visualising and debugging societies 
of ZEUS agents. 
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6.3.3 The ZFL'S Toolkit architecture 
The ZEUS toolkit consists of a set of components, written in the Java programming 
language, that can be categorised into three functional groups: an agent component 
library, an agent building tool and a suite of utility agents comprising nameserver, 
facilitator and visualiser agents (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2 Components of the ZEUS agent building toolkit 
6.3.3.1 The Agent Component Library 
The Agent Component Library is a collection of classes that form the building blocks of 
individual agents. Together these classes implement the application-independent agent- 
level functionality required of collaborative agents. The contents of this library address 
issues such as: communication, ontology, and co-ordination. For communication the 
Component Library provides: 
9a performance-based agent communication language, in this case KQML; 
0 an asynchronous socket-based message passing system; 
" an editor for describing domain-specific ontology - the domain concepts; and 
"a frame-based knowledge representation language for representing domain concepts. 
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Next, for reasoning and multi-agent co-ordination, the Component Library provides: 
"a general purpose planning and scheduling system suitable for typical task-oriented 
application domains, and the co-operative problem-solving inherent to these 
applications, and 
"a co-ordination engine that controls the social behaviour of an agent (i. e. when and 
how it interacts with other agents and the types of contracts it sets up with them). 
The functioning of the planner and co-ordination engine are influenced by the agent's 
knowledge context (i. e. its available resources and competencies, its organisational 
relationships with other agents and its available co-operation strategies). Thus, to support 
these two components, the Component Library also provides: 
"a library of predefined re-usable co-ordination protocols (e. g. contract-net and various 
auction protocols); 
"a number of predefined organisational relationships (e. g. superior, subordinate, co- 
worker and peer relations); and 
" knowledge representation mechanisms and databases for describing and storing the 
resources and competencies of an agent. 
6.3.3.2 The Generic ZEUS Agent 
Together, the components of the Agent Component Library enable the construction of an 
application-independent generic ZEUS agent that can be customised for specific 
applications by imbuing it with problem-specific resources, competencies, information, 
organisational relationships and co-ordination protocols. Figure 6.3 and Table 6.1 show 
the architecture of the generic ZEUS agent. 
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Figure 6.3 Architecture of the generic ZEUS agent 
Table 6.1 The components of a generic ZEUS agent and their functions 
Component Functions 
Mailbox Handles communications between the agent and other agents 
Message Processes incoming messages from the Mailbox, dispatching them to the 
Handler relevant components of the agent. 
Co-ordination Makes decisions concerning the agent's goals; co-ordinates the agent's 
Engine interactions with other agents using the co-ordination protocols and strategies. 
Acquaintance Describes the agent's relationships with other agents in the society, and its 
Database beliefs about the capabilities of those agents. 
Planner & Plans the agent's tasks based on decisions taken by the Co-ordination Engine 
Scheduler and the resources and task specifications available to the agent. 
Resource Maintains a list of resources that are owned by and available to the agent. The 
Database Resource Database also supports a direct interface to external systems. 
Ontology Stores the logical definition of each fact type - its legal attributes, the range of Database legal values for each attribute, any constraints between attribute values, and 
any relationships between the attributes of the fact and other facts. 
Task/Plan Provides logical descriptions of planning operators (or tasks) known to the 
Database agent. 
Execution Maintains the agent's internal clock, and starts, stops and monitors tasks that 
Monitor have been scheduled for execution or termination by the Planner/Scheduler. It 
also informs the Planner of successful and exceptional terminating conditions 
of the tasks it is monitoring. 
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6.3.3.3 The ZEUS Agent Building Software 
The principle underlying the ZEUS toolkit is that application-specific agents can be 
constructed by configuring the generic ZEUS agent, and equipping it with the necessary 
application functionality. To facilitate rapid development, the ZEUS toolkit provides a 
high-level agent development approach that hides the complexities of the Agent 
Component Library from the agent developer. This approach has two key aspects: an 
agent creation methodology, which guides the developer through the analysis and design 
of the intended system, and a visual agent development environment that supports the 
creation methodology. The first work is fulfilled through a ZEUS Agent Generator. The 
second task is fulfilled through a kind of specified utility agent - Visualiser agents. 
The Agent Generator is an integrated suite of editors that guide developers through the 
stages of comprehensive agent development methodology. During this process 
developers describe the agents within their application, how they interact, and the tasks 
they perform. Amongst the tools provided are: 
" An Ontology Editor for defining the ontology items in a domain. Fact objects are 
defined in terms of their attributes and the valid value ranges for each attribute. 
A Fact/Variable Editor for describing specific instances of facts and variables, using 
the templates created using the Ontology Editor. 
0 An Agent Definition Editor for describing agents logically. This involves specifying 
each agent's tasks, its initial resources, and the dimensions of its plan diary. 
0A Task Description Editor for specifying the attributes of tasks and for graphically 
composing summary tasks. 
0 An Organisation Editor for defining the organisational relationships between agents, 
and agents' beliefs about the abilities of other agents. 
0A Co-ordination Editor for selecting the set of co-ordination protocols with which 
each agent will be equipped. 
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6.3.3.4 The ZEUS Utility Agents 
The ZEUS suite of utility agents consists of a nameserver and a facilitator agent that 
facilitate information discovery, and a visualiser agent for visualising or debugging 
societies of ZEUS agents. A ZEUS agent society may contain any number of these utility 
agents, with at least one nameserver agent. 
" Nameserver agents have only a Mailbox and Message Handler, the components 
needed for receiving and responding to agents' requests for the addresses of other 
agents. In addition, nameserver agents maintain a society-wide clock; thus, on 
initialisation, an agent registers with a nameserver and synchronises its internal clock 
to that of the nameserver. 
Facilitator agents have a Mailbox and Message Handler for receiving and responding 
to queries from agents about the abilities of other agents, and an Acquaintance 
Database for storing the abilities of the agents. They function by periodically 
querying all the agents in the society about their abilities, and storing the returned 
information in their Acquaintance Database. Also, individual agents might advertise 
their abilities to facilitators. Thus, when an agent wants to find other agents that have 
a particular competence, they can simply send an appropriate query message to a 
facilitator agent. 
" Visualiser agents can be used to view, analyse or debug societies of ZEUS agents. 
They function by querying other agents about their states and processes, and then 
collating and interpreting the replies to create an up-to-date model of the agents' 
collective behaviour. This model can be viewed from different perspectives through 
visualisation tools supported by the visualiser agents. The current tools include 
society viewer, reports tool, agent viewer, control tool, and statistics tool. 
6.3.3.5 Integrating ZEUS Agents with External Programs 
The ZEUS toolkit also provides primary interfaces between ZEUS agents and external 
programs. These include the domain functions in primitive plan operator specifications, 
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and developer-defined Co-ordination Engine graphs whose nodes make direct calls to 
external programs. For routine problem solving within the declared scope of the ZEUS 
toolkit, it is expected that for the most part, these primary mechanisms will suffice. 
However, the Agent Component Library also provides a secondary, more sophisticated 
interface, although employing it requires significant developer programming. This is 
done via a ZEUS external interface class and an agent internal event model. 
The ZEUS external interface class allows developers to link an external Java class to an 
executing ZEUS agent program. Once linked to the agent program, the external code can 
utilise the agent's public methods to query or modify the agent's internal state. Thus, for 
example, the resource and/or plan databases can be queried or modified. 
6.4 MASCOT MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
In common with most other structured development approaches, the ZEUS approach 
consists of analysis, design and realisation activities, as well as runtime support facilities 
that enable the developer to debug and analyse their implementations. Figure 6.4 
illustrates the MASCOT agent development process. 
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Figure 6.4 The MASCOT agent development process 
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The MASCOT agent development contains the following four steps: 
" Domain Analysis: The purpose of the initial analysis stage is to model and 
understand the application problem (e. g. agent responsibilities and roles). An 
approach recommended by ZEUS to fulfil this task is Role Modelling. Role 
modelling is relevant to most facets of the agent development lifecycle, addressing 
the specification, analysis, design, implementation, and maintenance of agents (BT, 
1999a). Role models are also patterns of interaction, providing a readily 
comprehensible means of analysing the problem in question. 
" Agent Design: This stage involves the translation of role responsibilities into the 
agent-level problems they represent, and deriving appropriate solutions (i. e. tasks, 
rulebases and interfaces). While the analysis process involved understanding the 
problem requirements, the design process involves expertise, knowing when and how 
to reuse and adapt existing proven solutions. Also, the knowledge (ontology) 
modelling process is conducted. This models the declarative knowledge that will be 
used by the agent roles. This stage results in the concepts inherent to the application, 
their attributes and possible values. 
" Agent Realisation: The objective of this process is to realise working agent 
implementations from the conceptual designs created during the previous stage. The 
agent realisation process consists of several stages, which are closely coupled to the 
levels of abstraction that exist within a ZEUS agent. This stage is where ZEUS begins 
to offer software support, providing an Agent Generator tool through which the 
designs can be entered, and then used to generate Java source code for the agents. 
" Runtime Support: The ZEUS approach does not end with the creation of the agents. 
There is also a suite of runtime support tools that are available through the Visualiser 
agent. This reflects the fact that the development process is unlikely to have ended 
with the implementation of the agents, as they still need to be tested, debugged and 
optimised. 
The MASCOT implementation process is described in three parts: the MASCOT role 
modelling, the application design and model realisation. 
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6.4.1 Role Modelling 
Agent roles and role models provide a vocabulary for describing agent systems, with each 
role describing a position and a set of responsibilities within a certain context or role 
model. This approach encourages developers to analyse the problem in terms of the roles 
that need to be played, and the responsibilities associated with each role. The role models 
formalise the definition of an agent role so that it can be modelled, designed, and 
implemented in software. The work of role modelling is effectively an agent-oriented 
extension of role modelling, as practised in conventional object-oriented software 
engineering. The qualifying criteria for roles are very similar to those of objects (i. e. the 
role should be modular; have high cohesion; be prudent; be complete; and have low 
coupling) (BT, 1999a). 
The role models are grouped into domains. These domains have been chosen after 
analysing existing agent applications and grouping together those that address similar 
problems or exhibit similar behaviour. The domains provide a context that enables 
developers to compare their planned system with existing applications. Thus each section 
of the subject domain possesses several role models. Role models are 'architectural 
patterns'that depict the high-level similarities between related systems (i. e. the problems 
inherent to each domain). 
6.4.1.1 The Components of a Role Model 
Role model notation originates from the UML (Unified Modelling Language) class 
diagram notation. Each role model entry begins with a description summarising its main 
features and general applicability. The model's constituent roles are then shown in a Role 
Model diagram (Figure 6.5). In role diagrams, the key concepts are roles rather than 
classes, (represented by rectangles), whilst containment and inheritance are depicted in 
the same fashion as in class diagrams, with diamond and triangle headed lines 
respectively. The only difference between a class diagram and role diagram is that class 
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diagrams describe the static relationships between classes, while role models describe the 
dynamic interactions between roles. Hence the UML (Unified Modelling Language) class 
diagram has been augmented with additional notation to depict interactions: the 
arrowhead line. Where an arrowhead line is shown with a filled circle, this means that 
more than one simultaneous interaction can occur between entities playing these roles. 
Parent Role Legend 
Interaction 1 
Peer Role 
Containing Peer Role Multiplicity 
Role 
Containment 
Inheritance -D 
Sub-role 11 
1Sub-role 
2 
Figure 6.5 The notation used within a typical role diagram 
After the role diagram, the next component of each role model entry is the collaboration 
diagram. This abstracts away from the specialisation and containment relationships 
between roles and instead concentrates on how they interact, an example is shown in 
Figure 6.6. The main difference between collaboration and role diagrams is that only 
interactions are shown. Each interaction is annotated with a number, which refers to an 
explanation of the interaction found later in the role model. Where the collaboration 
diagram is made easier to understand by the inclusion of sub-roles, these are shown 
inside their containing role. 
3 
Peer Role Containing Role Peer Role 
2 Sub-role 1 or 2 
Figure 6.6 The notation used within a collaboration diagram 
The next part of a role model entry is the role description section. The purpose of this 
section is to describe each role in terms of its social obligations and application-specific 
functionality. Hence each of the interactions shown in the collaboration diagram will 
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appear in the corresponding role description. As well as interactions with other roles, 
each entry also describes the interactions between the role and its external interfaces. 
6.4.1.2 MASCOT Role Modelling 
By following the role modelling procedure described above, the MASCOT role models 
were developed (Figure 6.7). Of the eight roles illustrated in the figure, an important role 
- the Case-based mediator role, will be incorporated in future study. Considering the 
interaction with the mediator role, an Mfacilitator role is adopted instead of the common 
facilitator role provided by ZEUS. Implicit in this role model is the presence of the name 
server role and the visualiser role. Figure 6.8 illustrates the interactions between these 
roles where the inquirer, registrant and mediator roles are not presented. Table 6.2 
describes the collaboration relationship. 
Figure 6.7 The MASCOT role representation 
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I------------------------- 
Case-based Reasoning 
Mediator 
Figure 6.8 The MASCOT collaboration diagram 
Table 6.2 Interaction summary 
Collaboration Explanation 
1 Registration Agents register or de-register their claim items for negotiation. 
2 Offer Message containing agent's offer 
3 Counteroffer Another agent replies to a previously submitted offer 
4 Report to client Report to the client on the negotiation process 
5 Participant in 
negotiation 
The client may get involved in the negotiation 
6 Inquiry Agents inquire from the Mfacilitator about any possible solution 
to the claim. 
7 Answer The Mfacilitator answers the inquiries from agents 
Note: 1) The initial interactions between agents as they register with a Name Server are not 
shown. 
2) The interactions 6 and 7 are currently not implemented within MASCOT (shown as dot 
lines in Figure 6.8). 
The following tables are the role description entries (Table 6.3 - 6.7). The purpose is to 
describe each role in terms of its social obligations and application-specific functionality. 
Furthermore, each entry also describes the interactions between the role and its external 
interfaces. The external interfaces represent the means through which the role performs 
its application-specific activities, such as accessing databases, or reading information 
from a developer interface. 
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Table 6.3 Contractor role description 
Contractor 
Role Model: MASCOT 
Relationships to other roles: Contained by the Negotiator role 
Description: This is the role played by the contractor. No assumptions are made as to the 
expertise of the contractor. 
Responsibilities: Collaborators: 
[1]To inform the Facilitator of the new claims item Mfacilitator 
[2,3] To make and respond to offers from the Engineer Engineer 
[4] To inform the Client the negotiation message Client 
External Interfaces: 
To facilitate the entry of its owner's pre-negotiation information 
To interpret the negotiation 
To facilitate further involvement of its owner 
Prerequisites: 
The specified negotiation protocol and strategies of the MASCOT model 
Table 6.4 Engineer role description 
Engineer 
Role Model: MASCOT 
Relationships to other Roles: Contained by the Negotiator role 
Description: This is the role played by the engineer. No assumptions are Made as to the 
ex ep rtise of the engineer. 
Responsibilities: Collaborators: 
_ 
[2,3] To receive and respond to offers from the Contractor => Contractor 
[4,5] To inform the client of the negotiation status, and Client 
receive instructions from the client 
External Interfaces: 
To facilitate the entr of its owner's re-negotiation information 
To interpret the negotiation 
To facilitate further involvement of its owner 
Prerequisites: 
The specified negotiation protocol and strategies of the MASCOT model 
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Table 6.5 Negotiator role description 
Role Model: MASCOT 
Relationshis to other Roles: specialist Task Agent, contains Contractor and Engineer 
Implementation: Modified Task Agent 
Table 6.6 Client role description 
CLIENT 
Role Model: MASCOT 
Relationshis to other Roles: Contained by the Su pervisor role 
Description: This is the role played by the client. 
expertise of the client. 
No assumptions are made as to the 
Responsibilities: Collaborators: 
[4,5] To receive information from the contractor 
the engineer, and make suggestions to the engineer 
and Contractor, Engineer 
External Interfaces: 
To facilitate the entry of its owner's pre-negotiation information 
To interpret the negotiation 
To facilitate further involvement of its owner 
Prerequisites: 
The specified negotiation protocol and strategies of the MASCOT model 
'Cable 6.7 Mfacilitator role description 
MFACILITATOR 
to other Roles: contains Case-based reasoning mediator 
Description: 
This is somewhat similar to the standard ZEUS Application Facilitator role (il' not 
considering the case-based reasoning role, it can he fulfilled by a standard ZEUS 
Facilitator role). Currently, it mainly stores all the information about claim items and 
each agent's negotiation history. 
[6] To receive notifications and inquiries from participants 
[7] To reply to agents' inquiries 
External Interfaces: 
Collaborators: 
Contractor, ý; II IIICCI', 
Client 
To store information on negotiation participants 
Prerequisites: The specified negotiation protocol and strategies of the MASCOT model 
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After defining all the roles in the MASCOT model, the next task is to allocate these roles 
to agents. A simple way is to assign an agent to each role, but that may not be an 
optimum way in most cases. The ZEUS role modelling guide (BT, 1999a) provides two 
principles in determining how to make appropriate agents. 
" The first is derived from the fact that agents should be autonomous (i. e. be 
responsible for the control of resources and provision of services). This area of 
control is known as the agent's Sphere of Responsibility. Thus when considering what 
agents will exist, it is necessary to consider how the application domain will be 
partitioned. A simple rule is "Each sphere of responsibility should possess a single 
agent". It is also worth noting another factor that may help identify candidate agents. 
Agents tend to be responsive (i. e. able to perceive their environment and respond 
accordingly to events that affect their own sphere of responsibility). 
0 The second is The Point of Interaction, which is related to the Sphere of 
Responsibility test, but extends it by considering the social dimension of agents. 
Agents are often distinguished from other software systems by their ability to interact 
intelligently and constructively with other agents and people. Hence in an agent 
application, resources and services may not be directly accessible, but invoked by 
requesting the agent responsible for their control. A Point of Interaction test, which 
illustrates the difference between resources and agents: agents affect resources, 
interactions affect agents, illustrates another rule for agent creation: "The access point 
for information, expertise and services is a good agent candidate" . 
Thus, individual roles do not necessarily need to be played by individual agents. It is 
more likely that several roles will be combined and be performed by a single agent. 
Roles may combine in various ways: the behaviour may be just added together; some 
behaviour may override other behaviour; or the behaviour might be combined 
synergistically. 
Considering these two principles (i. e. Sphere of Responsibility and The Point of 
Interaction), this study creates several agents to fulfil the roles identified in the role 
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model (Table 6.8). Each role described in the above tables is assigned to an agent. Two 
more utility agents provided by the ZEUS toolkit are also included. 
Table 6.8 Agents created in MASCOT model 
Agent Roles Played 
Contractor Agent Negotiator (offer, counteroffer, registrant, inquiry) 
Engineer Agent Negotiator (offer, counteroffer, registrant, inquiry) 
Client Agent Supervisor (supervision if necessary, registrant, inquiry) 
Mfacilitator Agent Mfacilitator (currently: register claim items and record 
negotiation history; 
future: case-based mediator 
Visual Agent Visualiser 
ANS Agent name server 
Having identified what roles and agents should exist within the application, the next step 
is to determine how agents will realise each role. This process needs two steps: 
application design and model realisation. 
6.4.2 Application Design 
The application design is a process of refinement, mapping each of the responsibilities 
identified in the previous stage to a generalised problem, and then choosing the most 
appropriate solution. In many cases, the solutions can be found in the existing ZEUS 
toolkit, such as utility agents, and relationship, especially co-ordination protocols. 
However, no ZEUS co-ordination protocol and strategies can fulfil the agents' 
responsibilities in the MASCOT model. Thus, the focus of this application design is on: 
" identifying the negotiation protocol and strategies; 
" identifying the input information (interface); and 
" identifying how the input information is transferred into the form which the 
MASCOT model requires. 
Another important aspect of the application design, knowledge modelling (ontology 
creation), will be discussed in the next section - realisation of the model. 
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6.4.2.1 Negotiation Protocol and Strategies 
The developed MASCOT negotiation protocol is illustrated in Figure 6.9. A detailed 
description of the protocol can be seen in Chapter 5. 
Figure 6.9 The flowchart of the MASCOT negotiation protocol 
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The existing negotiation protocol and strategies provided by the ZEUS toolkit cannot 
fulfil the above complex tasks, and therefore will not be adopted in this prototype. In the 
MASCOT model, the contractor and the engineer are required to make a decision with 
regard to the negotiation strategies at two stages: the criteria for the acceptance of the 
opponent's proposal, and the decision to determine who should concede and how much 
the agent should concede (Figure 6.9). This is achieved by Zeuthen's strategy discussed 
in Chapter 5. The strategy for the client agent is to decide whether it should join the 
negotiation between the contractor agent and the engineer agent, (i. e. whether it should 
use its reservation value to substitute the engineer agent's reservation value), thereby 
improving the chances of an agreement being reached. 
6.4.2.2 Input Information 
There are two essential principles underlying the decision on agents' input information: 
to address all the key factors of claims negotiation defined in previous studies; and to 
simplify the implementation system to ensure that only the key factors are involved. 
Seven pieces of input information are selected for the contractor and the engineer agents. 
These are: `claims items', `my reservation value', `my optimum value', `time allowed for 
negotiation', `the opponent's possible reservation value', the opponent's negotiation 
habits', and the `confidence in my estimate of the opponent information'. Since the client 
agent does not play a direct negotiator's role, it is not necessary for it to estimate the 
contractor's reservation value and negotiation habits. Thus, there are five 111Crrs of input 
information involved in the client input window (Figure 6.10). 
of the estimate about the Opponent -s negotiation hehlt ir. hlgh k- con[loence of the estimate about the oppunentb negotiation hehlt ln: Iedlu. 
to negotiate: ceservatlonValue"900.0, optl. uavalue"1100.0, tlseConstra-Jil lAtteapting to negotiate: [ese[vation0alue" 1000.0, opctsuava lue. 800.0, 
tim Item!: abouic osl Choose 
reserve value pp Clalm hems dýýýnrroý. l 0111ae6 
optimum value t TO -- 0 `I `, I AMaenevawe ro 
is euowad for negotiation (from one to flue unit) 30 My optimum value ýi, uu u 
e engineer's possible reservation value 50 <i Tima allowed for negotiation (Oom one to five unto. 11 u 
s engineer's Offers usually lowerthan his real value by 1.5 i Conddance about the above estimation is High Medium Low 
nil deuce about fire above eiemalmn u High Medium low 
t ?` Negotiation 
_ 
Negoeatlon 
Figure 6.10 The MASCOT model input window 
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9 Claims Items 
When a party starts a negotiation, he first needs to identify the negotiation item (i. e. the 
ID of the claim item) such as labour cost claim, material cost claim or loss of productivity 
claim. If both parties initiate different negotiation items, the Mfacilitator agent will 
remind them of the difference, and arrange a negotiation for the same item. Moreover, the 
identification of the ID of a claim (negotiation) item is also essential for agents to 
conduct any of the extended solution searching strategies, where agents make trade-offs 
between different claim items; or ask their owners to relax some negotiation constraints, 
so that the opportunity to reach an agreement is increased. 
" My Reservation Value and My Optimum Value 
These two values represent the maximum or minimum value a party can offer to or 
accept from the opponent. For the contractor, reservation value is the minimum value that 
s/he could accept for the claim item; optimum value represents the possible maximum 
value that the contractor expects from the engineer. For the engineer or the client, 
reservation value is the maximum value that they could offer to the contractor; the 
optimum value represents the minimum value that they would prefer to offer for the 
claim item. In this study, these two pieces of information fully define a party's utility 
function in negotiation. It is private information. It is assumed that every party clearly 
understands his/her reservation value and optimum value. 
9 Time Allowed for Negotiation 
This value defines the deadline within which a party is willing to end a negotiation. In 
this study, the deadline is represented as a different time unit, from one to five. If a party 
wishes to finish the negotiation within a very short time period, s/he should input one 
(time unit). Otherwise, he may choose an appropriate time unit if he has enough time to 
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handle the negotiation. Based on the input time unit, the party's utility will be reduced by 
a certain percentage for every iteration during the negotiation (for details, see Ren, 2001). 
" The Opponent's Possible Reservation Value 
This value represents a party's estimate of the opponent's reservation value. In this study, 
the opponent's reservation value is not represented by the single input reservation value. 
Rather, it is described by a group of reservation values with specific probability 
distribution determined by the estimated reservation value and the party's confidence 
about the estimate. The probability distribution of the reservation values is hypothesised 
as the normal distribution. 
The normal distribution frequently occurs in practical problems, and is most commonly 
used to describe the events which are possibly distributed in symmetrically in the real 
world. Importantly, the distribution provides an accurate approximation to a large number 
of other probability laws (Scheaffer and Mcclave, 1999). Its characteristics, symmetry 
and bell shape, reflect the distribution characteristics of one party's estimate of the 
opponent's reservation value. 
The general formula for the probability density function of the normal distribution is 
expressed as: 
e-(X-R)= /(2a2) 
f(x)= 
Q 27r 
Where, t is the mean of the distribution (location parameter) which shifts the location of 
the normal distribution curve along the horizontal axis; and a2 is the variance of the 
distribution (scale parameter) which determines the shape of the curve. The effect of a 
scale parameter greater than one is to stretch the curve while the curve is compressed if a 
scale parameter is less than one. Figure 6.11 is the plot of normal probability density 
functions with different ß values. 
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Figure 6.11 Normal distribution curves 
In this study, mean t represents the input estimated opponent's reservation value. 
Standard deviation ß is determined by the negotiating party's confidence about his 
estimate. It is assumed that if the party's confidence is high, a is one; if the confidence is 
low, a will be three (Table 6.9). The shape of the curve is very plain in this case (a 
straight line means that a party does not have any pre-knowledge about the opponent's 
possible reservation value). 
Table 6.9 Attribute assumptions of normal distribution 
[Confidence High Medium Low 
a 1 2 3 
The Opponent's Negotiation habits 
This value is a party's estimate of the opponent's negotiation habits. In the contractor's 
input window, it is expressed as "The engineer's offer is usually lower than his real value 
by 
- percentage". 
The relationship between the engineer's reservation value and his 
possible offers is illustrated in Figure 6.12. If the engineer has a reservation value R1, he 
will most probably make an offer that is around O. The input negotiation habit 
represents the ratio O1/ R1. Such a distribution is normally asymmetric because the 
engineer does not have much interest in those offers which are much lower than Ot since 
a=o. 5 
a=1.0 
2.0 
=5.0 
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they can seldom be accepted by the contractor, and vice versa. Such an asymmetric 
distribution can be figured out either through an industry survey, or by a mathematical 
probability distribution. This study adopts the mathematical probability approach. It is 
hypothesised that lognormal distribution can illustrate such an asymmetric distribution". 
Probability 
0 
a 
L 
Offer 
Figure 6.12 Relationship between the engineer's reservation value and the possible offers 
The lognormal distribution may be defined as the distribution of a variate whose 
logarithm obeys the normal law of probability (Aitchison and Brown, 1963). Many 
applications of the lognormal distribution have been noted in nature from a variety of 
fields such as: small particle statistics, biology, anthropometry, astronomy, philosophy, 
physical and industrial processes, economics, and sociology. Two typical application 
cases are distribution of incomes and analysis of consumer behaviour. 
The density function of lognormal distribution is described as: 
21 This hypothesis needs to be further proved theoretically and verified in various cases. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this study to make such a comprehensive analysis. The limited objective of this study 
is to discuss the lognormal distribution as a candidate for the mathematical description of the relationship 
between negotiation participants' reservation value and the possible offers, especially the asymmetric 
distribution. Although some other distributions such as the Gamma distribution and the Weibull 
distribution are also characterised as asymmetric distributions, the physical meaning of these distributions 
are not suitable for this application scenario (For details, see Aitchison and Brown, 1963). 
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Where, t and ß are the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal 
distribution as described in the normal distribution. The impacts of these two factors on 
the lognormal distribution are shown in Figure 6.13 and 6.14. 
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Figure 6.13 Frequency curves of the lognormal distribution for three value of µ 
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Figure 6.14 Frequency curves of the lognormal distribution for three value of a 
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By analysing the influence of different attributes on the shape of the lognormal 
distribution, this study makes a number of assumptions (Table 6.10). Since it is difficult 
to make a quantitative analysis of the assumptions, the idea is to control the shape of the 
curve through the attributes. For example, if a party has high confidence in his estimate, 
the shape of the curve will be relatively sharp; meanwhile, the relationship between 
mode, median and mean of the distribution is also considered. 
Table 6.10 Attribute assumptions of lognormal distribution 
Confidence a 
_High 0.4 0.9 
Medium 0.7 0.8 
Low 1.0 0.7 
" Confidence 
Confidence describes the degree of a negotiation party's understanding of the opponent's 
reservation value and negotiation habit. Consequently, it influences the probability 
distribution of a party's estimate of his opponent's reservation value and the conditional 
probability distribution of the opponent's possible offers given an estimated reservation 
value. Confidence is described by using three qualitative values: high, medium, or low. 
When a party has little domain knowledge about the opponent, his confidence is assumed 
to be low. On the contrary, if he has much negotiation experience with the opponent, it is 
reasonable to assume that the confidence of his estimate is high. Otherwise, it is proper to 
define the confidence as medium. 
6.4.2.3 Determination of the Probability Distribution 
After obtaining the input information, the next step is to transfer the input information 
into the probability distributions required for the application of the Bayesian learning 
approach (for details see Table 3 in Ren, 2001). The following example illustrates this 
process. 
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Suppose the contractor's input information about the engineer is: 
" The engineer's possible reservation value is: 950 
" The engineer's offer usually is lower than his real offer by: 0.20 (i. e. 20%) 
" The confidence about the above estimate is: high 
Based on this information, the distribution of the engineer's reservation value can be 
worked out using the normal distribution. To ensure accuracy, eleven possible reservation 
values are included based on the estimated reservation value. The centre of the 
distribution is decided by the estimated reservation value (950). The range of these data is 
determined by the contractor's estimate of the engineer's negotiation habit (0.2). The 
shape of the distribution is determined by the contractor's confidence (high) (Table 6.11). 
Table 6.11 Reservation distribution 
Possible 
Reservation 760 798 836 874 912 950 988 1026 1064 1102 1140 
Value 
Probability 0.022 0.044 0.078 0.116 0.147 0.160 0.147 0.116 0.078 0.044 0.022 
The following work is to determine the conditional probability of the engineer's offers 
given the possible reservation values. This process includes three steps: 
" Firstly, the probability distribution is calculated based on the lognormal distribution, 
which, in turn, is determined by the contractor's confidence about his estimate. To 
ensure a reasonable accuracy, seven data are selected to plot the probability 
distribution (Table 6.12). 
Table 6.12 Lognormal distribution 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Probability 
Distribution 
0.152 0.174 0.143 0.110 0.084 0.064 0.050 
" Secondly, the engineer's possible offers are determined based on the range of the 
reservation values in Table 6.13 and the estimated engineer's negotiation habit. Since 
the engineer and the contractor have different tendencies in making offers, the range 
of their offers are quite different even if their reservation value distributions are 
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similar. The first row in Table 6.13 represents the engineer's possible offers in this 
example. 23 possible offers are selected to describe the conditional probability. 
" Thirdly, the conditional probabilities of the engineer's offers given the reservation 
values are determined. For each possible reservation value, there is a distribution of 
possible offers that is described by a lognormal distribution. For example, if the 
engineer's reservation value is 950 and his negotiation habit is 20% (i. e. the engineer 
usually makes an offer lower than the reservation value by 20%), then the engineer's 
most possible offer is: 950x80%=760. Thus, the maximum probability of 0.174 is 
assigned to an offer of 760. Consequently, the other probabilities are assigned to the 
other possible offers sequentially. The result is shown in the seventh row 
(highlighted) of Table 6.14. Similarly, the conditional probabilities for each 
reservation value are worked out as shown in Table 6.14. 
In the above analysis, it is implicitly assumed that the engineer will always prefer to 
make his offer lower than the reservation value by the same percentage (e. g. 20%) during 
the whole negotiation process. The assumption may work well in some cases depending 
on the individual negotiation mechanisms. For example, Zeng and Sycara (1998) adopt a 
similar assumption in their project - BAZZAR. In their system, a simple concession 
mechanism is adopted (e. g. a buyer will always make his offer 10% lower than the 
seller's reservation value estimated by him) that has been proved successful. The 
problems, such as who should make the next concession or how much the concession 
should be, are not considered. 
However, there is a potential problem in this assumption. In practice, the engineer may 
make his offer 20% lower than his reservation value at the beginning of the negotiation, 
and reduce it to 10% at the final stage of the negotiation after both parties have made 
some concessions. His offer should be close to his expected offer amount (but not 
necessarily the reservation value) at this stage. Since the MASCOT model aims to build a 
relatively sophisticated negotiation mechanism (e. g. it involves the problem such as who 
should make concessions and how much concession should be), it is more reasonable to 
consider the change of the negotiators' exaggerated amount. 
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This can be achieved by adopting different negotiation habits (exaggerated amounts) in 
different reservation values. For example, in the above example, the engineer's 
exaggerated amount may change from 20% to 15% when the reservation value increases 
from 760 to 1140. The modified conditional probability distribution is shown in Table 
6.14. The implementation of the MASCOT model has shown that such an improvement is 
very effective. However, the estimate of the change of the exaggerated amount (e. g. from 
20% to 15%) is relatively sensitive and difficult. 
6.4.3 Model Realisation 
This section describes aspects of the application design (i. e. the knowledge modelling) 
and how the developed design is realised by using the ZEUS toolkit, in the form of the 
Agent Generator editor. The realisation process combines the steps necessary to create a 
generic ZEUS agent with the steps necessary to implement the role-specific solutions 
identified during the previous phases. The realisation process consists of the following 
activities: 
" ontology creation 
" agent creation, for each task agent this consists of: 
a) agent definition 
b) task description 
c) agent organisation 
d) agent co-ordination 
" utility agent configuration 
" task agent configuration. 
6.4.3.1 Ontology Creation 
An ontology is declarative knowledge representing the significant concepts within the 
application domain. A concept is significant and must be modelled if meaningful 
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interactions cannot occur between agents without both parties being aware of the concept. 
An ontology contains (BT, 1999d): 
" the key concepts within the application domain; 
" the significant attributes of each concept; 
" the types of the each attribute, any constraints on the attributes; and 
" initial values of these attributes. 
The ZEUS toolkit provides two kinds of ontology: abstract and entity. The former defines 
the abstract concepts which are apart from physical items, such as: time, money and 
name. The latter defines the physical entities, such as: beam, column and floor. In the 
MASCOT model, all the concepts (also termed as `Facts'), such as reservation value, 
probability and agent name, refer to abstract instances rather than physical ones, thus the 
ontology of the MASCOT model is based on the abstract facts. Table 6.15 describes the 
ontology defined in the MASCOT model to fulfil each agent's roles (the initial value of 
each attribute is not listed; for details see appendix 1). Basically, the ontology can be 
further classified as two kinds: those concepts that describe the key facts and data in 
negotiation, such as claimltem, agentName and offer; and those which work as trigger 
facts for rulebases, such as startMakelnitialoffer, startMakeNewOffer, and 
startResponseTo Offer. Figure 6.15 illustrates how a fact is created through the ontology 
editor window. 
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Table 6.15 MASCOT ontology 
Facts Description Attributes 
claims The claim items lossofproductivity 
timeextension 
lumpsumitem 
labourcost 
material 
equipment 
constraints Constraints contain some of the essential hasBeenSent 
information which needs to be specified 
ent's owner before the b an a 
initialOfferDone 
y g 
negotiation can proceed, such as agent's opReserv 
reservation value, optimum value and 
time constraints opDev . 
domainknowledge 
confidence 
myReserv 
myOpty 
time 
opOpty 
owner 
transferConditionalProbabilit 
yDone 
agentsName Each agent needs a specified name name 
flags A set of flags which will allow certain newOfferDone 
rules to be called or inhibited according to 
the combinations set name . 
negotiationInProgress 
stop 
moveToNextExchange 
registerDone 
formerOfferHistory A record of who accepts a particular client 
negotiation item. 
engineer 
contractor 
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Table 6.15 MASCOT ontology (cont. ) 
Facts Description Attributes 
negotiationOrder A feature describing negotiation sequence previous 
next 
acceptProposal A feature describing whether the opponent's name 
offer has been accepted accept 
initialOffer An agent's initial offer initialOffer 
name 
negotiationParticipants The participants of a negotiation respondent 
initiator 
startAssignOptimumValue Trigger to assign the opponent's optimum 
value after receiving his initial offer. 
start 
startAssignOptimumValuel Trigger to assign the opponent's optimum 
value after receiving his initial offer. 
start 
startMakelnitialOffer Trigger to start making initial offer start 
startStartNegotiation Trigger to start the negotiation start 
startRespondToProposal Trigger to start making response to the 
opponent's offer/ counteroffer 
start 
startSendAcceptNotice Trigger to send the accept notice start 
startMakeNewOffer Trigger to make new offer/ counteroffer start 
startSendProposalBack Trigger to send proposal back to the 
opponent 
start 
startSendProposal Trigger to send offer to the opponent start 
startChangeNegotiationParti Trigger to start changing the negotiation respondent 
cipants participants (for future use) initiator 
startInvolvementOfClient Trigger for the involvement of the client start 
startTransferToConditionalP 
robability 
Trigger to start transferring the owner input 
data into conditional probability 
start 
startRegister Trigger to register to the facilitator start 
startEvaluateProposal Trigger to evaluate the opponent's 
offer/counteroffer 
start 
startAssignValue Trigger to assign value to an attribute to draw 
the negotiation process 
start 
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Table 6.15 MASCOT ontology (cont. ) 
Facts Description Attributes 
domainKnowledge The estimate of the opponent's domain knowledge 
(i. e. the opponent's negotiation habits) 
domainknowledge 
offer The offer and counteroffer value. status 
owner 
toBeEvaluatedBy 
offer 
reservationValue The estimated opponent's reservation value in reservationValue 
each iteration. agName 
status 
owner 
hypothesis An array recording the opponent's possible hyp 
reservation values. owner 
probability An array recording the possibility related to the probability 
above hypotheses. owner 
proposal Values are used for agents to plot the negotiation status 
process. owner 
proposal 
toBeEvaluatedBy 
opproposal 
myreserv 
myoptv 
opreserv 
opoptv 
optimumValue A value recording the opponent's optimum value status 
owner 
optv 
pevent An array recording the possible events owner 
pevent 
cprosl An array recording the current offer's conditional owner 
probability cprosl 
mem A fact recording all the negotiation offers and owner 
counteroffers mem 
mof 
agreement The value of final agreement agreement 
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Figure 6.15 Ontology editor window 
6.4.3.2 Agent Creation 
During the agent creation stage, the generic ZEUS agent is configured to fulfil its 
application-specific responsibilities. Thus, before creating the agents, the following 
decisions should have already been made in the role modelling and application design 
stages: 
. What agents exist? 
0 What activities will each agent perform? 
. How will each agent interact with other agents? and 
0 What strategies should each agent adopt? 
The next step is to create these agents using the ZEUS toolkit, which consists of' three 
main activities. They are: 
" Configuring planning parameters: in this study, the parameters (e. g. maximum 
number of simultaneous and tasks planner length) are set as default (i. e. defined by 
the ZEUS toolkit); 
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" Task identification: the new (or defined) primitive tasks and rulebases are assigned tu 
each agent, which will perform these tasks according to the role modelling: and 
" Initial agent resources allocation: the resources (defined in the ontology) that agents 
would possess when they are initialised are listed as the agents' initial resources. 
However, it is not necessary to define any facts which will he generated by tasks 
during the negotiation process. In the MASCOT model, there are three kinds of value 
that need to he defined in the initial attributes: 
a) Name strings, such as agentsName, are set as related agent's name, or none il' the 
agent does not exist at the beginning; 
b) Boolean values, such as: startMakeNewOff'r or sturtSenclfcceptNotice are all set 
as false; 
c) Real values, such as: doniainKnowledge, are set as zero. 
Figure 6.16 illustrates how an agent is created through the agent editor window. "fahle 
6.16 lists agents' primitive tasks, rulebases and initial resources defined in MASCOT. 
Agent Definition Panel u (1I u', 
Planning Pararn. tar$ 
__.. __...... _........ .... -_: ýýl: rlrtiiýt'i , (lýli i, r'i r-I ý`. t -iiý_ýIli, '. rl,., i, ýi. ' 1,., ". 4 ., 
fl. _ 
12U 
Task Identification 
galt t, ýý.,. 
Register 
_ ý_ 
Rulbase 
SlartTransle rTOContlRlonalProbablllty Rulobase 
ranslerTo Con tll ti anal Pro bat Pi hty Prn rnltlve 
Initial Agent Resources 
ýE . r, I..: I ill ll 
Figure 6.16 Agent definition window in the ZEUS toolkit 
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Table 6.16 Tasks, rulebases and initial resources related to agents in MASCOT 
Agent Primitive Tasks Rulebases Initial Resources 
Contractor TransferToConditionalP 
robability 
Register agentsName 
MakelnitialOffer StartTransferToCondit 
ionalProbability 
startStartNegotiation 
MakeNewOffer StartMakelnitialOffer flags 
AssignOptimumValue negotiationOrder 
AssignOptimumValuel acce tPro osal 
startSendAcceptNotice 
startMakeNewOffer 
startSendPro osalBack 
DomainKnowledge 
startMakeInitialOffer 
startAssi n0 timumValue 
ne otiationPartici ants 
startChangeNegotiationPart 
icipants 
startAssi n0 timumValue1 
startRes ondToPro osal 
startEvaluateProposal 
startNewOffer 
startAccept 
startSendProposal 
startlnvolvementOfClient 
startAssignValue 
acce tPro oral 
agreement 
Engineer TransferToConditionalP 
robability 
Register (same as the contractor) 
MakelnitialOffer StartTransferToCondit 
iona Probability 
MakeNewOffer StartMakelnitialOffer 
AssignOptimumValue StartNegotiation 
Client AssignValue Register agentsName 
N protocol flags 
startlnvolvementOfClient 
acce tPro osal 
startSendAcceptNotice 
startAssignValue 
Mfacilitator InterfaceEndRB agentsName 
formerOfferHisto 
Ne otiationPartici ants 
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Besides the above elements, another two aspects, agent organisation and agent co- 
ordination, also need to be defined through the agent editor window. 
6.4.3.3 Agent Organisation 
By default, agents are ignorant of the names and abilities of their neighbours, so if an 
agent needs the service of another, it will need to contact a directory service. However, 
agents may have prior knowledge of other agents, especially if they interact with each 
other on a regular basis. These known agents are called 'acquaintances'. There are four 
different types of relationships that can exist between agents: 
. Peer: The default relationship with no assumptions about agent interaction; 
" Superior: The acquaintance possesses higher authority than this agent, and can issue 
orders that this agent must obey; 
" Subordinate: The acquaintance has less authority than this agent, and can be issued 
orders that it must obey; and 
" Co-worker: The acquaintance belongs to the same 'community' as this agent, and 
will be asked before peers when any resources are required. 
In the MASCOT model, the relationship between the contractor agent and the engineer 
agent (or the client agent) is peer to peer because they have equal position in terms of the 
claim issues. On the other hand, the relationship between the engineer agent and the 
client agent can be understood as subordinate to superior. However, since this study does 
not adopt the ZEUS pre-defined protocol and strategies. This subordinate to superior 
relationship is represented in the MASCOT protocol and strategies. Peer to peer 
relationship is defined to all agents. 
6.4.3.4 Agent Co-ordination 
The key aspects of any agent interaction are the co-ordination protocol and the 
negotiation strategies. The ZEUS toolkit provides a few pre-built co-ordination protocols 
that implement various aspects of contract-net type conversations, and related strategies. 
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These protocols and strategies are not suitable for the MASCOT model. New negotiation 
protocol and strategies were developed at the application design stage. 
Although the ZEUS toolkit also provides an approach for system developers to build their 
own interaction protocols and strategies in a case where the predefined protocol and 
strategies are not appropriate for some application scenarios, this approach is more 
suitable for simple cases. In fact, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a 
developer to modify ZEUS' internal key documents to build a complex application 
protocol and strategies. As a result, this study adopts a more practical approach to 
developing the negotiation protocol and strategies (i. e. to building the protocol and 
strategies through the integration of the ZEUS rulebases, primitive tasks, and external 
Java programmes). At the current stage, this approach is more suitable for building the 
various negotiation protocols and strategies if the ZEUS pre-defined protocol and 
strategies cannot be adopted for any specific application scenario. 
6.4.3.5 Rulebase Definition 
In the ZEUS toolkit, a rulebase is used to refer to a collection of precondition-action 
rules. Rules provide a means of adding reactive behaviour to agents. Unlike primitive 
tasks, which are invoked in order to acquire a particular fact, rules are triggered in 
response to the detection of particular facts or variables. A rule can have one or more 
conditions. Once all these conditions are satisfied, a rule's actions will occur. The ZEUS 
toolkit provides several rule actions, which include fact manipulation actions (assert, 
retract, modify, bind), activity actions (send message, execute), control actions (if, while), 
goal related actions (achieve, buy, sell), input and output actions, and Java runtime 
actions. These actions allow agents to conduct various activities required by the 
MASCOT model as shown in the following example. 
Example: 
In the rulebase: StartTransferToConditionalProbability, there are two conditions and 
three actions. 
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Conditions: 
? cons <- (constraints (tra, isfýrCo, icütionalProbability1)one no)) 
? sttcp <- (st(ii-tTransferToConclitionulProbubility (start true)) 
Actions: 
(modify ? ends (trans ferCorlclitionalProbabilitvDone pending)) 
(achieve (fact (startTait rsferToCotiditionaIPro/ a/ ility (start false))) (end_time 4) 
(confirm time 2)) 
(nnoclrfv ? cons (transferContditionalProbuhilitvDone yes)) 
According to this rulebase, if- the String "traltsfi'rConclitiunulProhu/)ilitvvl)once" in the 
fact constraints is "no", and the flag "startTrulls k'rToConditionalProhuhility" is "true" 
the agent, who owns this rulebase, will conduct three activities: 
" first, modify the String "tr(ins%erCollditiollalProbahility, I)one" to "pending 
" second, create a new goal for the agent using the supplied parameter (i. e. to achieve 
the Boolean value of start7'runs/ýrToCrniditioýriulPrnhuhilityy 10 be 
" third, modify the String ` trun. tiferCnnclitinýicilYýýýhuhrlittDuýtcý" lu "yes 
Figure 6.17 illustrates a Rulehase editor window. Table 6.17 describes all the Rulehases 
in the MASCOT model. 
Rulebase Editof 
". . r3 .. n,: ýoi i. rr, ýna1 , ft"ýur,:,... 14 oI "4.1 
GndNhinr 
Inrfrt 
'cons (constraints (translerconopllona)Probablbtyoone no)) 
lunthoI1 
? sttcp(startTransferToConditionalProbabiI (start true)) 
koren Pledlcrlr 
'rwl 
harrt At tIno arrelt 
olirbyy 
Actbns 91 L]M-l-I 
(modify ? cons (IransferContlplronalProbabibty()one pending)) 
EntIN 
(achieve (fact (sIaITTransferTo(, onyltlonalProbablllfy (start fasle))) (entl_tlme 4) 
(I onflrm_eme 2)) 
(modify ? cons (IransferConditinnalPrnbahihryDone yes)) 
Inrrtt ! ett Inrrrl In N 
UOIMA z Iwlxbace 
Figure 6.17 Rulehase editor window 
228 
Table 6.17 Rulebases of MASCOT model 
Rulebases Function Description 
Register Rule 1 Register 
Key registerDone (false). 
Trigger 
Goal To register with the agent Mfacilitator once the negotiation 
starts. 
StartTransferToCondit Rule 1 startTransferToConditionalProbability 
ionalProbability 
Key startTransferToConditionalProbability 
Trigger (start true) 
Goal To achieve the goal 
startTransferToConditionalProbability 
(start false) , To do this it calls the primitive task 
TransferToConditionalProbability. 
StartMakelnitialOffer Rule 1 StartMakelnitialOf fer 
Key (startMakeInitialOffer (start true)) 
Trigger 
Goal To achieve the goal startMakelnitialOf fer 
(start false) .,, To do this it calls the primitive task 
MakelnitialOffer. 
Nprotocol Rule 1 StartAssignValue 
Key startAssignValue (start true) which was set 
Trigger in the primitive task MakeNewO ff er . 
Goal To inform the client agent the negotiation history between 
the engineer agent and the contractor agent. 
Rule 2 InvolvementOfClient 
Key startInvolvementOfClient(start true), 
Trigger which was set in the primitive task MakeNewOf f er. 
Goal To replace the engineer agent's reservation value with the 
client agent's reservation value if the latter are higher than 
the former. 
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Table 6.17 Rulebases of MASCOT model (cont. ) 
Rulebases Function Description 
StartNegotiation Rule 1 StartNegotiation 
Key startStartNegotiation (start true), which 
This rulebase contains 
Trigger was set from the primitive task MakelnitialOffer. 
nine rules. The first Goal To send several negotiation information from the contractor 
four rules describe the agent to the engineer agent. In common cases, they can be 
process where an set as initial agent and respondent agent. 
agent submit its initial 
value to the opponent 
Rule 2 startAssignOptimumValue 
, 
and the opponent Key startAssignOptimumValue (start true), 
assigns this value as Trigger which was sent from the initial agent (contractor agent) to 
the agent's optimum the respondent agent (engineer agent) in the Rule 1. 
value. Goal To achieve the goal startAssignOptimumValue 
(start false) . To do this it calls the primitive task 
The last five rules Ass 
ignOptimumValue, i. e. the respondent agent 
express the 
(engineer) assign the initial agent (contractor) initial value 
negotiation protocol. as 
its optimum value. 
The protocol is really Rule 3 SendlnitialOf fer 
a procedural and so 
the order of rule firing 
Key StartSendProposalBack (start true) , which 
is controlled by trigger 
Trigger was set in the primitive task Ass ignOptimumValue . 
facts, these usually Goal To send the respondent agent (engineer)'s initial value to 
start with start, e. g. the initial agent (contractor). 
(startNegotiatio 
Rule 4 StartAssignOptimumValuel 
n (start true)) . 
A trigger to fire the Key startAssignOptimumValuel (start true), 
next rule is set at the Trigger which was sent from the respondent agent (engineer agent) 
end of a rule. to the initial agent (contractor agent) in the Rule 3. 
Goal To achieve the goal startAssignOptimumValuel 
(start false) . To do this it calls the primitive task 
AssignOptimumValuel, i. e. the initial agent 
(contractor agent) assign the respondent agent (engineer) 
initial value as its optimum value. 
Rule 5 RespondTOProposal 
Key startEvaluateProposal(start true), which 
Trigger was set in the primitive task AssignOptimumValuel. 
Goal To compare the opponent's offer with the agent's offer, if it 
satisfies the agent, then accept this offer, otherwise, start to 
make a new offer. 
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Table 6.17 Rulebases of MASCOT model (cont. ) 
Rulebases Function Description 
StartNegotiation Rule 6 MakeNewOffer 
Key startMakeNewOffer(start true), which was 
Trigger set in Rule 5 if the agent cannot accept the opponent's offer. 
Goal To achieve the goal startMakeNewOffer(start 
false). To do this it calls the primitive task 
MakeNewOffer. 
Rule 7 SendProposal 
Key startSendProposal (start true) , which was 
Trigger set in the primitive task MakeNewOf f er. 
Goal To send the new offer to the opponent and the client agent, 
meanwhile changing some negotiation information, such as 
the status of the offer, the initial agent & the respondent 
agent, and the agent to evaluate the offer. 
Rule 8 SendAcceptNotice 
Key startSendAcceptNotice(start true), which 
Trigger was set in Rule 5 if the agent accept the opponent's offer. 
Goal To set the agreement value, and inform all the agents of the 
agreement. 
Rule 9 SendRejectNotice 
Key flags (stop true) , which was set in the rule 
Trigger InvolvementOfClient, RulebaseNprotocol. 
Goal To stop the negotiation, and inform all the agents. 
6.4.3.6 Primitive Task Definition 
A primitive task is a presentation of the lowest level of agent activities. Each task can be 
depicted as a resource flow, where facts flow into a task, whereupon they are transformed 
into new facts. To define a primitive task, the following elements need to be configured: 
" Preconditions - the resources needed for the execution of the task; 
" Effects - the resources that will be produced upon execution of the task; 
" Cost - an expression giving the cost of executing the task; 
" Duration - an expression giving the time taken to execute the task; 
" Precondition Ordering - the sequence in which preconditions should be achieved; 
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0 Constraints - applicability restrictions on executing the task. 
Within these factors, the preconditions and effects are the most essential elements, 
especially the setting of modifiers. The modifier in preconditions determines how the 
precondition resources will perform in the task. The modifiers applicable to preconditions 
are described in Table 6.18. 
Table 6.18 Modifiers in primitive task preconditions 
Modifier Applying Situation 
Not Task only performed if fact is not present in locally 
Is Read Only Fact is not consumed (i. e. it survives task execution, but during that 
time it is not allocated exclusively to the task) 
Must be in 
Local Database 
Fact must be in the agent's own local possession, prevents agent 
obtaining it from another agent 
Is Replaced 
after Use 
Fact will be allocated to the task for the duration of its execution, but 
will not be consumed 
The Modifiers field for effects has a single option: Is a Side-Effect Only'. If this is 
selected, this task will not be selected by the Planner/Scheduler seeking to achieve this 
effect. The difference between an effect and a side-effect is subtle. The same fact can be 
either defined as a side-effect or not as a side-effect depending the objective of the task 
itself. In this study, it is relatively easy to determine which item should be defined as a 
side-effect because every primitive task is initiated by a rulebase in which a trigger fact is 
set as a objective of the primitive task. All the effects except the trigger effect should not 
be set as side-effects. The following example describes this method. 
Example: 
To achieve the new goal `startTransferToConditionalProbability' (start false) defined in 
the rulebase, a primitive task `TransferToConditionalProbability' is created. The task 
preconditions include four facts: 
" StartTransferToConditionalProbability, which is consumed in the task, thus, must be 
in the local database; 
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0 Constraints, which is not consumed in the task, thus, is read only; 
0 ngentsNume, which is not consumed in the task, thus, is read only, 
" SturtMukelnitialOf er, which is the trigger for the next rulebase, will be consumed in 
the task, thus, must he in the local database. 
The task effects include eight facts: 
" conditionulProbahility, hypothesis, probability, pevent, cprosl, and 'nenn are it series 
of arrays which are transferred from the owner's initial data through the primitive task 
and the external Java program; 
" StartMakelnitialQfler is the trigger for the next action. The attribute of this trigger is 
set as true in the task effects; 
StratTraiis%erl'oConclitinnulProbability is the objective of this primitive task, thus, 
this fact is not set as side-effect. All the other facts are set as side-effects. 
Figure 6.18 illustrates a task editor window. Table 6.19 describes all the primitive tasks in 
the MASCOT model. 
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Figure 6.18 Primitive task editor window 
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Table 6.19 Primitive tasks in MASCOT model 
Primitive Tasks Task Description 
TransferToCondit To convert the interface input qualitative information into quantitative 
ionalProbability information for further calculation (see the above analysis). 
MakelnitialOffer To make an initial offer according to the constraints- 
" The input information includes: constraints, agentsName, 
and two startflags: 
startTransferToConditionalProbabilityand 
startMakeInitalOffer. The first two are set as READ_ONLY, 
while the latter two are set as LOCAL. 
" The output information includes: offer and two 
startflags: startMakeInitalOffer and 
startTransferToConditionalProbability. The first 
two outputs are set as SIDE_EFFECT. 
MakeNewOffer To make a new offer according to the constraints. 
" The input information includes: constraints, agentsName, 
conditionalProbability, hypothesis, 
optmumValue, pevet, probability, offer, 
reservationValue, cprosl, memand two startflags: 
startSendProposalBack, 
startInvolvementOfClient and startMakeNewOffer. 
The first six ontology are set as READ_ONLY, while the others are 
set as LOCAL (because these elements will be modified in this 
task). 
" The output information includes: offer, 
startMakeNewOffer, reservationValue, 
probability, cprosl, proposal, 
startInvolvementOfClient, 
start SendProposalBack and mem. All the elements are set 
as SIDE_EFFECT except startMakeNewOffer. 
AssignOptimumV To assign the contractor agent's initial offer as its optimum value. 
alue 
" The input information includes: constraints, agentsName, 
startAssignOptimumValue, 
startRespondToProposal, and 
startAssignOptimumValuel. All the elements except 
agentsName are set as LOCAL. 
" The output information includes: 
startAssignOptimumValue, 
startRespondToProposal, optimumValue, 
startAssignOptimumValuel, and offer. All the 
elements are set as SIDE_EFFECT except 
startAssignOptimumValue. 
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Table 6.19 Primitive tasks in MASCOT model (cont. ) 
Primitive Tasks Task Description 
AssignOptimumV To assign the engineer agent's initial offer as its optimum value. 
aluel 
" The input information includes: agentsName, 
startRespondToProposal, startAssignOptimumValuel 
and initialOffer, The two triggers are as LOCAL, while the 
others are set as READ-ONLY. 
" The output information includes: startEvaluateProposal, 
optimumValue, and startAssignOptimumValuel. All the 
elements are set as SIDE_EFFECT except 
startAssignOptimumValuel. 
AssignValue To assign several essential negotiation features into an ontology 
proposal. 
" The input information includes: constraints, 
startAssignValue, optimumValue and mem. All the 
elements except constraints are set as LOCAL. 
" The output information includes: startAssignValue and 
proposal. The latter is set as SIDE-EFFECT. 
Figure 6.19 illustrates how the MASCOT negotiation protocol and strategies are achieved 
through the integration of rulebases and primitive tasks, where one or more triggers are 
generated after a Rulebase is executed. For example, a trigger fact needs to be set as 
`false'. This trigger, in turn, will ignite a task. The execution of the task will turn the 
trigger fact into `true', whilst the objective tasks are performed. A Rulebase may call 
several tasks or other Rulebases, and vice versa. 
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Figure 6.19 The co-operation between rulebases and primitive tasks 
6.4.3.7 The Utility Agent Configuration 
As discussed above, the ZEUS toolkit provides several utility agents to support the 
infrastructure, which are: name servers, facilitators, visualisers, and database proxies. The 
implementation needs to address the following four aspects: nameservers, facilitators, 
visualisers and database proxies, shown in Figure 6.20. 
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Figure 6.20 The utlility agents configuration panel 
. Configuring the Name Servers 
An agent society must possess at least one Agent Name Server (ANS). The ANSs 
maintain a registry of known agents, enabling them to map agent identities to a logical 
network location. This is necessary because agents only know the names of their 
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acquaintances and not their locations. Name Server agents are created and configured 
using the Name Servers' panel. By default the Name Servers table has one entry, 
referring to a single ANS. However as the ANS is vital to all agent communication it is a 
potential bottleneck, and so it may be necessary to have multiple ANSs to support larger 
societies, or to provide a degree of redundancy in case one fails. 
The Host field shows the I. P. address (i. e. network location) of the machine that the ANS 
will run on. More than one ANS can reside on a single host. If there is more than one 
ANS the developer needs to choose which is the root server, the only operational 
difference in changing this is that the root server will provide the time-grain value and be 
responsible for maintaining the society-wide clock. As the root ANS serves as a reference 
point for all other agents in the society, there must be a means of informing other agents 
where the root ANS is located. Hence when the root ANS starts, it will write its network 
location on a file called the Default Name Server (DNS) file. If agents share a network 
file system it is recommended that the DNS file be expressed in terms of a network 
pathname. 
To make non-root name servers aware of the root ANS, they must be told where to find 
the root's DNS file. This pathname is entered into the DNS File field. If this is not a 
network accessible file, it will need to be copied to the local file system of the agent 
concerned, and hence this field will contain its local pathname and filename. In the 
MASCOT model, a single ANS is set up by default. It is also selected as the root ANS. 
The other items in the name server panel are all set as default. 
" Configuring the Facilitators 
Whereas every agent society must have an ANS, there is no such obligation for 
Facilitators. Whether or not Facilitators are included depends on the nature of the 
application. Most of the items in the Facilitator panel are the same as the agent name 
server panel. By default the Facilitators table has one entry. That suffices for small-scale 
applications, but as it could be a potential bottleneck it may be desirable to have multiple 
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Facilitators for larger applications, or where some redundancy is desired in case of 
failure. Here, all the items in the Facilitator panel are set as default because an 
Mfacilitator is created. 
Configuring the Visualisers 
Like Facilitator, there is no requirement for an application to contain a Visualiser. 
Whether one is included or not depends on whether the application is to be debugged, 
monitored or analysed. Given that the Visualiser offers some very useful functionality for 
free, it will usually be included in the list of agents to be created. By default the 
Visualisers table has one entry, whether or not more than one is necessary will probably 
depend on the number of locations where developers will want to visualise some aspect 
of the society. Another influencing factor is that Visualisers are not essential to the 
operation of an agent society, and so that the implications of failure are less serious there 
is less need for redundancy. In the MASCOT model, all the items in the Visualiser panel 
are left as default. 
6.4.3.8 The Task Agent Configuration Stage 
This stage takes the same process as the previous stage for the application's utility agents. 
All task agents are configured through the Task Agents' pane of the Code Generator 
window, which includes nine factors, such as: Status (modified or saved), Host and DNS 
file, and Icon (Figure 6.21). Three factors need to be emphasised: 
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Figure 6.21 Task agent configuration panel 
. 
0 
Task Agents 
External Database :A task agent can obtain the resources it needs to hcrf'ori» its 
tasks from one of three sources: its resource database, other agents, or an external 
data source. The latter can be connected to the task agent through a Java class that 
implements the zeus. actors. ExternalDb interface. This is achieved through the 
Database External in the Task Agent panel. 
External Program: Different from the utility agents, a task agent can he linked to 
external programs that enable it to send or receive information gram the outside 
world. In the MASCOT model, the external programs are agents' interfaces 
(ContructorUl, Eii, gineerUl and Client(l) through which instructions are received 
and to which agents send results. Figure 6.22 illustrates the external programs and 
their related external classes. 
0 Agent Viewer GUI: The Agent Viewer GUI is a specialised tool that displays 
detailed information on the internal components of the agent. This Is Independent of' 
any other application front-end and provides the best means for understanding how 
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the agent works, as well as being an excellent debugging aid. In the MASCOT model, 
most of the key information of the Contractor agent, the Engineer agent and the Client 
agent are sent the agent viewers to observe their activities during negotiations. 
External External Class 
Program 
call OwnerFrontEnd: This class defines the input window. 
" ContractorUI 
call 
" EngineerUI NegotiationPanel: Once the interface window has had 
constraints entered and `start' pressed then this rule fires 
" ClientUl 
to send the constraints to the agent. It also sends the 
trigger startTransferToConditionalProbability (start true) 
to the contractor agent and the engineer agent so that their 
status can become active. 
Figure 6.22 External programs and their related external classes 
6.4.3.9 Primitive Task Implementation and External Classes 
There are two files for each primitive task. The first is a machine-generated `stub' file to 
deal with the input and output information with a single call to another external Java class 
containing the actual task. The second file is the external Java class. These external 
classes, in the MASCOT model, are differentiated by the prefix `My' in front of the 
name. This two-file structure enables new domain-specific functionality to be integrated 
with the automatically created agent-specific code without needing to modify the latter. 
Figure 6.23 illustrates the relationship between agents, tasks, and external classes. In the 
course of interacting with other agents, an agent may need to perform a task, whereupon 
information is passed from agent to task. Once in the task it can be used for whatever 
purpose it is required, before the information is returned to the agent (modified or not). 
Meanwhile, external Java classes, written by the developer, may conduct various 
complex calculations and numerical value assignments by using the data from the tasks. 
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Figure 6.23 Flow ofinformation between agent, task and external class 
Each task consists of three sections: an initial section where the information is read in 
from the agent, a mid section where it is used and a final section when it is returned to the 
agent. As agents are unaware of what happens inside tasks, when one is hcrlormecl the 
agent will pass information into it regardless of whether it will he used or not. 
Furthermore the agent will expect to receive information in return. The interface hctwccn 
agent and task, i. e. the facts sent and expected back is what is specified when the 
developer describes the preconditions and effects of a task. 
Consequently, of the three sections in a task the mid-section is optional and the first and 
last sections are generated by default in the task stuh file. This means that if the task does 
not need to use the information passed into it, the developer need not alter the task stub 
file. Thus, this activity is only relevant if the developer wishes to alter how the 
information received is used, and its scope is limited to the shaded area depicted in Figure 
6.23. 
Typical actions that are encoded into task bodies display information for the developer's 
benefit, and passing information to an external class for processing. The external classes 
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are different from the external programs. The external classes are linked to the tasks, 
which are invoked when a particular activity is performed and terminated when the 
activity is completed, and launched when tasks are executed. An external class may also 
call some other external classes. By contrast, the external programs are linked to agents 
through an interface. They are launched when the agent starts, and may persist for as long 
as the agent does. Table 6.19 shows the external programs, primitive task codes generated 
by the ZEUS toolkit, and the external classes. 
Table 6.20 Primitive tasks and external classes 
Primitive Task External Class Function Description 
TransferToConditionalP MyTransferToConditionalP To transfer the input information into 
robability robability four calculation attribute data, calls 
another class, PriorDistribution, with 
these data, then visualises the output of 
PriorDistribution, i. e. hypothesised 
probability and the conditional 
probability. 
AssignOptimumValue MyAssignOptimumValue To assign the contractor agent's initial 
offer as its optimum value. 
AssignOptimumValuel MyAssignOptimumValuel To assign the engineer agent's initial 
offer as its optimum value. 
MakelnitialOffer MyMakelnitialOffer To create initial offer for the contractor 
agent and the engineer agent. 
MakeNewOffer MyMakeNewOffer To make new offers for each agent. 
This class achieves the Zeuthen's 
concession strategy in negotiation. 
AssignValue MyAssignValue To assign several essential negotiation 
features into an ontology proposal. 
This is mainly used for drawing the 
negotiation process. 
PriorDistribution This is an external class called by an 
external class 
MyTransferToConditionalProbability. 
It accepts attribute data from this class 
and calculates the probability of 
hypothesised reservation values and 
the probabilities. 
The link between primitive tasks and external classes is achieved by adding codes in the 
stub file that call an external class. The stub files are machine generated. They are over- 
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written whenever the primitive task editor is modified, and the code is regenerated. 
Thus, 
developers have to modify the stub file every time after it is regenerated. The following 
examples (Listing 6.1) show how a stub file calls an external Java file. The 
first section of 
Java code is the stub file generated by the ZEUS Agent Generator, the bold lines are 
developed by developers. The second section is the external Java code developed by 
developers, which fulfils the function of real task. 
Primitive Task Code: MakelnitlaOffer 
importjava. util. *; 
import zeus. util. *; 
import zeus. concepts. *; 
import zeus. actors. TaskContext; 
import zeus. actors. ZEUSTask; 
public class MakelnitialOffer extends ZEUSTask { 
protected void exec() { 
II The Input Facts: 
Fact[] 
_smioin = 
inputArgs[O]; II startMakeInitialOffer 
Fact[] 
_cons = 
inputArgs[1]; II constraints 
Fact[] 
_ssnin = 
inputArgs[2]; II startStartNegotiation 
Fact[] an = inputArgs[3]; II agentsName 
H The Output Facts: 
Fact[] inofout; // offer 
Fact[] smioout; // startMakelnitialOffer 
Fact[] 
_ssnout; // startStartNegotiation 
/* DEVELOPER CODE STARTS */ 
System. out. println("-Expected Input-"); 
for(int i=0; i< expInputArgs. length; i++ ) 
System. out. println(expInputArgs[i]. pprint()); 
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System. out. println("-Input-"); 
for(int j=0; j< inputArgs. length; j++) { 
System. out. println("Input Fact["+j+"]"); 
for(int i=0; i< inputArgs(j]. length; i++) 
System. out. println(inputArgs[j] [i]. pprintO); 
} 
System. out. println("-Expected Output-"); 
for(int i=0; i< expOutputArgs. length; i++ ) 
System. out. println(expOutputArgs[i]. pprint()); 
System. out. println("-Output-"); 
_inofout = new 
Fact[1]; 
inofout[O] = new Fact(Fact. FACT, expOutputArgs[0]); 
MyMakelnitialOffer id = new MyMakelnitialOffer (); 
id. exec(_cons, an, _inofout); 
System. out. println(-inofout[O]. pprint()); 
_smioout = new 
Fact[1]; 
_smioout[O] = new 
Fact(Fact. FACT, expOutputArgs[1]); 
System. out. println(_smioout[O]. pprinto); 
snout = new Fact[1]; 
_ssnout[O] = new 
Fact(Fact. FACT, expOutputArgs[2]); 
System. out. println(_ssnout[O]. pprintO); 
/* DEVELOPER CODE ENDS */ 
outputArgs = new Fact[3][]; 
outputArgs[O] = _inofout; 
outputArgs[ I] = _smioout; 
outputArgs[2] = _ssnout; 
} 
External Class: MyMakelnitialOffer 
import java. util. *; 
import zeus. util. *; 
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import zeus. concepts. *; 
import zeus. concepts. fn. *; 
import zeus. actors. ZEUSTask; 
public class MyMakelnitialOffer extends MakelnitialOffer 
{ 
private final String pn="MyMakeInitialOffer"; 
protected void exec(Fact[] _cons, 
Fact[] 
_an, 
Fact[] 
_inofout) 
{ 
System. out. println(pn+" agent "+_an[O]. getValue("name")); 
//set up proposal facts 
Fact of= new Fact(Fact. FACT, _inofout[O]); 
//declare variables and get values for constraints 
double myOpty=Double. valueOf(_cons[O]. getValue("myOpty")). doubleValue(); 
//the initial offer is the optimum vale 
// of. setValue("offer", myOptv); 
H put the figure into offer 
//_inofout[O]. setValue("offer", new FactFn(of)); 
inofout[O]. setValue("offer", myOptv); 
inofout[O]. setValue("toB eEvaluatedB y", _an[O]. getValue("name")); 
inofout[O]. setValue("status", "mine"); 
_inofout[O]. setValue("owner", _an[O]. getValue("name")); 
} 
Listing 6.1 The integration of primitive tasks and external Java codes 
6.4.3.10 Display Windows 
Display windows help users to understand more clearly what is going on within the 
system through the provided visual information. The function of the display windows is 
similar to the Visualisar agent; however, in this case, it is more specific to the negotiation 
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features. The MASCOT implementation provides for three display windows programmed 
using Java language. The data is transferred from ZEUS external programmes, primitive 
tasks and classes. 
The first display window is generated after a negotiator inputs all the necessary 
information in the input window (Figure 6.24). It provides the negotiator with two 
kinds of information: the probability distribution curve of the opponent's possible 
reservation value; and the conditional probability distribution curve of the 
opponent's real offer given a hypothesised reservation value. Such information can 
help the users to check whether the input information is within a reasonable range. 
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Figure 6.24. Display window of a party's estimate of the opponent's information 
. The second display window is generated during the negotiation process. This 
illustrates all the key information in which a negotiating agent (the contractor or 
engineer agent) and its owner are interested (Figure 6.25). This information includes 
the agent's reservation value, optimum value, current offer, its opponent's current 
offer, optimum value and the agent's estimation of opponent's reservation value at 
the current stage. This display window helps the agent's owner to monitor the 
negotiation process, and understand how the negotiation is conducted between 
agents. 
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Figure 6.25 Display window for the contractor or the engineer in negotiation 
The third display window is also generated during the negotiation process. It shows 
the client agent and its owner the negotiation history between the contractor agent 
and the engineer agent; and in which situations, the client agent may join the 
negotiation between the negotiating agents (Figure 6.26). This display window also 
reminds the client of his reservation value and optimum value. 
I, 
I: ii, 
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Figure 6.26 Display window for the client during negotiation 
6.4.4 Running the Program 
To run the program, there are three batch files to run in this order: 
" Run 1: sets up the name server; 
" Run2: starts the application agents; interface agent, contractor agent, engineer agent 
and the client agent; and 
" Run3: starts the visualiser. 
6.5 PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
The developed prototype was tested in various situations, and one problem was found. 
That is, a negotiation party may make an unreasonably large concession in the first 
iteration, or does not make any concession in the first few iterations. This problem could 
happen in two extreme cases: 
Case one: a party does not have adequate information about the negotiation item, or 
lacks enough domain knowledge about his opponent, but he still believes that his 
estimate of the opponent's key negotiation features is reliable. In this case, this 
party's input of the opponent's reservation value or negotiation habit could be very 
far from the opponent's real value, whilst he still thinks that his confidence about the 
estimate is high (or at least, medium). Consequently, his updated reservation value in 
the first iteration will be quite different from the opponent's real value. Thus, he may 
concede too much (e. g. he gives up all his bargaining amount) in the first iteration or 
may not concede at all. Consequently, the negotiation will converge with an 
unreasonably high rate or never converge. 
. Case two: the opponent may adopt a misleading strategy (i. e. he purposely makes an 
extremely high or low initial offer). In this case, if the negotiator holds his current 
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position (or makes very little concession as a gesture) for several iterations, it is 
expected that the opponent will come back to the normal negotiation offer. 
The first case is harmful for the negotiator because he may give too much to the opponent 
than he would otherwise get, or a party may lose the opportunity to reach a possible 
agreement. The second case is the negotiator's right response. A distinction between 
these two cases is that in the first case, the opponent will not make a big concession even 
if the negotiator does not concede for several iterations; whilst in the second case, the 
opponent may concede very quickly after the first few iterations. 
To overcome this problem, two extra rules were applied in the external class 
'myMakeNewOffer': 
" first, each party cannot make a concession that is more than a threshold (e. g. one 
quarter of his bargaining amount) in the first (or first three) iteration(s); and 
" second, each party should make a minimum concession, (e. g. one tenth of his 
bargaining amount) in the first (three) iteration(s). 
By adopting these two simple rules, the problems caused by the wrong input information 
can be avoided. 
Besides the problem mentioned above, there is a trend where both parties prefer to make 
high concessions in the first few iterations, whilst making low concessions at the late 
stages of the negotiation. This is caused by the MASCOT negotiation mechanism in 
which both parties try to reduce the risk of conflict. 
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the implementation of a MASCOT model prototype. It first 
explored the major characteristics of the ZEUS toolkit, where the issues for building the 
DAI application tool, design philosophy, functions, and architecture of the toolkit were 
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addressed. It particularly explored the system component library, building software, 
structure of a generic agent, utility agents, task agents, and external programs. This 
chapter then presented the three major steps of the system implementation process; which 
included: role modelling, application design and model realisation: 
" Firstly, the concept, component, process, and applications of role modelling were 
introduced. The development of the MASCOT role model was further discussed; 
" Secondly, the application design was performed, where the MASCOT negotiation 
protocol and strategies were further developed; the input information for the 
prototype was determined; and the probability distributions for agents' input 
information were selected; 
. Thirdly, the realisation process was discussed in detail, where the ontology, agent 
creation process, agent organisation, agent co-ordination were first addressed. Then, 
the creation and functions of Rulebases and Primitive Tasks were discussed. 
Particular attention was paid to how the Rulebases and Primitive Tasks were 
integrated to achieve the system negotiation protocol and strategies. Furthermore, the 
configuration of the utility agents and task agents was discussed. Then, it emphasised 
the difference between the external programme and external class, and how they 
worked with the ZEUS primitive task. In the last stage, the display windows of the 
prototype were introduced. 
Finally, the major problem of the initial prototype (i. e. the negotiation agent could 
make unreasonable concession in the initial iteration(s)) was addressed. The solutions 
adopted were also discussed. 
The next chapter describes the operation of the MASCOT conceptual model using a 
practical problem. All the major aspects of the model are presented. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SYSTEM OPERATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the operation of the MASCOT model in a real application scenario 
involving a claim for loss of productivity. A number of the key points of system 
operation are described including: the utility functions, the negotiation preparation, the 
negotiation process, and the comparisons between the MASCOT negotiation mechanism 
with other negotiation mechanisms. 
The aim of system operation is to demonstrate the working of the MASCOT conceptual 
model. The key negotiation strategies of the system are illustrated using a practical 
problem. Although the system, as currently implemented, is far from being able to handle 
very complex practical problems, it is important to ensure that the system works properly 
in a variety of situations, and that the outcomes generated are reasonable. The advantages 
of the negotiation mechanism are shown by comparing the solution provided with a 
simple gradient descent approach for the same problem. 
The focus of this operation process is on the contractor agent's offering mechanism 
which includes how the contractor agent updates its beliefs and uses its beliefs to 
concede. Since the simple concession approach is adopted (see Section 5.4.4.2), 
negotiation strategies such as the involvement of the client agent and expanded solution 
searching are not demonstrated. The first example is presented in full, while only the 
assumptions and outcomes of the other examples (which are variants of the first example) 
are presented. This problem has also been run using the developed MASCOT prototype. 
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7.2 BACKGROUND TO THE EXAMPLE 
The project presented below is based on a real water supply project. The author, working 
as the project manager, was involved in the whole claims negotiation process. 
The work of the project mainly comprised the construction of intakes, pipelines, and 
treatment plants in seven towns. The contract amount was about £10 million. The 
estimated construction duration was 26 months. The contract followed the FIDIC 4th 
edition. The project was designed by the engineer three years before the tender without a 
detailed geological investigation. According to the design, the intakes of A, G and P 
towns adopted the same structural style (i. e. the walls of intake chamber were based on 
the driven concrete piles). The length of the piles was 8m with 7.5 in driven into the 
riverbed. The remaining 0.5m would be used to connect with the wall of intake. The 
number of piles was 225. The contractor's quotation for piles was £50/m. According to 
the contractor's schedule, G town's intake would be started first. Once the piling work in 
G town was completed, the piling team would move to P and then A town. 
After two days' piling work, the contractor found that piles could only be driven 3.5m 
into riverbed. The contractor informed the engineer immediately. The engineer replied 
that it was the contractor's responsibility to drive the piles to the designed level. The 
failure of piling work was caused by the contractor's old piling machine. Any delay 
would be the responsibility of the contractor. As a result, the contractor continued the 
work with all the possible methods. However, only three piles were driven 4.5m into the 
riverbed by the time all the piling work was completed. The work took 80 days while it 
was planned to be completed within 20 days. 
Following a request by the contractor, a borehole was drilled by the National Geology 
Laboratory (NGL). The test showed that a 3m dense gravel-sand layer lay underneath the 
riverbed at about 3-4m while the original drawing showed this as soft clay. By showing 
the evidence and informing the client, the engineer finally agreed that the problem was 
primarily created by the faulty design. Consequently, a claim was submitted by the 
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contractor which included time extension, new pile rate, cost of pile cutting and 
removing, overheads and loss of productivity. All these claims were supported with a 
detailed cost breakdown. Since town A and P's intake might encounter the same problem, 
both the contractor and the engineer were very cautious about the claim. The real case 
took more than four months to be settled. The most difficult negotiation item was loss of 
productivity, and more than 10 negotiation meetings were held at different levels. In this 
study, the MASCOT model will be adopted to resolve the claim for loss of productivity. 
7.3 UTILITY FUNCTION 
In claims negotiation, neither the contractor agent nor the engineer agent can have 
complete information about the opponent. Uncertainty about the opponent's utility 
function is a critical feature of construction claims negotiation. In the MASCOT 
prototype, it is assumed that both the contractor agent and the engineer agent's utility 
functions are linear, which can be determined by two points: the optimum (amount) point 
and the reservation (amount) point. Here, the utility is assumed as 1 at the optimum point, 
and 0.6 at the reservation point (Figure 7.1a, b). Each agent can estimate the opponent's 
utility function based on these two critical points. Meanwhile, it is reasonable to assume 
that each agent's initial offer is its optimum amount (i. e. each agent starts the negotiation 
by offering the opponent the deal that is best for itself). Thus, an agent can know the 
opponent's utility function if it can estimate the opponent's reservation amount through 
the learning mechanism. The relationship between the utility functions of the contractor 
agent and the engineer agent are shown in Figure 7.1c. 
7.4 NEGOTIATION PREPARATION 
The reasons for the contractor's claim for the loss of productivity were: 
many different methods such as increased piling times and increased weight of 
hammer, have been tried to drive the piles to the designed level, therefore, the 
efficiency of piling work was seriously affected; 
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" the efficiency of piling was adversely affected as the piling team was mobilised and 
demobilised several times; 
" the extra length of piles above riverbed influenced site transportation; 
" the delay of piling work influenced the construction of intake well which was just 
beside the chamber; 
" the precast piles occupied the site store during the delay, therefore, all the other 
construction materials have to be stored a mile away from the site; and 
" the schedules of P and A town were influenced. 
Based on these factors, the contractor estimated his real loss of productivity as £9,000. 
Considering his current situation and the importance of the claim, he prepared his critical 
negotiation figures as follows: 
Table 7.1 The contractor's major negotiation figures 
Reservation value Optimum value 
£9,000 £11,000 
Meanwhile, the contractor also tried to estimate the engineer's critical negotiation figures 
based on his domain knowledge. In this case, the contractor was interested in the 
engineer's reservation value. Table 7.2 shows the contractor's estimate about the possible 
distribution of the engineer's reservation value. Table 7.3 shows the contractor's estimate 
about the conditional probabilities of the engineer's offer given his hypotheses of the 
engineer's reservation value. The data in Table 7.3 is encoded from the contractor's 
perception about the engineer negotiation strategy; for example, 'the engineer will 
normally make his offer 10% lower than what he really wants'. 
Table 7.2 The contractor's prior knowledge about the probability distribution of the 
engineer's reservation value 
Hypothesis R1 R2 R3 R4 RS R6 
£7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 11,000 
Probability P(RA) 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
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Table 7.3 The contractor's prior knowledge about the conditional probabilities of 
the engineer's offer 
Possible 
ve t 
e0 El e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
n 
Hypothesis 
£6,000 £7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £9,500 £10,000 £11,000 
£7,000 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 
£8,000 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 
£8,500 0 0.14 0.5 0.30 0.05 0.01 0 0 
£9,000 0 0.1 0.15 0.45 0.25 0.05 0 0 
£ 10,000 0 0 0.05 0.20 0.45 0.25 0.05 0 
El 1,000 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.40 0.20 
Similarly, the engineer also calculated and determined his key negotiation figures (Table 
7.4), and estimated the contractor's key information: the possible distribution of 
reservation value (Table 7.5) and the conditional probabilities of the contractor's offers 
given the hypothesised reservation value (Table 7.6). 
Table 7.4 The engineer's major negotiation figures 
Reservation value Optimum value 
£9,800 £7,000 
Table 7.5 The engineer's prior knowledge about the probability distribution of the 
contractor's reservation value 
Hypothesis R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
£7,500 £8,000 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability P(RA) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 
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Table 7.6 The Engineer's prior knowledge about the conditional probabilities of the 
contractor's offer 
Possible el e2 e3 e4 E5 e6 e7 
vent 
Hypothesis 
£7,500 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 £12,000 
£7,500 0.35 0.5 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 
£8,000 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 
£9,000 0 0.01 0.11 0.3 0.4 0.18 0 
£ 10,000 0 0. 0 0.15 0.4 0.4 0.05 
£11,000 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 
7.5 NEGOTIATION PROCESS (Example 1) 
1) The contractor agent's initial offer 
In this research, the contractor agent makes its initial offer of £11,000 that is assumed as 
its optimum claim amount. 
2) The engineer agent's initial counter-offer 
After receiving the contractor agent's initial offer, the engineer agent makes a 
counteroffer of £7,000 to the contractor agent, which is also assumed as the engineer 
agent's optimum value. 
3) The contractor agent's offer in the 2 °d iteration 
Updating the probability of the engineer agent's reservation value 
Based on the engineer agent's counteroffer and the contractor's prior knowledge about 
the engineer shown in Table 7.2 and 7.3, the contractor agent updates its belief about the 
probability of the engineer agent's reservation value R according to the Bayesian rule: 
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P(R1 I e) 
P(R1)P(e I R, ) 
_ 
P(R, )P(e I R, ) 
lk-1 P(e Rk)P(Rk) P(e) 
Where, 
P(R11e) - the probability that the engineer agent's reservation value is R; given the 
condition that its offer is e; 
P(R; ) - the probability that the engineer agent's reservation value is a certain R;; 
P(ejR; ) - the probability that the engineer agent's offer is a certain e given the 
certain reservation value R;; 
P(e) - the probability of the engineer agent's counteroffer is e. 
In this case, the engineer's offer is £7000 (e1=7000), thus, 
_ P(R3 I el) 
P(R3)P(el 1 R3) 
_ 
0.25*0.14 
= 0.5833 6 P(e1 1R (0.25 *0.14) + (0.25 *0.1) 2: k=1 JP(Rk) 
_ 
P(R4)P(el 1 R4) 
_ 
0.25 * 0.1 
= 0.4166 P(R4 el) 6 P(eIRk)P(Rk) (0.25 * 0.14) + (0.25 * 0.1) 
6 
Where, 
P(Rilel)=0, P(R21e1)=0 since P(R1)= P(R2)=O; 
p(R51el)=0, P(R61e1)=0 since P(eiIR5)= P(eiIR6)=0 (see Table 7.3) 
Estimating the engineer agent's reservation value 
Prior to receiving the engineer agent's offer (£7,000), the contractor agent would think 
that the engineer agent's reservation value is: 
R= JP(R1)*R; =0.25*8500+0.25*9000+0.25*10000+0.25*11000=9625. 
After receiving the counteroffer, the contractor agent's current estimation of the engineer 
agent's reservation value is: 
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R= JP(R; )*R; = 0.5833*8500+0.4166*9000 = 8707. 
" Utility functions 
a) The contractor agent's utility function: Since the agents' utility functions are linear, 
they can be expressed as uc = kx+b . Also, the two key points in the utility 
functions 
are known, i. e. optimum point: (11000,1) and reservation point: (9000,0.6). Thus, 
the contractor agent's utility function can be worked out as: u, =2x 10-4x -1.2 . 
b) The contractor agent's estimate of the engineer agent's utility function: The engineer 
agent's utility function is ue = kc +b, where the contractor agent knows two points 
alone this line based on its updated beliefs: optimum point: (7000,1); reservation 
point: (8707,0.6); Thus, the contractor agent estimates the engineer agent's utility 
function as: ue =-2.3x10-4x+2.64. 
c) The combined utility function: Since the contractor agent's and the engineer agent's 
utility functions are: uc =2x 10-4x -1.2 and ue = 2.3x10-4x+2.64, the correlation 
between the contractor agent and the engineer agent's utility functions can be 
calculated as: ue =-1.17uc +1.234. 
" Risk evaluation 
According to Zeuthen's model, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the 
contractor agent (Pcmax ) and the engineer agent (Pemax) can be calculated as: 
U` -U` U` -U` Pc = rc re ,p_ ee er c max U 
cc -U(C) 
'e max Ur-U/ý. ) 
ee e 
Where, 
U'CC - the contractor agent's utility generated by its offer in t iteration; 
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U `Ce - the contractor agent's utility which offered by the engineer agent's offer in t 
iteration; 
UU(c) - the contractor agent's utility of a conflict deal, it is assumed as 0 in this case; 
U tee - the engineer agent's utility bring by its current offer in t iteration; 
U tcc - the engineer agent's utility which offered by the contractor agent's offer in t 
iteration; and 
Ue(c) - the engineer agent's utility for a conflict deal, it is assumed as 0 in this case 
(Figure 7.1c). 
In this iteration, the offer of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are (11000, 
7000). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptability to the contractor and the 
engineer are: 
P_ 
Uýý -Ufe _1-0.2_0.8 Pc max U ýc -UC (C) 1 
Pe 
UPe- U`l 1-0.11_0.89 
max vee - ve(C) 1 
" Concession 
Since the Pcmax < Pemx (i. e. the contractor's maximum risk acceptability is less than that 
of the engineer agent), the contractor agent knows that it should make a concession in the 
next iteration. In this example, a simple concession approach is adopted to calculate the 
concession rate (i. e. the contractor agent will make the minimum concession sufficient to 
make the engineer agent's maximum acceptable risk smaller than its own in the next 
iteration). The concession step can be calculated as: 
P_ 
U(we)U(Dc) I1uec I_0.8, 
cmax U(we)-U(e) 1-0 
uec = 0.2, => ue = 0.8837 => x=10418 
Thus, the contractor agent's new offer will be equal to, or lower than £10418. 
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4) The engineer agent's counter-offer in the 2nd iteration 
Based on the contractor agent's new offer of £10418, the engineer agent updates its belief 
about the probability of the contractor's reservation value. 
_ 
P(R1)P(el I R1) 
_ 
0.3 * 0.308 
= 0.536 P(Rl el) 
=1 
PeIRPR (0.3 * 0.308) + (0.2 * 0.4) (-4k 1 k) ( k) 
P(R2)P(el I R2) 
_ 
0.2 * 0.4 
= 0.464 P(R2 I el) lk_t P el I Rk)P(Rk) (0.3 * 0.308) + (0.2 * 0.4) ( 
Where, P(eiIR1) is obtained through the method of linear interpolation from data in Table 
7.6. Meanwhile, P(R3jet)=P(R4jel)=P(R5jel)=0 because P(e1IR3)= P(e1IR4)=P(R5)=0. 
. Estimating the contractor agent's reservation value 
Prior to receiving the contractor agent's offer (£10418), the engineer agent would think 
that the contractor agent's reservation value is: 
R= JP(R; )*R; = 0.2*7500 +0.3*8000+0.3*9000+0.2* 10000=8600. 
After receiving the new offer of 10418, the engineer agent's current estimation of the 
contractor agent's reservation value is: 
R= EP(R; )*R; = 0.536*9000+0.464*10000=9464. 
Utility functions 
a) The engineer agent's utility function: In this case, the data of the two points, which 
determine the engineer agent's utility functions, are: optimum value point: (7000,1); 
and reservation value point: (9800,0.6). Thus, the engineer agent's utility function is: 
ue =-1.43x10-4x+2. 
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b) The engineer agent's estimate of the contractor agent utility function: At this stage, 
the engineer agent's information about the contractor agent's utility function is: 
optimum point: (11000,1); reservation point: (9464,0.6). Thus, it calculates the 
contractor agent's utility function as uc = 2.6 x 10"4 x -1.87 . 
c) The combined utility function: Based on the identified two utility functions: 
ue =-1.43x10-4x+2; 
uc =2.6x10-4x-1.87; 
The function between the contractor agent's utility and the engineer agent's utility 
can be worked out as: u. = -0.55uc + 0.972. 
Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the contractor agent and the engineer agent's offers are (10418,7000), 
thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptability of the engineer agent and contractor 
agent are: 
Pe "4 
U«- U« 1-0.51 
_ 0.49 "a" U« Ue(C) 1 
_ _ 
0.84 -0 U, c - U, fe Pc max - Uýc - UI(C) 0.84 
1' 
. Concession 
Since the Pemax < Pcmax, the engineer agent knows it should make a concession in the next 
iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
P= 
Uý. -Uce = 
0.84 - Ure = 0.49 C max U 
cc -UC (C) 
0.84 
uCe = 0.428, => ue=0.736 => x=8838 
Thus, the engineer agent's new counteroffer will be equal to, or higher than £8838. 
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5) The contractor agent's offer in the 3rd iteration 
After receiving the engineer agent's new counteroffer of £8838, the contractor agent 
repeats the evaluation process as it did in 3) to decide what it should offer for the next 
iteration. 
Updating the probability of the engineer agent's reservation value 
After the last iteration, the contractor agent has already updated its belief about the 
probability of the engineer agent's reservation value as: 
Table 7.7 The contractor agent's estimate about the probability of the engineer 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 3rd iteration (Iversen, 1984) 
Hypothesis 1 2 3 4 5 6 
£7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability P(R/el) 0 0 0.5833 0.4166 0 0 
Based on this prior knowledge (at £7000) and the engineer agent's new counteroffer 
£8838, the contractor agent updates its belief as follows: 
_ 
P(R, I e, )P(e1, e2 I RI) P(R` (e,, e2) E6 k=1P(e1, e2 I Rk)P(Rk) 
Where, 
P(el, e2,.... e I R, )=P(el I Ri)*P(e2I R1)*........ P(e I R1) 
P(e,, e2 IR, ) = P(el R; ) * P(e2 1 R, ) = (0.14,0.1) * (0.12,0.306) = (0.0168,0.0306) 
The above equations are based on the assumption that event el and e2 are independent 
(Pearl, 1988). In this iteration, the new prior conditional probabilities are: 
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P(RI I el, e2) = 
P(RýI eº)P(el. ex lRl) 
_ 
0.5833 * 0.0168 
)=0.435 1 k. l (el, e2 I RI)P(RI) (0.5833 * 0.0168 + 
(0.4166 * 0.0306 
P(R2 e, )P(e1, e2 1 R2) 
_ 
0.4166 * 0.035 
= 0.565 P(R2 1 el, e2) = e. P (e1, e2 R2) P (Rx) (0.5833 * 0.0245 )+ (0.4166 * 0.035) Y, ký 
(i. e. after receiving the engineer agent two offers, the contractor agent believes that there 
are 43.5 % chance that the engineer agent's reservation value is £8500 and 56.5% chance 
that the amount is £9000). 
Estimating the engineer agent's reservation value 
After receiving the new counteroffer, the contractor agent's current estimation of the 
engineer agent's reservation value is: R=0.435*8500+0.565*9000 = 8782. 
Utility functions 
a) The contractor agent's utility function": uc =2x 10-4x -1.2 
b) The contractor agent's estimate of the engineer agent: Based on its updated beliefs 
about the engineer agent's reservation value, the contractor agent identifies the two 
points in the engineer agent's utility function: optimum point: (7000,1); and 
reservation point: (8782,0.6). Thus, the contractor agent estimates the engineer 
agent's utility function as: ue =-2.245x10-4x+2.571. 
ý) The combined utility function 
Since 
uc = 2x10-4x-1.2; 
u. =-2.245x10-4x+2.571; 
22 The contractor agent has worked out its utility function at 2"d iteration, so does the engineer agent. 
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Thus, the function between the contractor agent's and the engineer agent's utility 
function is: ue= -1.1225 uc+1.224 . 
Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the offer of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are (10418, 
8838). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptability to the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent are: 
U' -U` Pc max 
rc Ce 
= UI - Uc(C) 
= 
0.8836 - 0.572 
0.8836 = 
0.353 
P= 
Ufe - Uer _ 
0.582 - 0.1015 = 0.826 emax Üee - Ue(C) 0.582 
. Concession 
Since the Pcmax < Pemax, the contractor agent knows it should make a concession in the 
next iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
U(we)-U(D, ) 
- 
10.582 - u« P, max - U(we)-U(e) 0.582 -0 
0.353 
9 
uec = 0.377, _> uc=0.755 => x=9775 
Thus, the contractor agent's new offer will be equal to, or lower than £9775. 
6) The engineer agent's counter-offer in the 3 `d iteration 
Based on the last two encounters, the engineer agent's prior probability about the 
contractor agent's reservation value is shown in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8 The engineer agent's estimate about the probability of the contractor 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 3 `d iteration 
Hypothesis R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
£7,500 £8,000 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability P(R; jel) 0 0 0.536 0.464 0 
After receiving the new offer of 9775, the engineer updates its condition probability as: 
P(e1, e2 I R1) = P(el I Ri)*P(e2 Ri) = (0.3775,0.343)*(0.291,0.4) = (0.1099,0.1375) 
I_ P(R2 
I et)P(e1, e2 I R2) 
_ P(Rz e,, ez) Y, k. 1P(el, e2 I R2)P(R2) 
0.464 * 0.1375 
= 0.52 
(0.536 * 0.1099 )+ (0.464 * 0.1375 ) 
P(RI ei, e: ) = 
P(R1 I e1)P(e1, e2 I RI) 
6 Ek. 1P(ei, e2 I R1)P(Ri) 
0.536 * 0.1099 
= 0.48 (0.536 * 0.1099 )+ (0.464 * 0.1375 ) 
The engineer agent's current estimation of the contractor agent's reservation value is: 
R =0.48*9000+0.52* 10000=9520. 
" Utility functions 
a) The engineer agent's utility function: The engineer agent's utility function is: 
ue = -1.43 x 10-4x + 2, which is not changed since the engineer agent knows the 
exact information about its utility function line, (i. e. optimum value point: (7000,1); 
and reservation value point: (9800,0.6)). 
b) The engineer agent's estimate of the contractor agent utility function: At this stage, 
the engineer agent's information about the contractor agent's utility function is: 
optimum point: (11000,1); reservation point: (9520,0.6). Thus, the engineer agent's 
estimate about the contractor agent's utility function is: u, =2.703<c104x-1.973. 
c) The combined utility function: 
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Since: 
u. =-1.43x10-4x+2 
u, =2.703x10-4x-1.973 
Thus, the function between the utility functions of the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent can be calculated as: u, = -0.529 u, + 0.956 . 
. Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the current offers of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are 
(9975,8838). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptability to the engineer agent 
and the contractor agent are: 
P_Ue-Ue. - 
0.733 - 0.639 _ 0.129 ""= U« - UI(C) 0.733 
_ 
U' - U' cc Cr _ P" "m Uc-U, (C) 
" Concession 
0.6 - 0.422 
0.6 = 
0.297 
Since the Pemax < Pcmax, the engineer agent knows it should make a concession in the next 
iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
P=U n' -U re _ 
0.6 -U re _ 0.129 cmax Un - Uc(C) 0.6 
uCe = 0.5226, _> ue=0.6795 => x=9232 
Thus, the engineer agent's new offer will be equal to, or higher than £9232. 
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7) The contractor agent's offer in the 4th iteration 
" Updating the probability of the engineer agent's reservation value 
After the previous iterations, the contractor agent's new belief about the engineer agent's 
reservation value can be calculated as: 
Table 7.9 The contractor agent's estimate about the probability of the engineer 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 4 `h iteration 
Hypothesis 1 2 3 4 5 6 
£7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability 
P(Rel, e2) 
0 0 0.4949 0.5050 0 0 
Based on this prior knowledge and the engineer's new counteroffer of £9232, the 
contractor agent updates its belief as follows: 
P/Rl I eýýe2ýe3) _ 
P(R, I e1, e2)P(e1, e2, e3 I R, ) 
l 
Lk_IP(el, e2, e3 I Rk)P(Rk) 
Where, 
P(el, e2,.... e, I R, )=P(e1I R, )*P(e2 I R, )*........ P(e. I RE) 
P(el, e2, e3 I R, ) = P(e1 I R; ) * P(e2 R, ) * P(e3 R) = (0.016$0.0306)(0.03,0.15) = (0.00050.00459) 
Here, it is supposed that the conditional probabilities are independent with each other 
(Pearl, 1988). In this iteration, the new prior conditional probabilities are: 
P(R, I e,, e2)P(e,, e2, e3 I R, ) 
- 
0.4949*0.0005 P(Rý (eýýei+es) =6=0.096 Yk_l P(e,, e2, e3 I R, )P(R1) (0.4949 * 0.0005) + (0.505 * 0.00459) 
P(R2Iel, e2. )P(el, e2, e3IR2)= 0.505*0.00459 P(R21e1, ei, e3)- 6*0.0005) + (0.5 05 * 0.00459 = 
0.904 
(0.4949 ýk=ý P(eýý ezý es I RZ)P(RZ) 
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" Estimating the engineer agent's reservation value 
After receiving the new counteroffer, the contractor agent's current estimation of the 
engineer agent's reservation value is: R=0.096*8500+0.904*9000 = 8952 
" Utility functions 
a) The contractor agent's utility function: uc = 2x 10-4x -1.2 
b) The contractor agent's estimate of the engineer agent's utilityfunction: Based on its 
updated beliefs about the engineer agent's reservation value, the contractor agent 
identifies the two points along the engineer agent's utility function: optimum point: 
(7000,1) and reservation point: (8952,0.6). Thus, the contractor agent estimates the 
engineer agent's utility function is: ue = -2.05 x 10-4x + 2.434. 
c) The combined utility function 
Since: 
uc =2x10-4x-1.2 
ue =-2.05x10-4x+2.434 
Thus, the relationship between the utility functions of the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent can be expressed as: ue = -1.025uc + 1.204. 
Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the current offers of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are 
(9775,9232). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the contractor is: 
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Pc 
max _U 
ýý -U fe _ 
0.755 - 0.6464 
Uýý -UI(C) 0.755 
ul _u t_ = ee ec Pe max _ IT ee -U eýC) 
- 
" Concession 
0.541 - 0.43 
0.541 
= 0.143 
= 0.205 
Since the Pcmax < Pemax, the contractor agent knows it should make a concession in the 
next iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
U (We) -U (Dc) 
= 
10.541 
- U. 
I=- 
P, max = U(we)-U(e) 0.541 -0 
0.143 
uec = 0.4636, => uc=0.722 => x=9612 
Thus, the contractor agent's new offer will be equal to, or lower than £9612. 
8) The engineer agent's counter-offer in the 4th iteration 
After the last three encounters, the engineer agent's prior probability about the contractor 
agent's reservation value is shown in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.10 The engineer agent's estimate about the probability of the contractor 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 4th iteration 
Hypothesis R1 R2 R3 R4 RS 
£7,500 £8,000 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability 
P(Rei, e2) 
0 0 0.48 0.52 0 
The condition probability is: 
P(e1, e2, e3 R, )=P(el R, )*P(e2 R, )*P(e3 R, )=(0.1099,0.1375)(0.3612,0.303)=(0.0397,0.0417) 
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PRee_ 
P(R, I el, e2)P(e,, e2, e3 I R1) 
_ 
0.48 * 0.0397 
= 0.468 (1I 1+ 2, e3) -6 
k=1P(el, e2, e3 
IR1)P(Rl) (0.48*0.0397)+(0.52*0.0417 l) 
P(R2I e1, e2, )P(el, e2, e3 IR2) 0.52*0.0417 P(RZ I e,, eZ, e3) = `6 ==0.532 
L', k=1P(el, e2, e3 
I R2)P(R2) (0.48 * 0.0397) + (0.52 * 0.0417) 
After receiving the counteroffer (E9612), the engineer agent's current estimation of the 
contractor agent's reservation value is: R =0.468*9000+0.532* 10000=9532. 
" Utility functions 
a) The engineer agent's utility function: u, = -1.43 x 10-4x+2 
b) The engineer agent's estimate of the contractor agent utility function: At this stage, 
the engineer agent's information about the contractor agent's utility function is: 
optimum point: (11000,1) and reservation point: (9532,0.6). Thus, the contractor 
agent estimates the engineer agent's utility function is: it = 2.725 x 10"` x -1.9973 . 
ý) The combined utilityfunction 
Since: 
ue =-1.43x10-4x+2 
uc = 2.725 x 10-4 x -1.9973 
Thus, the relationship between the utility functions of the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent can be expressed as: u, = -0.525uc + 0.952. 
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" Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the current offers of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are 
(9612,9232). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the contractor is: 
P_ut-ut-0.68 - 
0.625 
= 0.081 Pe max u 
ee -U e(C 
) 0.68 
P_U 
ý' -U `e _ 
0.622 - 0.518 _ 0.167 Pc max u ýc -Uc (C) 0.622 
Concession 
Since the Pe. X < P,.,,,, the engineer agent knows it should make a concession in the next 
iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
P_ 
U' - U' 
- 
0.622 -Uf! - 0.081 cmax Uýc -Uc(C) 0.622 
uCe = 0.572, _> ue=0.6517=> x=9429 
Thus, the engineer agent's new offer will be equal to, or higher than £9429. 
9) The contractor agent's offer in the 5t" iteration 
After receiving the engineer agent's new counteroffer, the contractor agent starts its new 
evaluation process to decide what it should offer for the next iteration. 
. Updating the probability of the engineer agent's reservation value 
After the above iterations, the contractor agent's new belief about the engineer agent's 
reservation value are shown in Table 7.11. 
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Table 7.11 The contractor agent's estimate about the probability of the engineer 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 5th iteration 
Hypothesis 1 2 3 4 5 6 
£7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability 
P(R, l el, e2, e3) 
0 0 0.096 0.904 0 0 
Based on this prior knowledge and the engineer's new counteroffer £9429, the contractor 
updates his belief as follows: 
P(R1 1 el, e2, e3, e4) = 
P(RI 
6Ie,, 
e2, e3)P(e1, e2, e3, e4 I R1) 
lk=l P(el, e2, e3, e4 l Rk)P(Rk ) 
Where, 
p(el, e2,.... e 1 Ri) = P(el 1 RI) * P(e2 1 Ri) *........ P(e 1 R, ) 
P(el, e2, e3, e4 1R1) = P(el I R, ) * P(ea I RI) * P(e3 I RI) * P(e4 I R1) _ 
(0.0005,0.00459 )(0.01568 , 0.0784) = (7.84 
* 10 -6 , 3.6 * 10 -4 ) 
It is supposed that the conditional probabilities are independent with each other (Pearl, 
1988). In this iteration, the new prior conditional probabilities are: 
P(R, I e,, e2, e3)P(e,, e2, e3, e4 I R1) 
= 
0.096*7.84*10-' 
P(RI I el, ez, es, e4) = =0.0023 Yk=IP(e,, ez'e3+e" IR1)P(R, ) 10,4 ) 
P(R2I e1, e2, e3+e4)= 
P(R2 I e,, e2, e3)P(e>>ez. e3, e" I R2) 
= 
0.904 * 3.6 * 10-4 
=0.9977 k. 
ýP(e1. ez, e3, e4 
I R2)P(R2) (0.096 * 7.84 * 10-6) + (0.904 * 3.6 * 10-4 ý, ) 
Estimating the engineer agent's reservation value 
Therefore, after receiving the new counteroffer, the contractor agent's current estimation 
of the engineer agent's reservation value is: R=0.0023*8500+0.9977*9000 = 8999. 
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" Utility function calculation 
a) The contractor agent's utility function: uc =2x 10-4 x -1.2 
b) The contractor agent's estimate of the engineer agent's utility function: At this stage, 
the two points which the contractor agent has are: optimum point: (7000,1) and 
reservation point: (8999,0.6). Thus, the contractor agent estimates the engineer 
agent's utility function is: ue = -2 x 10-4 x+2.4. 
c) The combined utility function 
Since, 
uc =2x104x-1.2; 
u. =-2x104x+2.4; 
Thus, the relationship between the utility functions of the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent can be expressed as: ue = -uc + 1.2. 
Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the current offers of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are 
(9612,9429). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the contractor is: 
Pc 
max 
U ýý -U ýe 0.7224 
Uýc -UC(C) 0.7224 
_ul_Ul_ ee ec 
Pe 
max =Ut 
ee 
v 
e( 
C 
- 0.6858 
0.514 - 0.478 
0.514 
= 0.0366 
= 0.07 
274 
" Concession 
Since the P,., < < Pe. R, the contractor agent knows it should make a concession in the 
next iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
P 
, max 
U(we)-U(Dc) 
= 
10.514 -uec 1=0.0366 
, "»aX U(we)-U(e) 0.514 -0 
uec = 0.495, => u, =0.705 => x=9524 
Thus, the contractor agent's new offer will be equal to or lower than £9524. 
10) The engineer agent's counter-offer in the 5 `h iteration 
Based on the last four encounters, the engineer agent's prior probability about the 
contractor agent's reservation value is shown in Table 7.12. 
Table 7.12 The engineer agent's estimate about the probability of the contractor 
agent's reservation value at the beginning of 5th iteration 
Hypothesis R1 R2 R3 R4 RS 
£7,500 £8,000 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 
Probability 
P(Ril e1, e2, e3) 
0 0 0.468 0.532 0 
Thus, the condition probability is: 
P(e1, e2, e3, e4 JR)=P(e, R, )*P(e2 R, )*P(e3 R, )*P(e4 R, )=(0.0397,0.0417)*(0.358,0.295)=(0.0142,0.0123) 
p(Rl I e, e2 e3 e4) _ 
P(Rij et ex, es) piep ez " e3 + ea 
I RI) 
_ Zbk=iP(ei, e2, e3, e1 1 R1)P(R1) 
0.468 * 0.0142 
(0.468 * 0.0142) + (0.532 * 0.0123) = 
0.504 
P(R2 I el, e2., e3)P(e,, e2, e3, e4 I R2) 0.532*0.0123 P(R2Iel, e2, e3, ea)= 6=0.496 ýk=IP(el, e2, e3, e4 I R2)P(R2) (0.468*0.0142)+(0.532*0.0123) 
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After receiving the counteroffer (£9524), the engineer agent's current estimation of the 
contractor agent's reservation value is: R =0.504*9000+0.496*10000=9496. 
" Utility functions 
a) the engineer agent's utility function: ue = -1.43x 10-4x + 2. 
b) The engineer agent's estimate of the contractor agent utility function: At this stage, 
the engineer agent's information about the contractor agent's utility function is: 
optimum point: (11000,1) and reservation point: (9496,0.6). Thus, the contractor 
agent estimates the engineer agent's utility function is: u, =2.66x104x-1.926. 
c) The combined utilityfunction 
Since, 
ue =-1.43x10'x+2 
uc =2.66x10'x-1.926 
Thus, the relationship between the utility functions of the contractor agent and the 
engineer agent can be expressed as: u. = -0.525uc + 0.952. 
Risk evaluation 
In this iteration, the current offers of the contractor agent and the engineer agent are 
(9524,9429). Thus, the maximum likelihood of risk acceptable to the contractor is: 
Ut 
«-Ue Pe c_0.652 - 
0.63 
_ 0.0337 ý" __ U« - UI(C) 0.652 
_U r'. 
-u 11 
__ 
0.622 - 0.582 = 0.064 P` °m" U ýc -UC (c) 0.622 
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" Concession 
Since the Pe, I, ax < PA R, the engineer agent knows it should make a concession in the next 
iteration. The concession step can be calculated as: 
U C- U1_0.622 -U 
cc e-U (C) 0.622 
- 0.0337 'c ma -U( 
Uce = 0.601, _> ue=0.642 => x=9500 
Thus, the engineer agent's new offer will be equal to, or higher than £9500. 
Table 7.13 and Figure 7.2 shows the above negotiation process23. It can be seen that the 
negotiation will converge at the next few encounters. However, the speed of convergence 
slows down when the negotiation nears an agreement. Practically, it may be assumed that 
an agreement is reached when the difference between both parties' offers is small enough 
(e. g. £50 or within 1% of the offer amount). 
Table 7.13 The negotiation process of example 1 
Initial 
offer 
2nd 
iteration 
3rd 
iteration 
4th 
iteration 
5th 
iteration 
The contractor agent 11,000 1,0418 9,975 9,612 9,524 
The engineer agent 7,000 8,838 9,232 9,429 9,500 
23 The unit of vertical axis is 100. 
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a 
-+- The contractor agent 
The engineer agent 
The contractor agent's reservation amount 
The engineer agent's reservation amount 
Figure 7.2 The negotiation process of Example 1 
7.6 OTHER CASES AND DISCUSSION 
The above example shows the negotiation process where a simple case that the MASCOT 
model can address. To enable better understanding of the MASCOT prototype, few 
further examples are presented below, as variations of Example 1. 
07.6.1 Negotiation with Time Penalty (Example 2) 
In this case, time penalties are incorporated. It is assumed that the time penalty for the 
contractor agent is 3% utility reduction per iteration and 5% for the engineer agent. By 
following the same procedure as case 1, the negotiation result is shown in the following 
278 
Initial Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
offer iteration iteration iteration iteration iteration 
table. An agreement is reached after the contractor makes its offer in the third iteration 
under the pressure of time penalty (Table 7.14 and Figure 7.3). 
Table 7.14 The negotiation process with time penalty (Example 2) 
The contractor 
agent 
The engineer 
agent 
12000 
10000 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
Time penalty Initial 
offer 
3% deduction 11,000 
of current utility 
5% deduction 7,000 
of current utility 
-+- The contractor agent 
The engineer agent 
The contractor agent's reservation amount 
The engineer agent's reservation amount 
Pt 
iteration 
2" 
iteration 
3[" 
iteration 
10,285 9,730 9,595 
9,143 9,674 
Figure 7.3 The negotiation with time penalty (Example 2) 
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7.6.2 Negotiation with a Conflict Outcome (Example 3) 
In this case, it is assumed that the reservation value of the engineer agent is reduced from 
£9800 to £8800. Obviously, there is no agreement zone between the contractor agent and 
the engineer agent since their reservation values are £8800 and £9000. Table 7.15 shows 
such a negotiation process using the MASCOT model. A conflict deal is reached in the 
third iteration (Figure 7.4). 
Table 7.15 The negotiation process with a conflict outcome (Example 3) 
Initial offer I' iteration 2"° iteration 3`° iteration 
The contractor agent 11,000 1,0418 9,596 9,210 
The engineer agent 7,000 8,008 8,515 8978 > 8800 
12000 
10000 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
-ý- The contractor agent 
-e The engineer agent The contractor agent's reservation amount The engineer agent's reservation amount 
Figure 7.4 The negotiation reaches a conflict deal (Example 3) 
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7.6.3 Negotiation with Random Conditional Probabilities (Example 4 and 5) 
In practice, a negotiation party may not have more knowledge about his opponent. 
Therefore, the probability distribution and conditional probability encoded from his prior 
know may be unreasonable. In this case, we assume two cases with extreme conditional 
probability (Example 4 and 5). The data are shown in the following tables. 
Table 7.16 The contractor's prior knowledge about the conditional probabilities of 
the engineer's offer (Example 4) 
Possible 
t 
e0 el E2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
even 
Hypothese 
£6,000 £7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £9,500 £10,000 £11,000 
£7,000 0.35 0.4 0.2 0.05 0 0 0 0 
18,000 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 
£8,500 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.05 0.15 0 0 
£9,000 0 0.3 0.25 0.25 0.2 0 0 0 
£ 10,000 0 0 0.05 0.20 0.45 0.25 0.05 0 
£11,000 0 0 0 0.05 L 0.1 0.25 0.40 0.20 
Note: only rows £8,500 and £9,000 are modified since the data in other rows do not work 
in this case. The distribution of £8,500 is abnormal, while the distribution of £9,000 is 
shifted forward. 
Table 7.17 The contractor's prior knowledge about the conditional probabilities of 
the engineer's offer (Example 5) 
Possible 
ve t 
e0 el e2 e3 eq es e6 e7 
n 
Hypothese 
£6,000 £7,000 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £9,500 £10,000 £11,000 
£7,000 0.35 0.4 0.2 0.05 0 0 0 0 
£8,000 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 
£8,500 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.05 0.15 0 0 
£91000 0 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.1 0.3 0 0 
£ 10,000 0 0 0.05 0.20 0.45 0.25 0.05 0 
£11,000 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.40 0.20 
Note: in tnis case, the distribution of i9,000 is high at two side and low at middle. 
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Table 7.18 The engineer's prior knowledge about the conditional probabilities of the 
contractor's offer (Example 4,5) 
Possible el e2 e3 eq e5 e6 e7 
vent 
Hypothesis 
£7,500 £8,000 £8,500 £9,000 £10,000 £11,000 £12,000 
£7,500 0.35 0.5 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 
£8,000 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 
£9,000 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
£10,000 0 0. 0 0.333 0.333 0.334 0 
£11,000 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 
Note: this is pure even distribution 
The results of Example 4 and 5 are shown in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6. 
In Example 4, the likelihood distribution in Table 7.16 shows that the contractor agent 
clearly understand that the engineer agent's offer will not be higher than £9,000, when 
the engineer agent's real reservation value is £9,000. By chance, this assumed 
distribution is more accurate than the original case. Thus, it converges much fast than the 
original case (Table 7.19 and Figure 7.5). 
Table 7.19 The negotiation process with random conditional probability (Example 4) 
Initial 
offer 
1st 
iteration 
2°iteration 3` iteration 
The 11,000 1,0418 9,910 8,926<9000 =>accept 
contractor the engineer agent's last 
agent offer (or offer £9000) 
The 7,000 8,926 9,517 (> the contractor 
engineer agent's reservation value) 
agent 
Note: although the contractor agent's calculated offer 8926 is smaller than the reservation value 
9000 in 3`d iteration, this is different from the case conflict deal. In conflict deal, party A's offer is 
smaller than its reservation value while party B does not offer any amount which can satisfy party 
A's reservation value. 
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0 
-0 The contractor agent 
-ý- The engineer agent 
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The engineer agent's reservation amount 
Figure 7.5 The negotiation with random conditional probability (Example 4) 
In Example 5, the unreasonable high value of conditional probability P(950019000) 
(Table 7.17) causes the contractor agent reduce its concession speed at this point. 
However, the negotiation is still converging, and finally will reach an agreement. The 
negotiation process is shown in Table 7.20 and Figure 7.6. 
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Table 7.20 The negotiation process with random conditional probability (Example 5) 
Initial offer 1' iteration 2 iteration 3` iteration 
The contractor agent 11,000 1,0418 9,910 9,770 
The engineer agent 7,000 8,926 9,517 9,662 
12000 
10000 
----- 
Ar- 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
Initial Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
offer iteration iteration iteration iteration iteration 
-4 The contractor agent 
-ý- The engineer agent 
-a- The contractor agent's reservation amount 
The engineer agent's reservation amount 
Figure 7.6 The negotiation with random conditional probability (Example 5) 
7.6.4 Negotiation through Simple Gradient Descent With Time Penalty (Example 6) 
To make a comparison with the MASCOT model, two examples adopting simple 
gradient descent mechanism with consideration of time penalty are discussed. The 
negotiation mechanism in this case is simple and straightforward. However, the 
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concession approach is far from real claims negotiation. The negotiation simply depends 
on the selection of concession rate or time penalty. The calculation is shown as follows: 
" Critical negotiation features 
Table 7.21 The contractor agent's major negotiation figures in Example 6 
Reservation value Optimum value Time penalty 
£9,000 £11,000 £50/per iteration 
Table 7.22 The engineer agent's major negotiation figures in Example 6 
Reservation value Optimum value Time Penalty 
£9,800 £7,000 £80/per iteration 
Negotiation Mechanism 
Monotonic concession protocol is adopted. Meanwhile, both parties will adopt a simple 
negotiation strategy: both parties have fixed concession rates 1.5%, and make 
concessions alternatively until an agreement is reached. 
Negotiation process 
ý) The IS` iteration: Contractor agent's initial offer is of £11,000. The engineer agent's 
initial counteroffer is of £7,000. 
b) The 2nd iteration: The contractor agent checks the engineer agent's offer. Since the 
offer 7000 is lower than its reservation value, the contractor agent makes its counter- 
offer of 11000*(1-1.5%)=10835. Considering the time penalty, the real value that the 
contractor agent can get is 10835-50= 10785 at this stage. Similarly, since the 
contractor agent's offer 10835 is larger than the engineer agent's reservation value 
9800, the engineer agent will make a concession 7000*1.5%=105 in its new offer. 
Therefore, its new offer is 7105. The real value that the engineer agent can get is 
7105+80=7185 at this stage. 
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The whole negotiation process is shown in Table 7.23. From the table, it can be seen that 
the contractor agent's offer can satisfy the engineer agent's reservation value in the 70' 
iteration. It means the engineer agent might accept the contractor agent's offer and reach 
an agreement at £9757. Otherwise, the negotiation will go on, and an agreement will be 
reached in 1 1th iteration at a price of £8989 or £8980. 
Table 7.23 The negotiation process with same concession rate (Example 6) 
Iteration The contractor agent The engineer agent 
Concession 
amount 
New offer Real value Concession 
amount 
New offer Real value 
11000 7000 
2 165 10835 10785 105 7105 7185 
3 162 10623 10573 108 7293 7373 
4 159 10415 10365 111 7483 7563 
5 155 10209 10159 113 7677 7757 
6 152 10007 9957 116 7873 7953 
7 149 9807 9757 119 8072 8152 
8 146 9611 9561 122 8275 8355 
9 143 9418 9368 125 8480 8560 
10 141 9227 9177 128 8688 8768 
11 138 9039 8989 132 8900 8980 
12 135 8855 8805 135 9115 9195 
The drawback of the above negotiation process is the agent who has a higher initial offer 
will always make more concession since both parties' concession rates are same. To 
overcome this problem, we assume that the concession amount of agents is same (with 
different concession rates). Suppose, the concession step is £50/per iteration, and the time 
penalty for the contractor agent is £50 and £80 for the engineer agent per iteration. The 
negotiation result is shown in Table 7.24. 
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Table 7.24 The negotiation process with same concession amount (Example 6) 
Iteration The contractor agent The engineer agent 
New offer Real value New offer Real value 
1 11000 7000 
2 10950 10900 7050 7130 
3 10850 10800 7180 7260 
4 10750 10700 7310 7390 
5 10650 10600 7440 7520 
6 10550 10500 7570 7650 
7 10450 10400 7700 7780 
8 10350 10300 7830 7910 
9 10250 10200 7960 8040 
10 10150 10100 8090 8170 
11 10050 10000 8220 8300 
12 9950 9900 8350 8430 
13 9850 9800 8480 8560 
14 9750 9700 8610 8690 
15 9650 9600 8740 8820 
16 9550 9500 8870 8950 
17 9450 9400 9000 9080 
18 9350 9300 9130 9210 
19 9250 9200 9260 9340 
20 9150 9100 9390 9470 
21 9050 9000 9520 9600 
22 8950 8900 9650 9730 
23 8850 8800 9780 9860 
In this case, the contractor agent's offer satisfies the engineer agent's reservation value in 
the 13th iteration. An agreement is possible to be reached if the engineer agent is willing 
to accept such an amount. Otherwise, an agreement will be reached in the 18th iteration at 
an amount around £9250. 
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7.7 DISCUSSION 
The above demonstration of the system operation shows that the MASCOT negotiation 
mechanism works properly in different situations (Examples 1-5). Also, the results 
achieved in these situations were reasonable, which is an essential requirement for all 
negotiation systems. However, it is not easy to achieve. For example, the simple gradient 
descent approach, adopted by many negotiation systems, can seldom reflect real cases. 
Negotiation may be very inefficient if an agent proposes a high initial offer (Example 6). 
In other cases, an agent may benefit from an unreasonably high initial offer if a binary 
divisive approach is adopted. Since the MASCOT negotiation mechanism is based on a 
thorough analysis of negotiation theories and the characteristics of claims negotiation, the 
learning approach and the risk avoidance model ensure that negotiation can be conducted 
reasonably. The problem in binary divisive mechanism will be reduced because an agent 
may have prior knowledge about the opponent's approach to negotiation. Thus, no matter 
how high the opponent offers, the agent will make a reasonable counter-offer based on its 
domain knowledge about the opponent. The large number of claims in a construction 
project makes it possible for a party to obtain enough domain knowledge. On the other 
hand, if an agent cannot get enough prior knowledge about its opponent, the negotiation 
can still converge and reach a reasonable result (shown in Examples 4 and 5) since the 
agent can make its decision according to the opponent's offers during negotiation. 
With consideration of its particular advantages, the various aspects of the MASCOT 
negotiation mechanism have great potential to be further applied in other domains. For 
example: 
0 Modified Monotonic Concession Protocol (mMCP): MCP is a general negotiation 
protocol which could be used in many different areas, however, its assumptions such 
as complete information and conflict deal limits its application (see Chapter 5). 
rnMCP relaxes some of these assumptions. For example, it changes the situations for 
conflict deal; it also takes consideration of the time issue, and the involvement of the 
client during negotiation. These improvements allow mMCP to be applied more 
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effectively in multi-agent negotiation systems where time, conflict situations, and the 
involvement of new agents are generally important. 
" Zeuthen's negotiation strategy, Bayesian learning approach, and the integration of the 
two: These major components of the MASCOT negotiation strategy could be 
effective negotiation strategies when they are applied to environments, where risk 
acceptability is crucial for negotiators to make their decisions; or when it is essential 
for a negotiator to learn about the others' approaches to negotiation. These situations 
are particularly meaningful for the application of multi-agent systems in construction 
because the construction industry is characterised as risky, complex and dynamic. In 
application environments such as: collaborative design, supply chain management, 
plan and schedule monitoring, and material management, an agent's learning ability 
is particularly important for it to learn from the other specialist agents through 
interactions. Furthermore, the overall MASCOT negotiation mechanism could be 
adopted in facilitating or mediating the negotiations between project participants in 
large-scale civil engineering projects, where Pena-Mora and Wang (1998) have 
developed a simple MAS negotiation mechanism based on game theory. The adoption 
of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism will greatly enhance the capability of their 
negotiation system. 
" Expanded-solution searching strategy: the key aspects of this strategy such as the 
involvement of a third agent (e. g. the client agent or a mediator agent), the trade-offs 
between different negotiation items, and the involvement of the agents' owners are 
generally useful for the development of multi-agent systems. The adoption of these 
strategies is not limited to agent negotiation systems, but could be adopted or further 
developed in various agent collaboration systems. 
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7.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the system operation process. The key negotiation strategies 
of the MASCOT conceptual model were demonstrated using a practical problem. The 
utility function was first defined, and negotiation preparation process was described. 
Then, the key stages of negotiation processes were presented using several examples. The 
rational of results were discussed. Also, the advantages of the negotiation mechanism 
were shown by comparing the solution provided with that based on a simple gradient 
descent approach. The examples serve to aid understanding of the operation of the system 
and illustration of the key features of the system. The next chapter will discuss the 
evaluation of the system in terms of its negotiation mechanism and prototype software. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SYSTEM EVALUATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
System evaluation is an integral part of the model development. This chapter describes 
the system evaluation process which includes two major steps: theoretical evaluation and 
prototype assessment. It first introduces the objectives of system evaluation, and explains 
the methodology adopted for the evaluation. A theoretical evaluation of the MASCOT 
negotiation mechanism is then carried out. Section 8.5 presents the prototype evaluation 
process including the selection of the evaluation group, design of the questionnaire, and 
analysis of the responses. All the major aspects of the system are discussed in this 
section. These include the suitability of the system, its industry background, the features 
of the system, and perspectives for the application of MAS in other construction fields. 
The results of the evaluation and the evaluation method are also discussed. 
8.2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 
The aim of system evaluation is to determine how well the developed MASCOT system 
facilitates construction claims negotiation. The particular objectives are: 
To assess the quality of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism. Like many other 
MAS research projects (Kraus, 1993,1996,1997; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994), it 
is essential to analyse the quality of the negotiation mechanism of a developed system 
in terms of a number of key evaluation criteria, which include: 
a) Suitability; 
b) Simplicity; 
c) Distribution; 
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d) Efficiency; 
e) Stability; and 
f) Symmetry. 
" To assess the performance of the MASCOT prototype. Unlike the system evaluations 
performed in most of the current MAS research projects where a theoretical analysis 
of negotiation mechanism is deemed adequate, an industry-oriented prototype 
assessment is necessary because this project focuses more on the development and 
application of the system to real industry problems. The prototype evaluation was 
designed to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the MASCOT prototype in 
supporting claims negotiation. A number of questions to be addressed include: 
a) Is the analysis of the industry background sound for the MASCOT system bases? 
b) Do the key features of the system reflect the major characteristics of construction 
claims negotiation? 
c) Is the system coming up with reasonable answers? 
d) What are the major problems of the system? 
e) How could the system be improved? 
f) What are the major limitations and difficulties for the application of MAS in the 
industry? 
8.3 METHODOLOGY 
To achieve the system evaluation objectives described above, different approaches have ' 
been taken. The details are discussed as follows: 
8.3.1 Theoretical Evaluation 
To achieve the first objective, a theoretical approach was adopted to analyse the quality 
of the MASCOT negotiation algorithm. Since the MASCOT negotiation mechanism was 
developed based on both the economic and behaviour theories, some of the key issues 
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required by these theories must be satisfied. Kraus (1993,1996,1997), and Rosenschein 
and Zlotkin (1994) have defined a number of important evaluation criteria, such as 
efficiency, stability and suitability, by which the quality of the negotiation mechanism of 
a MAS could be assessed. A successful MAS negotiation system should satisfy the key 
criteria. Such a theoretical analysis is commonly used in the MAS community for 
assessing the developed negotiation mechanism. 
8.3.2 Prototype Evaluation 
To achieve the second objective, a prototype evaluation approach was adopted. In this 
approach, the major characteristics of MAS, the MASCOT development process, and the 
MASCOT prototype were demonstrated to an evaluation group, and the evaluators' 
feedback was obtained on the appropriateness of the application of MAS to construction 
claims negotiation would be. A few major issues related to this are discussed below: 
8.3.2.1 Evaluation Techniques 
Different approaches have been adopted to evaluate different systems (or prototypes). 
Miles et al (2000) describe two evaluation methods for knowledge-based systems, which 
could be extended for general evaluations. One of them is to provide industry users with a 
working version of the system under evaluation and, leave them to make use of it over a 
prolonged time period (e. g. a number of weeks). This would give project personnel an 
opportunity to get used to its functionality and form an opinion on whether the stated 
benefits are actually achieved. A diary is used to provide a record of usage by the 
evaluators, and includes information on any difficulties that occurred and any features 
that are felt to be lacking. This is certainly not an easy task as there are many difficulties 
involved with carrying out a trial in a working environment. The difficulties are 
magnified when the trial system must be integrated with existing systems. Another 
approach is where a relatively large number of evaluators are available for a short period 
of time. An evaluation session is held in a single location with all the evaluators 
participating simultaneously. The session consists of a hands-on usage portion, where the 
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evaluators are guided through a usage scenario with the use of appropriate notes. This is 
followed by the distribution and completion of a questionnaire by each evaluator. 
Of these two evaluation methods, the second approach (i. e. the prototype evaluation 
approach) was chosen. A demonstration was considered adequate to provide the 
evaluators with the necessary exposure to the main concepts. The chosen method means 
that the evaluation could be carried out with several people at one time - more people 
than could have been included had individual evaluation sessions been carried out. More 
importantly, since the study on MAS, especially for its application in construction, is 
quite new, the most important thing at this stage is to gain an understanding of whether 
the MAS approach is appropriate and applicable to the industry. There would be little to 
gain at the current stage from having the industry users try out the system because an 
immature prototype can hardly provide industry users with satisfactory solutions to real 
problems and fully present the advantages of the techniques. In fact, much work needs to 
be done to build a more realistic and robust negotiation system which could be ready for 
the industrial development. 
The drawback of the demonstration and prototype approach is that its effectiveness is 
sometimes limited due to the short evaluation session with a pre-determined set of data. 
Also, it is very difficult to assess the problems generated beyond a normal working 
environment. The effectiveness of the system in meeting these goals would need to be 
addressed in later evaluation processes. 
8.3.2.2 Choice of Evaluators 
A sample group of nine people from both the industry and academia were involved in the 
prototype evaluation. These evaluators had various backgrounds in the industry and 
experience of construction claims (i. e. the participants represented all the claims parties, 
such as: client, contractor, engineer or architecture; and various positions in their 
organisation, such as: project engineer, project manager, quantity surveyor, or IT 
developer). Importantly, they also had some knowledge of IT and its applications in the 
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industry24. Although in no way statistically significant, it was expected that their opinions 
would be indicative of how industry practitioners would view the system. As Eason 
(1988) states that "for a scientific study it should be necessary to obtain numbers for the 
sample to be representative of all level and types of users. An evaluation for practical 
rather than scientific purpose may not need to be rigorous about numbers but it should 
include the full range of users. " 
8.3.2.3 Evaluation Questionnaire 
The evaluation questionnaire is an important part of the prototype evaluation. It consisted 
of five major parts that roughly correspond to various aspects of the evaluation 
objectives, such as the system environment, feature, functions, and further improvement 
(see Appendix A). It included questions about: 
9 the background of the respondents in terms of the number of years of practical 
experience in the industry, the role(s) they have held, and the area(s) of experience; 
" the essential characteristics and features of construction claims negotiation on which 
the MASCOT system is based; 
" the adoption of multi-agent systems to support claims negotiation; 
" the various aspects of the MASCOT model; and 
" the MASCOT model in general, and possible improvements. 
These questions were designed to allow respondents to express their ideas in both 
quantitative and qualitative manners. Quantitative questions consisted of a number of 
statements to which the respondents could express their level of agreement or 
disagreement by circling a number on a five-point scale. The five-point scale was chosen 
as it was deemed to provide a sufficient range of responses without being overly 
complex. Respondents were also allowed to make specific comments via open questions. 
24 A pilot prototype demonstration was conducted with a small sample group of industry participants who had very little knowledge of the applications of IT in the industry. During the evaluation session, 
considerable effort had to be made to introduce the background knowledge to the participants for them to further evaluate the system. Therefore, it was considered more effective to involve the evaluators who had knowledge of the industry practice and the application of IT in the industry. 
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Thus, the evaluators' responses were not limited by the format of questions proposed by 
the system developer. 
This mixed approach is endorsed by Eason (1988) who states that "structured questions 
have the virus of easy analysis and direct comparability. Their weakness is that they pre- 
defined the answers it is possible to give and may not therefore permit the user to report 
the most important issues. We have always found it useful to use a structured approach to 
reveal issues and, once an issue is located, to use an unstructured method to explore the 
nature of the issues". 
8.3.2.4 Discussions 
Besides the questionnaire, a short discussion session was also carried out after the 
evaluation to explain some respondents' questions, and gain more evaluators' feedback 
on the prototype. This fitted in well with the demonstration approach since they are both 
appropriate for use with a group of people. Although fuller responses may have been 
gained from individual interviews or smaller discussion groups, these would have been 
more time-consuming. For this reason, the method chosen was deemed to be adequate. 
8.4 EVALUATION OF THE MASCOT NEGOTIATION MECHANISM 
8.4.1 Criteria for Effective Assessment System 
Different negotiation systems will bring different qualities to the overall system. There 
are several well-accepted criteria in evaluating negotiation quality (Kraus, 1995,1996; 
Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994); these include: 
" Suitability: the system should best reflect the characteristics of the negotiation 
scenarios, and could generate similar or reasonable negotiation outcomes as human 
negotiations (to a certain degree). 
" Simplicity: the negotiation process should be short and consume only a reasonable 
amount of communication and computation resources. The simpler the system the 
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easier it is to make it efficient if effort is not being wasted on complicated 
communication. It also makes the process more transparent. 
" Distribution: the decision making process should be distributed. There should be no 
central unit or agent that manages the problem. The level of distribution of agents, not 
only physically but also their authority is a key issue. There are issues such as 
security and simplicity that may impose a central arbiter. However, the greatest 
performance benefits will come from a fully distributed system. 
" Efficiency: this essentially means the agents as a group arrive at the most optimal 
solution. This has been defined in many ways. One might be when the sum of the 
agents' benefits is maximised. More commonly accepted is the status of Pareto 
Optimality, where no agent could derive more from a different agreement without 
some other agent deriving less. 
" Stability: there should be no incentive for agents to deviate from agreed negotiation 
strategies. In a pure game situation, with complete information, the Nash equilibrium 
concept is used. A pair of strategies (6, r) is in the Nash Equilibrium if, given 'r, no 
strategy of Agent 1 results in an outcome that Agent 1 prefers to the outcome 
generated by (6, 'r), and similarly for Agent 2, given a (Nash, 1950). If Nash 
equilibrium is reached, agents will have no incentive to deviate from agreed 
negotiation strategies. 
" Symmetry: the negotiation process should not treat agents differently. Individual 
agents may need and wish to discriminate but the interaction process itself should not 
be unfairly weighted against certain agents. 
These attributes need not be universally accepted. There will sometimes be trade-offs 
between one attribute and another. Ultimately, there are some criteria that determine the 
acceptability of one interaction protocol over another. In most cases, distribution, stability 
and efficiency are regarded as the key points which a system should satisfy, whilst others, 
like symmetry, may not be reached if the real application situation requires one of the 
agents to play a more important role than the others. 
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8.4.2 Analysis 
Of these attributes, the distribution characteristic is the basis of the MASCOT model. 
Also, the symmetry characteristic of the MASCOT model has been addressed in the 
system's assumptions. This section will focus on the three major attributes: efficiency, 
stability and simplicity. The suitability of the system would be evaluated through the 
prototype evaluation. 
" Efficiency 
Ideally, agents should not squander resources when they come to an agreement. There 
should not be wasted utility. For example, it makes sense for the agreements to satisfy the 
requirement of Pareto-optimality, where no agent could derive more from a deferent 
agreement without some other agents deriving less. Given the full information 
assumption and the Monotonic Concession Protocol, Zeuthen's strategy is efficient. 
Agents using the Zeuthen strategy will not run into conflict because at least one of them 
will always make a concession. Since agreement is guaranteed, and offers are restricted 
to the negotiation set, the result will be efficient (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). 
Harsanyi (1977) have confirmed that if both agents use Zeuthen's strategy, they will 
agree a deal that maximises the product of their utilities (i. e. Pareto-optimal). 
In MASCOT, the application of Zeuthen's strategy is based on the agents' beliefs, and 
the final settlement point is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the agreement may 
not be Pareto-optimal. However, the result is sufficiently efficient (i. e. the agreement is 
Pareto-optimal if the agents' beliefs are true - this is reasonably true at the final 
negotiation stage in the MASCOT model). 
" Stability 
No agent should have an incentive to deviate from the agreed-upon strategies. This is 
known as the notion of strategies in equilibrium. The strategy that agents adopt can be 
proposed as part of the interaction environment design. Once these strategies have been 
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proposed, the individual agent designers (e. g. different industry parties) should not have 
an incentive to go back and build their agents with different, manipulative, strategies. 
Three levels of equilibrium are commonly used in economic (game) theory, which are 
Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium and dominant equilibrium (Binmore, 1990; 
Rasmusen, 1994). Each level of equilibrium is stronger than the preceding one. As 
defined above, two strategies S, T are in Nash equilibrium if, assuming that one agent is 
using S, the other agent cannot do better using some strategy other than T, and vice 
Versa. Perfect equilibrium means that when the game has multiple steps, and one player 
is using S, there exists no state in the game where the other player can do better by not 
sticking to the strategy T. There do exist situations where strategies might be in Nash 
equilibrium, but not in perfect equilibrium. In that case, although strategy T was best at 
the start of the game, as the game unfolds it would be better to diverge from T. Dominant 
strategy equilibrium means that no matter what strategy your opponent chooses, you 
cannot do better than to play strategy T; strategies S and T are in dominant strategy 
equilibrium when S is the dominant strategy for one player and T is the dominant strategy 
for the other. However, the above equilibria are based on the complete information 
assumption, which is not true in most practical cases. To overcome this problem, 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is introduced by Harsanyi (1965,1977). This equilibrium 
includes a set of beliefs (one for each agent) and a set of strategies. A strategy 
combination and a set of beliefs form a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if the strategies are in 
Nash equilibrium given the set of beliefs, and the agents update their beliefs, according to 
Baye's rule. 
The use of Nash equilibrium may not be an effective way of analysing the outcomes of 
the models of alternating offers (Kraus, 1995). Some games may not have any 
equilibrium strategy (Sandholm, 1996), while some others may be in equilibrium only at 
the beginning of the negotiation, but may be unstable at intermediate stages. Rosenschein 
and Zlotkin (1994) have proved that Zeuthen's strategy is not stable in the case when two 
agents find themselves one step away from concluding a negotiation, and have equivalent 
risk. One agent, knowing that the opponent is using Zeuthen's strategy, could diverge 
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from Zeuthen's strategy by not making a concession, and benefit from this divergence. 
To avoid such problems, this study formalises the assumptions that are appropriate for the 
claims negotiation environment. For example, all agents suffer a loss over time, there is a 
finite set of agreements, and any agreement reached is better for all agents than opting out 
of the negotiations. When an agent tries to diverge from Zeuthen's strategy, the time 
penalty will push the agent with high time penalty to concede at the next encounter. 
Therefore, the negotiation will finally converge at an equilibrium point (i. e. Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium). 
" Simplicity 
By adopting the MASCOT negotiation protocol and strategies, agents need to compute 
the entire negotiation set in order to carry out their strategy. This may require a great deal 
of information about the encounter. The learning process also increases the calculation 
expense. However, such calculation is performed locally by each agent, thus, it is less 
costly compared with communication. Communication is typically expensive in terms of 
time and resources and can become a bottleneck of the negotiation process. The learning 
mechanism allows an agent to get more realistic beliefs about its opponent by updating its 
beliefs during negotiation, thus, reducing the frequency of communication. 
8.5 EVALUATION OF THE MASCOT PROTOTYPE 
8.5.1 Evaluation Process 
Following the theoretical evaluation of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism, a 
demonstration assessment of the MASCOT prototype was carried out in line with the 
objectives outlined in section 8.2. This was carried out by presenting the prototype to a 
number of evaluators, and obtaining their feedback via a questionnaire and discussions. 
All those who were invited to participate had practical experience in the industry as well 
as experience in the use of information technology. In all, the opinions of nine people 
were obtained. 
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In order to ensure that the respondents fully understood the concepts involved, they were 
first shown a presentation. It first introduced the essential characteristics and features of 
MAS with focus on the negotiation algorithms between agents; then discussed the 
theoretical foundations of the MASCOT model; finally, it explained the development 
process of the model, especially the nature and key characteristics of construction claims 
negotiation. The presentation also addressed the broad objectives of the application of 
MAS in the industry. The slides of this presentation are shown in Appendix B. 
The demonstration of the MASCOT prototype immediately followed the presentation. 
The demonstration illustrated a typical negotiation process between the contractor agent 
and the engineer agent regarding the claim for loss of productivity. Three cases were 
illustrated (i. e. an agreement was reached by the contractor agent and the engineer agent; 
an agreement was reached by the involvement of the client agent; and no agreement was 
reached). The participants were invited to interject at any point during the demonstration 
to ask questions of clarification. 
Following the demonstration, the questionnaire was distributed. Key questions were 
further explained. Discussions were held later regarding the details of the model and the 
further development of MAS in the industry. 
8.5.2 Analysis of Results 
Using the feedback from the questionnaire, an analysis on various aspects of the 
MASCOT model was conducted: 
8.5.2.1 Evaluators' Background 
From the responses to the five questions regarding the respondents' industry 
backgrounds, it can be seen that respondents held a wide variety of roles in the industry, 
as shown in Table 7.25. Some participants often had experience representing more than 
one background. 
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Table 8.1 The Evaluators' Background 
Contractor Engineer Architect Client Others 
5 2 1 3 1 
Their working experience in the industry ranged from 1 to 37 years with an average of 10 
years. 90% of the respondents had more than three years working experience. The 
descriptions of positions held in their organisations produced a wide variety of answers 
including quantity surveyor, project manager, civil engineer, research engineer, and 
project engineer (representing the client). 78% were familiar with construction claims and 
claims negotiation while 50% had experience of applying IT in construction 
management. 
Based on the above information about the respondents' level of experience, roles played, 
positions held, knowledge of claims negotiation, and IT applications in the industry, it 
was considered that the evaluation group, sufficiently qualified to provide a fair 
assessment of the system. 
8.5.2.2 Responses to Questions 
For each section of the questionnaire, the results of the quantitative questions are shown 
in the followings tables, where a response of 1 represents `strongly disagree' or `poor', 
whilst 5 represents `strongly agree' or `excellent'. The results are also discussed based on 
the mean ranking of each question. This was followed by a selection of the most pertinent 
of the responses to the qualitative question. The achievements against objectives were 
assessed at each stage. 
1) Responses to Construction Claims Negotiation 
This section contained the questions about essential features of construction claims 
negotiation on which the MASCOT model was developed and could be further developed 
(Table 8.2). 
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Table 8.2 Responses to construction claims negotiation 
Statements Rankin 
1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
Ranking 
1.1 Inefficiency is one of the major problems in current 2 5 2 4.00 
construction claims negotiation. 
1.2 A negotiator can have a certain perception about the 5 2 4.29 
opponent's fraud offer (exaggerated amount) after 
s/he negotiates with the opponent for some time in 
a project. 
1.3 Negotiation tactics play an important role in 2 6 1 3.89 
deciding the outcome of the claim negotiations 
1.4 The involvement of the client in the claims 2 4 3 4.11 
negotiation is helpful for the negotiation 
1.5 It is possible to adopt a computer-aided approach 1 2 4 2 3.78 
to improve the efficiency and resolve some 
problems of construction claims negotiation 
1.6 Two factors influence a negotiators' attitude in claims negotiation: 
a) Try to maximise his/her own benefits; 
b) Try to avoid breaking the negotiation; 
Within these two factors, 
3 
" a) is more important than b) 
2 
" b) is more important than a) 
" a) is as important as b) 
2 
" It depends on the claim cases 
2 
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1.7 Two factors may influence a negotiator's decision on the concession 
amount: 
a) The gap between his/her current offer and his/her reservation 
value; 
b) His/her estimate of the opponent's reservation value and the 
opponent's current offer; 
Within these two factors: 
" a) is more important than b) 4 
" b) is more important than a) 3 
" a) is as important as b) I 0 
" It depends on the claim case 12 
The respondents gave a relatively high ranking to the first four statements. Also, the 
range of responses was fairly low for these statements. This confirmed some important 
features of the MASCOT system, particularly the rationale for the development of the 
system, input information, and negotiation strategy. Furthermore, a few points need to be 
discussed: 
" Firstly, the responses to statement 1.5 received the lowest mark (3.78) in this section. 
The respondents' attitude to the adoption of computer supported negotiation was 
relatively neutral rather than positive. As a key pre-condition of the system, the 
responses were further analysed. The five respondents who claimed to have 
experience of applying IT in construction gave a high rank to the statement (two 
strongly agreed; while three ranked `agreed'). On the other hand, those who had little 
knowledge of IT gave it a relatively low rank (one `agreed'; two were neutral; and 
one `disagreed'). This reflects the respondents' general confidence in the application 
of IT in the industry. 
" Secondly, the almost evenly distributed rank to the two motivations of claims 
negotiation (i. e. to maximise each party's own benefits, or to avoid breaking the 
negotiation) in question 1.6 (Q1.6) indicates that the respondents agreed that both 
aspects were essential for construction claims negotiation. In other words, it 
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confirmed the contract-obliged self-interested reasoning model of the MASCOT 
system. 
" Thirdly, the responses to Q1.7 indicated that both claims negotiators' own negotiation 
features and their estimation of their opponent's negotiation features were important 
for decision-making during negotiation. This suggested an interesting point: that the 
dual responsive model - (a behaviour theory-based negotiation model) would be 
appropriate for the further development of the MASCOT system. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 9. 
The results of this section suggested that the respondents agreed in general that the 
essential features of construction claims negotiation on which the MASCOT model based 
were defined appropriately in this research project. 
2) Responses to Multi-agent Systems 
Compared with the responses to Q1.5, this result was much more positive (Table 8.3). 
The respondents had relative high confidence about the solutions provided by multi-agent 
systems in construction claims negotiation. This supported the major hypothesis of this 
research project. 
Table 8.3 Responses to multi-agent systems 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
Ranking 
2.1 Compared with other information technologies, 2 5 2 4.00 
such as expert systems and decision making 
systems, multi-agent systems are more suitable to 
solve the problems caused by the fragmentation of 
the construction industry 
3) Responses to the MASCOT Model 
Various aspects of the MASCOT mode were evaluated in this section (Table 8.4). 
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Table 8.4 Responses to the MASCOT model 
Statement 12345 Mean 
Rankin 
3.1 How well does the MASCOT model ensure that all 1 6 2 4.11 
the essential perspectives of construction claims 
negotiation are represented? 
3.2 There are seven pieces of input information in the MASCOT model: 
" the negotiated claim item 
" the negotiator's reservation value for this item 
" the negotiator's optimum value for this item 
" the negotiation deadline for this item 
" the opponent's reservation value for this item 
" the opponent's negotiation habit 
" the confidence about this input information 
To what extent does this input information represent the 2 5 2 4.00 
information needed for real negotiations? 
3.3 How effective is the modified Monotonic concession 2 6 1 3.89 
protocol in the MASCOT model? 
3.4 How effective are the listed MASCOT negotiation strategies? 
a) the adoption of the maximum risk acceptability as 
2 3 4 4.22 
the criterion for concession 
5 3 4.38 
b) the learning ability of agents in the claims 
negotiation 
c) the time penalty in the claims negotiation 
1 2 4 2 3.78 
d) the involvement of the client agent to facilitate 2 5 2 4.00 
claims negotiation 
e) the extended solution-searching to facilitate 7 2 4.22 
claims negotiation 
3.5 To what extent does the MASCOT system improve 6 3 4.33 
the efficiency of claims negotiation? 
3.6 To what extent does the MASCOT system improve 1 2 5 1 3.67 
the effectiveness of claims negotiation? 
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The respondents gave relatively high rankings to Q3.1, Q3.2, Q3.3, Q3.4a), b), d), e) and 
Q3.5. The results suggested that the respondents felt in general that the principal features 
of system were affective. In other words, they agreed that: 
" the MASCOT system represented all the essential characteristics of construction 
claims negotiation; 
" the input information of the MASCOT prototype represented the information needed 
for real negotiations; 
" the modified monotonic concession protocol was relatively effective for the 
MASCOT model; 
" the adoption of the maximum risk acceptability as the criterion for concession was 
appropriate; 
" the learning ability was important for agents in claims negotiation; 
" the involvement of the client agent could facilitate claims negotiation; 
" the extended solution-searching strategy was appropriate for the MASCOT model; 
and 
the MASCOT system could improve the efficiency of claims negotiation. 
However, the respondents gave relative low scores to two questions regarding agents' 
time penalty during negotiation process (Q3.4c) and the improvement of claims 
negotiation effectiveness through the MASCOT system (Q3.6). These two questions were 
also discussed after completing the questionnaire. 
A major question that respondents asked regarding the Q3.4c was "since computer 
negotiation could be very efficient, the time penalty would have little function in 
practice". In this aspect, the respondents failed to recognise that an agent could just hold 
its position for many iterations if the agent was not given a time penalty for such time- 
wasting strategy. In fact, the adoption of time penalty as a functional attribute has been 
discussed by many game theorists, economists and MAS researchers. In the MASCOT 
model, an important role played by the time penalty was to keep Zeuthen's strategy 
stable. 
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A more important discussion was about Q3.6. Although IT is commonly recognised as a 
powerful tool in improving system efficiency, it could also improve system effectiveness 
provided that the IT system is properly designed and adopted in an appropriate 
circumstance. An example is the application of the word processor and spreadsheet that 
not only improves the speed of writing and calculation but also reduces mistakes during 
these processes. Regarding the MASCOT system, a typical case that improves the 
effectiveness of claims negotiation is when the system reduces the problems caused by 
the engineer's conflicting roles in claims management. Nevertheless, the evaluators felt 
that the MASCOT system does not necessarily improve the overall effectiveness of 
construction claims negotiation. 
Besides ranking the statements, two closely related questions were asked in Q3.2 
regarding the input information. These responses covered a wide area which should or 
could be considered at the next stage, such as: 
" Please specify the problems if you are not satisfied with the input information: 
a) how elegant the guessing skills involved are; 
b) how to reflect the opponent's negotiation tactics; and 
c) how to reflect the history of claims better. 
" Which kind of information needs to be added or deleted? 
a) the honesty of the opponent; 
b) the correlation between past history and current claims; and 
c) the possibility for the users to modify the utility functions. 
Most of the comments were related to human or other complex issues of construction 
claims negotiation (This point will be further addressed in the next section). For example, 
a major concern was how to encode human negotiators' domain knowledge into agents' 
domain knowledge. More industry surveys are needed to address such issues. 
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4) Responses to General Questions 
This Section contained some of general questions regarding the usage and further 
development of the MASCOT model, and the potential application of MAS in other 
construction areas (Table 8.5,8.6,8.7). 
Table 8.5 Responses to general questions (1) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
Ranking 
4.1 This study has clearly analysed the characteristics 
of construction claims negotiation, and identified 
the problems properly. 
1 5 3 4.22 
4.2 How useful is the MASCOT system to different participants? 
" Contractor 1 4 4 4.33 
" Engineer 2 4 3 4.11 
" Client 1 5 3 4.22 
" Others: sub-contractors, suppliers 4 5 3.56 
4.3 How easy is the MASCOT prototype to use? 3 5 1 3.78 
4.4 How useful is the MASCOT system to the overall 
claims management or project management? 
5 4 4.44 
4.5 What is your overall rating of the system? 
1 4 4 4.33 
The questions in this section were in two parts. Q4.1 to Q4.5 summarise the respondents' 
overall evaluations of the MASCOT system. The first statement received a high response 
of 4.22 indicating that the MASCOT model was built based on a clear analysis of claims 
negotiation characteristics and problems. Furthermore, the respondents confirmed that the 
system would benefit all the major claims negotiation participants by ranking them 
almost equally high. However, a low mark (3.56) was given to the subcontractors and 
suppliers since the demonstration did not include these project participants. In fact, 
further explanations needed to be made to the evaluators. 
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Importantly, the respondents gave very high scores to the overall system (Q4.5), and its 
usability in claims management and project management (Q4.4). This means that the 
essential goal of the system has been achieved. However, the respondents gave a lower 
rank (3.78) to the question `how easy is the prototype to use? ' (Q4.3). The main reason 
addressed by the respondents was due to the terms used to describe the input information 
and the figure used to check the input information. During the discussion, it was also 
recognised that there should be a balance between the complexity of the input 
information and the power of the system (i. e. the comments for Q3.2 and Q4.3). 
The second part (Q4.6-Q4.8) is concerned with improvements to the MASCOT system. 
The following questions were answered: 
" Q4.6 What is the risk of application of the MASCOT system? 
The responses given to this question were: 
a) The reliability of the system (including both software and hardware), such as bugs 
or virus; 
b) The honesty and reliability of the other parties. A party could modify his agent 
and benefit from it; 
c) People may depend too much on the system; and 
d) No one would be responsible for mistakes if any problem happened. Problems 
would be attributed to machine failure as seen in the case where machines are 
used to take actions on a human's behalf. 
The first two responses revealed the security problems for the application of the system. 
The problems of network security issues related to agents could be created by external 
agents (e. g. viruses, pilfering databases, or program modifications by the opponent) or by 
internal agents (e. g. unauthorised data modification, or failure of actions). All these 
problems could lead to serious results. Claims negotiation involves many sensitive issues, 
particularly because it aims to reach a deal for a claim. Therefore, industry users may be 
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reluctant to deploy the system without adequate guaranteed security. The last two 
responses were concerned with how the MASCOT system could be applied appropriately 
in the industry, which is highly related to the human factors. This will be further 
discussed later. 
" Q4.7 Suppose you are using the MASCOT system, to what range will you allow your 
agent to determine the final negotiation amount? 
Two kinds of responses were given: 
a) The first was directly related to the maximum value of agent negotiation. The 
respondents' answers ranged from £100-500, less than £1000, less than £2000, to 
maximum claim amount given that the accuracy was within 5-10%. 
b) The second kind of responses suggested that agents should submit the agreement 
reached by them to their owners as a suggestion value, or as a possible negotiation 
starting point. Any agreement should be confirmed by their owners. 
There are potential legal implications in abdicating responsibility for critical decisions to 
agents that have independent execution autonomy, especially when this happens in claims 
negotiation. Thus, agents' authorities become very important and more sensitive in the 
MASCOT system. The respondents addressed this question from two different 
perspectives. The first comment suggested the maximum amount authorised by agent. 
Although the value varied widely, this approach was also suggested by the other industry 
partners of this project. The second comment suggested that all the deals should be 
accepted by the owners in order to achieve the twin objectives of giving negotiators 
ultimate control in the final decisions, whilst facilitating the negotiation process. In 
practice, this issue would be determined by the complexity of claims, significance of the 
system, and users' confidence in the system. All these aspects are closely related. An 
agreement should be reached regarding agents' authorities before the system is adopted in 
any project. 
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" Q4.8 What might discourage people from using the system? 
The comments made by the respondents included: 
a) new technologies, thus, difficult to accept; 
b) possibly difficult to use for the people who lack IT knowledge; 
c) loss of benefits from human interaction during negotiation; 
d) project participants' ignorance of the system; 
e) user interruptions to the system; 
f) lack of transparency; and 
g) lack of trust of machines in settling financial matters. 
There was a wide spectrum of response to this question with the respondents giving a 
number of issues and potential barriers that might discourage people from using the 
system. By far, the most popular opinion was the lack of exposure to IT that currently 
exists in the industry. This problem is more serious for the adoption of MAS than other 
IT tools because MAS is based on Al. The failure of Al to deliver on some of its previous 
promises of the 1980s has contributed to users' reluctance in accepting any new Al 
technology. This is principally due to the overselling of AI systems (Knowledge based 
and expert systems), with regard to their capabilities to mimic human intelligence in 
solving complex industrial problems. This experience at industry level has resulted in 
most AI research projects being confined to academic research labs. Furthermore, 
development of the MASCOT system should take this on board and ensure that the 
specific concerns and needs of industry are addressed. 
Another major barrier to the adoption of the system is the lack of trust of machines in 
settling financial matters. In many projects, claims management is thought too complex 
and important to be handled by computers alone. The reliability and benefits of the 
system to a project must be clear and demonstrated to encourage its use. Closely related 
to this problem is another common theme (i. e. the cultural issues such as the feeling of 
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loss of control). Enough flexibility for the user would need to be built in to allow them to 
remain in effective control. 
Further evaluation work in the form of a trial on an actual construction project may be the 
best way to determine both the problems involved and the potential benefits to both the 
users and the project in general. This is considered as future work. 
Table 8.6 Responses to general questions (2) 
4.9 In what ways can the MASCOT system be further improved? 
" Identify more clearly the characteristics of construction claims 
negotiation, such as: 
1 
" Build a more sophisticated negotiation mechanism by considering 
more human aspects and claim elements 
6 
" Others, please specify: 2 
Within the three potential areas, most respondents suggested improving the system 
through building a more sophisticated negotiation mechanism by considering more 
human elements and claim factors. A common comment regarded the involvement of 
qualitative information in claims negotiation. Others were concerned the factors such as: 
honesty of negotiators, negotiation tactics, and the information transfer from other project 
management systems. This is consistent with the comments in Q3.2. Although it would 
be desirable to involve more human and claims features in the system, such work should 
be sound and systematic. This will be the major concern of future work (see Chapter 9). 
One respondent chose the option that the system could be further improved by focusing 
on the clear analysis of the characteristics of construction claims negotiation. An example 
given was to add the overall claims level as an attribute to the system. Also, two 
respondents suggested that the system could be improved by working on other aspects, 
such as: the better integration of human negotiators and agents, adopting more 
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sophisticated implementation systems, and improving the security and safety of the 
system. 
Table 8.7 Responses to general questions (3) 
4.10 Through this study, do you think multi-agent 1 6 2 4.11 
systems have a high potential of resolving 
distributed construction problems? 
4.11 In which areas can the Multi-agent systems be best used in the construction 
industry? 
a) engineering design 
2 5 2 4.00 
b) concurrent engineering 
5 3 1 3.56 
c) material management 
2 4 3 4.11 
d) scheduling and control 
3 4 1 3.75 
e) supply chain management 
3 3 3.50 
17f) 
others, such as: 
Q4.10 received a relatively high mark (4.11) indicating that the respondents have 
recognised the potential benefits brought by the application of MAS in the industry. The 
responses to the five potential areas listed in Q4.1 further confirmed the respondents' 
positive attitude towards this point. Within these areas, the possible application of MAS 
in facilitating project material management has received the highest mark. In rank order, 
the others were engineering design, scheduling and control, concurrent engineering and 
supply chain management. The reasons for such ranking were twofold: first, it was 
thought that material management was less related to complex human factors, thus, more 
suitable for the application of MAS. Second, limited by time, some background 
knowledge was not fully introduced to the respondents during the evaluation process. The 
lowest and the second lowest ranking received by supply chain management and 
concurrent engineering were probably due to the respondents' limited background 
knowledge because some researchers (e. g. Swaminathan et al., 1998; Chen et al. 1999; 
Chedmail, 2001) have applied MAS in supply chain and concurrent engineering 
environments, and proved that MAS is an effective tool. Besides the listed areas, the 
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respondents also suggested a few other industry processes which could be improved 
using MAS, such as: general project management, and co-ordination between main 
contractor and sub-contractors. 
8.5.3 Discussion 
The following sections distil the results of the evaluation results and further discuss the 
effectiveness of the evaluation methods. 
8.5.3.1 Results 
Firstly, the theoretical analysis has proved that the MASCOT negotiation mechanism 
satisfies all the key evaluation criteria (i. e. the MASCOT system is reasonably simple, 
stable and efficient). 
Secondly, the responses to the MASCOT system, and the applicability of multi-agent 
systems in construction provide a positive assessment for each of the objectives laid out 
in Section 7.2. As a whole, the potential benefits of the prototype based upon the 
evaluation can be distilled as: 
9 The MASCOT model clearly addresses the major characteristics and problems of 
construction claims negotiation; 
" The major features of the model such as the system architecture and negotiation 
mechanism match the requirements of construction claims negotiation. The system 
possesses some particular advantages which can overcome problems which are not 
easily addressed by other approaches; 
The methods used to develop the system are both appropriate and suitably well 
implemented; 
MAS has great potential in facilitating construction engineering and management 
activities. 
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Despite this positive feedback obtained from the evaluators, there are some points that 
need to be further explained: 
" Firstly, the lack of IT knowledge, the low usage of IT tools and the fear of using IT 
tools to handle financial issues in the construction industry are potential barriers for 
the adoption of the MASCOT system. Moreover, the difficulty in quantifying the 
immediate return, especially the economic gains, on the system investment may make 
it more difficult to be accepted. 
" Secondly, although the MASCOT system can facilitate claims negotiation, the system 
could operate more effectively by adding further features. The maximum benefit can 
be gained through the integration of the system with other legacy systems, or more 
importantly, by considering more practical human factors and qualitative claims 
negotiation elements. 
Thirdly, unlike other industries, the construction industry is less willing to adopt 
advanced technologies due to the specific characteristics of the industry. Moreover, 
claims management and claims negotiation are one of the most complex and difficult 
areas in construction management. Although this research project adopted MAS in 
this area, it would be much easier to adopt MAS to resolve other engineering or 
management problems, such as material management, engineering design or 
concurrent engineering. 
" Finally, it has been pointed out that the system alone will not necessarily improve the 
overall construction claims management. It needs to be an integral part of a claims 
management strategy. 
8.5.3.2 Effectiveness of the Evaluation Approach 
The reasoning behind the selection of the demonstration and questionnaire evaluation 
method has been discussed in Section 8.3. This is manifested by the evaluation process 
and the results achieved. The chosen methodology helped test all aspects of the system as 
required in the evaluation objectives. 
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The evaluation process has resulted in a body of quantitative and qualitative results. The 
quantitative results are in general positive and give a good indication that the MASCOT 
prototype is considered to be appropriate for construction claims negotiation. The 
qualitative questions promoted the respondents to highlight areas that could be improved 
and to suggest what those improvements might be. This naturally leads to a more 
negative set of responses. In sections where lower marks were given for the quantitative 
questions there were fuller responses to the qualitative questions. Moreover, the 
respondents were encouraged to raise their queries during the evaluation process. Most of 
the queries related to those questions that received low marks in the questionnaire. This 
resulted in a good set of potential issues and concerns being given by the respondents. In 
addition, a wide variety of suggestions for improvements were also provided. 
The assessment process has been successful in that it has provided an indication of how 
appropriate the prototype is as well as important issues that need to be addressed to 
improve the system. However, it should be recognised that there are limitations in the 
results gained through the demonstration assessment. A major drawback was that the 
respondents' information about the system heavily depended on the presentation and the 
demonstration of the prototype. Due to time constraints, some aspects of the system could 
not be fully introduced to the respondents. As a result, those points received relatively 
low marks. 
8.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented a two-step system evaluation process. Firstly, a theoretical 
evaluation was conducted to analyse the quality of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism. 
It was proved that the MASCOT negotiation mechanism satisfied all the key criteria of 
the MAS negotiation mechanism defined by previous MAS researchers (i. e. the system is 
simple, stable and efficient). Secondly, a prototype evaluation session was carried out to 
assess the MASCOT prototype and perspectives for the applications of MAS in the 
industry. The results were highly positive and indicate that the objectives of the 
MASCOT system have been achieved. Moreover, the majority of respondents thought 
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that MAS would be a powerful technique in solving problems in the industry. The 
respondents also pointed out some important areas that were essential for the further 
development and applications of the MASCOT prototype in the construction industry. 
The next chapter will summarise the work conducted in this research, draw conclusions 
and make recommendations for further development. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes this research project, which explored the application of MAS to 
construction claims negotiation. It first summarises the model development process, the 
implementation, and the evaluation of the resulting prototype. It then concludes that MAS 
could be an effective and powerful tool in supporting construction engineering and 
management activities and resolving the problems associated with these activities. It ends 
by making recommendations for future work. 
9.2 SUMMARY 
The rationale of this research is that the particular characteristics of MAS are ideally 
suited to distributed collaboration. The applications of MAS in other industries, such as 
military, telecom and manufacture also suggested that MAS could be used to tackle the 
fragmentation problem that the construction industry faces. The aim of this research was 
to explore the applicability of MAS to facilitating the construction claims negotiation 
process, and resolving the major problems associated with the negotiation process. To 
achieve this aim, a number of research objectives were identified with respect to 
construction claims negotiation, MAS, negotiation theory, model development and 
implementation. Various activities were undertaken to achieve these objectives, which 
included: extensive literature reviews, interviews, group discussions, participation in 
conferences, prototyping, and system evaluations. 
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" Construction Claims Negotiation 
Initially, an extensive review provided general background on construction claims 
management. It shows that, although many efforts have been made at both the pre- 
construction and construction phases, the number and amount of construction claims and 
disputes are still escalating. The reasons are complex and multi-dimensional. The 
inefficient and ineffective claims negotiation is one of the major contributors. 
By investigating industry practice, exploring the negotiation environment and process, 
building and analysing the generic claims negotiation model, the major problems of 
claims negotiation were identified during the negotiation preparation and negotiation 
processes. These problems include distributed project teams (either geographical or 
organisational), inefficient communication, poor documentation, negative attitude to 
claims, lack of negotiation knowledge and expertise, lack of effective supporting tools, 
the conflicts between the engineer's authority and responsibility, and various problems 
inherent in negotiations as conflict resolution methods. 
Although various techniques have been adopted to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of negotiations, such as decision-making systems and communication 
techniques, their effects are limited because they can only support a single party's 
decision-making or only facilitate communications between negotiation parties. A newly 
developed computer technology - MAS has great potential to overcome the above 
problems. 
" Multi-Agent Systems 
This leads to the second research objective, which was to investigate the nature, 
principles and major characterises of MAS. Particular attention was paid to the 
development of negotiation mechanisms between agents (i. e. negotiation protocol and 
strategies), and various agent learning approaches. The major features of agents, such as 
autonomy, social ability, reactivity and pro-activeness make them ideal tools for 
resolving collaborative problems. As a flexible and powerful tool, MAS could be 
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designed to work in different environments to achieve their particular goals by adopting 
different co-operation mechanisms. Agents could be group-benefit oriented or self- 
interested; the latter was the focus of this research project. 
The key points are that system developers should, based on the real application 
environment, develop appropriate system architectures and, more importantly, 
negotiation protocol and strategies. As a result, various negotiation mechanisms have 
been developed, such as contract-based negotiation, plan-based negotiation, market-based 
negotiation, game theory-based negotiation, AI-based negotiation, psychology-based 
negotiation and other approaches. These approaches have been proved to be successful in 
resovling specific problems. Also, a number of learning approaches have been developed 
to allowing agents to obtain more knowledge about their working enviornment or key 
features of their partners during negotiations, such as inductive learning, analytic 
learning, genetic algorithms, and connectionist learning methods. 
However, since MAS technique is quite new, many important issues need to be further 
addressed in developing and applying MAS, such as system development methodology, 
agent communication languages, resource allocations, interaction mechanisms, agents' 
reasoning model, and implementation tools. Many MAS were developed in an ad hoc 
manner. There is not a generic approach to developing MAS, particularly agent 
negotiation algorithms. 
" Negotiation Theories 
Consequently, the third research objective was to explore negotiation theories in order to 
identify the theoretical foundation for the MASCOT negotiation mechanism. Three 
approaches based on negotiation theories were discussed; these included game theory, 
economic theory and behaviour theory. The first two approaches are closely related. Both 
focus on providing a device to clarify and isolate key factors in negotiation, to address the 
obstacles that stand in the way of solutions, and explore what special cases of the 
problem can be treated by what methods with this facility. For example, they both share 
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the same important assumptions, and adopt the concept of utility functions. The 
difference between these approaches are that game theory focuses on anticipating the 
negotiation results based on the rational assumptions, whilst the economic approach 
focuses on analysing the negotiation process. Game theory approach represents a static 
approach to negotiation analysis, whilst economic theory approach represents a dynamic 
approach. Some important economic models provide a sound theoretical foundation for 
the further development of MAS negotiation mechanism such as: Zeuthen's model, Cross 
model, and Osborne and Rubinstein model; they address the time issues and/or learning 
issue during the negotiation. 
Unlike these two approaches, behaviour theoretical models focus on the human aspects of 
negotiation. They attempt to analyse the negotiation processes where negotiators 
influence each other's expectations, perceptions, assessments, and decisions during the 
search for an outcome, thereby affecting the outcome. Much attention is given to the 
nature of changing expectations and negotiator' tactics, and to the significance of 
uncertainties of information, perception, and evaluation - all matters that tend to be 
ignored by the game theory approach and the economic theory approach. All this 
involves a closer approximation to the real world. The psychological model, learning 
model, dual-response model and joint decision-making model are all important behaviour 
theory models focusing on different aspects of human behaviour in negotiations. These 
aspects are discussed by construction claims negotiation researchers. Thus, it is essential 
to consider these human issues in the MAS negotiation mechanism. 
" Development of MASCOT Conceptual Model 
The fourth research objective was to develop a MAS model for construction claims 
negotiation (MASCOT) based on the studies of construction claims negotiation, MAS, 
and negotiation theories. This process included five steps: 
a) Firstly, the essential characteristics of construction claims negotiation were further 
analysed in terms of the application of MAS, where the contractually-obliged self- 
interested negotiation was identified as the key nature of construction claims 
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negotiation, and the reasoning model of the MASCOT system. Furthermore, some 
other characteristics of claims negotiation were also identified such as participant- 
dependent information, strategy-influenced process, time consumed for negotiation, 
the involvement of the client, and tradeoffs between different claim items. These 
factors play important roles in the development of the MASCOT system. 
b) Secondly, the negotiation theory model - (Zeuthen's model) was selected as the 
theoretical model for the MASCOT system because it reflected the contractually 
obliged self-interested nature of the claims negotiation. Importantly, the result 
reached by this model also maximises each party's utility which the Nash solution 
(1950) addresses. Furthermore, a learning approach - the Bayesian learning 
approach was also adopted to keep Zeuthen's model stable in an incomplete 
information environment. 
c) Thirdly, the MASCOT negotiation mechanism was developed. This included the 
development of the modified Monotonic Concession Protocol (mMCP) and various 
negotiation strategies which reflected the major characteristics of claims 
negotiation. An essential negotiation strategy was the integration of Zeuthen's 
strategy and the Bayesian learning approach. Also, other strategies, such as the 
involvement of the client agent and the expanded solution-searching strategy, were 
developed. 
d) Fourthly, the MASCOT processing model was developed and illustrated using the 
IDEFO diagram, where a whole claims negotiation process was described. 
" Model Implementation 
The fifth research objective concerned the implementation of the MASCOT model. This 
included two major parts. Firstly, the implement environment - the ZEUS agent building 
toolkit - was selected and studied. The ZEUS toolkit architecture was particularly 
analysed; this included the agent component library, the generic agent, the agent building 
software, the utility agents, and the integrating agents with external programs. Secondly, 
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a full description of the MASCOT model implementation process was given. It included 
a three-step process. 
Initially, MASCOT role modelling was conducted where the roles and domains of the 
claims negotiation were identified. Following this process, the implementation design 
was undertaken where agents were created; ontology was defined; negotiation protocol 
and strategies were further clarified to suit the ZEUS environment; more importantly, the 
input information was determined, and the probability distributions representing the input 
information were selected. Finally, the model was implemented to address issues such as: 
negotiation protocol and strategies were addressed through the integration of the 
Rulebases, Primitive tasks and external Java programme. Furthermore, the utility agents 
and task agents were set up in the system. The display windows were also presented. 
" System Operation 
The sixth objective was to execute the developed MASCOT system. A practical example 
was created to examine and validate the model. All the major features of the model were 
presented during the operation process; which include: utility function definition, 
negotiation preparation, and detailed negotiation process. Results of the system execution 
were discussed. Comparisons between the MASCOT negotiation mechanism and other 
negotiation mechanisms such as simple gradient descent strategy were also made. The 
example was also run using the developed prototype. 
" Evaluation 
The final research objective was to evaluate the developed system using appropriate 
techniques. It included two steps: a theoretical assessment of the MASCOT negotiation 
mechanism, and a prototype evaluation by industry practitioners and academic 
researchers. A detailed discussion about the selection of the evaluation technique, the 
selection of the evaluators, the design of the questionnaire, the feedback mechanism, and 
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the analysis of the feedback result were described in Chapter Seven. The results of the 
evaluation in a nutshell showed that: 
a) The MASCOT negotiation mechanism satisfied all the major evaluation criteria 
such as stability, efficiency and distribution. It meant that the design of the 
MASCOT negotiation mechanism was successful. 
b) The respondents gave a positive response to the system, its further development, 
and most importantly, to the future application of MAS in the industry. 
The evaluation confirmed that the MASCOT system could be an effective tool for 
facilitating construction claims negotiation. Furthermore, MAS, with their great potential 
for supporting distributed collaboration, could be an effective tool in supporting 
construction engineering and management activities, such as collaborative design, 
concurrent engineering, and supply chain management. 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has demonstrated the applicability and role of a MAS in construction claims 
negotiation, and developed a robust negotiation model for agents. Three main 
conclusions can be drawn from this research: 
" The MASCOT prototype system presented in this thesis represents an innovative 
and effective approach to supporting construction claims negotiation 
Based on a thorough analysis of industry practice, framework, essential characteristics of 
claims negotiation, multi-agent systems, and negotiation theories, the MASCOT 
architecture was built; the negotiation mechanism was developed. As shown by the 
evaluation, the system not only facilitates the claims negotiation by breaking the time and 
location barriers between the distributed project participants, but also resolves some 
particular problems associated with construction claims negotiation (e. g. the unbalanced 
responsibility and role for the engineer during the claims management) by involving the 
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intelligent agents. Hence, the MASCOT system has great potential to improve both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of construction claims negotiation. A number of particular 
conclusions can be drawn: 
a) The adoption of Zeuthen's negotiation model is proven as appropriately 
representing the contractually obliged self-interested nature of construction claims 
negotiation. It clearly addresses claims negotiation participants' attempts to 
maximise their benefits and avoid the risk of conflict result. 
b) The learning mechanism incorporated in the MASCOT prototype greatly enhances 
the negotiation efficiency. Agents' inference abilities allow them to estimate the 
opponent's key negotiation features (e. g. reservation value) based on their domain 
knowledge and the opponent's offers during negotiation - an important ability of 
human negotiators. With the power of learning, negotiations converge quickly and 
positively. 
c) The MASCOT prototype development process, particularly the method adopted for 
the development of the MASCOT negotiation mechanism (e. g. the selection of the 
economic theory model and the behaviour theory model) provides a general 
approach to building agent negotiation mechanisms in other application 
environments. 
d) The ZEUS agent building toolkit, integrated with Java external program, provides 
an effective tool to develop multi-agent system prototypes. As shown in this 
research, the co-operation between ZEUS primitive tasks, rulebases and external 
Java programs is able to fulfil various complex tasks. Also, the ZEUS development 
methodology such as role modelling, implementation design (e. g. defining system 
ontology, agent organisations, and negotiation protocol and strategies), and system 
realisation (e. g. defining agents, tasks and utility agents) provides system 
developers a systematic approach to build a multi-agent system prototype. 
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" MAS offers great potential for the improvement of construction claims 
management 
Besides the work on contract, risk management and procurement systems, much effort 
have been made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction claims 
management using information technologies such as: Adams (1988), Diekmann and 
Gjertsen (1992) and Keane (1994). Information technology provides two crucial 
advantages: the power to communicate over great distances, and the analytic power to 
help users engage in private and structured analysis (Shell, 1995). However, conventional 
information technologies such as expert systems and the Internet can either only facilitate 
communications between negotiation participants or only support decision-making for an 
individual party. Therefore, their functions in facilitating claims management are limited. 
The power of MAS lies in the fact that it possesses both the analytic power and 
communication ability, and goes far beyond that. Each individual agent's capabilities of 
autonomy, responsive, learning, and more importantly the ability to work as a virtual 
society provide great potential and flexibility for facilitating group work, especially 
distributed groups. The successful application of MAS in facilitating claims negotiation 
shows that MAS has a great potential to tackle the more complex issues in the whole 
claims management process. For example, a sophisticated MAS could be extended from 
the MASCOT prototype, in which agents with the knowledge of contract documents, 
project schedules and progresses, site reports, principles of compensation calculation, and 
negotiation mechanism can trace the reasons of a claim, document it, and settle it by 
collaborating with other agents. Such a system not only increase the efficiency of overall 
claims management by reducing the complex paper work, and time-consuming meetings 
and arguments, but also improve the effectiveness of the claims management by avoiding 
the errors such as late submission of claims notification, misrepresent claims information 
and so on. 
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" MAS have great potential for solving the fragmentation problems of the 
construction industry 
Besides facilitating construction claims negotiation and management, multi-agent 
systems are also a tool with great potential for enhancing many construction engineering 
and management activities. MAS provides a very useful framework within which social 
aspects of intelligent behaviour can be modelled, analysed, and evaluated under a wide 
variety of domains, behaviour and knowledge assumptions. Therefore, they are 
particularly powerful in solving (Chapter 3): 
a) problems requiring the interconnecting and inter-operation of multiple, autonomous, 
"self-interested" existing legacy systems (e. g. expert systems or decision-support 
systems); 
b) problems whose solutions draw from distributed autonomous experts. Agents in a 
multi-agent system are often designed based on functionality: such systems have a 
modular design and hence can be easier to develop and maintain; 
c) problems that are inherently distributed in nature (e. g. co-ordination of self- 
interested agents, etc. ) 
d) problems whose solutions require the collation and fusion of information, knowledge 
or data from distributed, autonomous and selfish information sources. 
Most of the above problems are common in the construction industry. A key benefit for 
the application of MAS in the construction industry is that MAS provides a decentralised 
approach to model construction engineering and management activities between 
distributed project participants. Although the distributed problem of the industry has been 
addressed for a long time, no tool, thus far, can resolve it effectively. The incorporation 
of MAS into the industry represents a novel approach to resolving the fragmentation 
problem. Some other key benefits include effective decomposition of large-scale 
problems; improved collaborative and concurrent working; and easier and cheaper access 
to specialist information. The use of MAS is expected to result in increased 
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competitiveness of the industry as the decentralisation of complex, large-scale problems 
and the collaborative input to their resolution, will lead to better quality, more economic, 
safer and more optimal designs. 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
Since the studies on construction claims negotiation and MAS are relatively new, many 
problems need to be further addressed. This research project has revealed a number of 
such areas, which mainly include: the further development of the MASCOT model, the 
development of MAS for construction claims management, and the applications of MAS 
in the construction industry. 
9.4.1 Further Development of the MASCOT Prototype 
The use of MAS to perform negotiations instead of human beings, especially in the 
complex claims negotiation, is indeed very creative and challenging. Many aspects of the 
MASCOT prototype need to be further explored. For example: 
" The encoding of claim participants' domain knowledge (Knowledge 
representation): in the MASCOT model, a party's domain knowledge about its 
opponent was encoded in terms of the opponent's "negotiation habits" (e. g. the 
engineer usually has a tendency to make his offers 10% lower than his reservation 
value). Although this assumption has been discussed by other researchers, and 
proved to be suitable for certain negotiation groups, it is far from real claims 
negotiation situation. Therefore, effort needs to be made on how to model a 
negotiator's domain knowledge, and transfer the knowledge into his agent's domain 
knowledge. 
" Further development of the negotiation mechanism: besides the possible 
involvement of a mediator agent in the system, the improvement on some other areas 
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is also necessary to make the negotiation mechanism more robust and realistic. For 
example, 
a) One important aspect is the development of an argument-based negotiation 
protocol, where an agent makes its offers with supporting information such as the 
related contract clauses, breakdown analysis, or site information. Thus, the 
system can not only handle the quantitative issues, but also deal with qualitative 
items. This is essential for claims negotiation. 
b) Another important improvement is the adoption of a dual responsiveness model 
instead of a learning model where each agent not only estimates the opponent's 
negotiation features, but also traces its own negotiation history. Therefore, an 
agent's concession history could be an important criterion for its decision of 
concession rate. A major benefit of this approach is that it allows an agent to 
change its risk attitudes during the negotiation process. 
" Involvement of a mediator agent: The involvement of a mediator agent, which can 
play a role like a human mediator in claims negotiation will be very useful for further 
development of the prototype, particularly when the system involves many agents. 
The mediator agent should have the database of project contract documents and 
various claims cases, thus, it can be able to conduct case-based reasoning to 
anticipant the possible outcomes of claims. Furthermore, such a mediator agent will 
play a facilitator role during the prototype implementation process. 
" The empowerment of the MASCOT agents: The importance and amount of claims 
varies from case to case. Like human negotiators, it is important to determine the 
authority of agents in the negotiation. The owner should decide the maximum 
amount and the type of claims that an agent can handle. This point concerns the 
industry participants. Similarly, legal issues may be also involved in the agent 
negotiation system. All these items need to be further investigated in the industry. 
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9.4.2 Development of MAS for Construction Claims Management 
There is a great possibility to extend the MASCOT prototype to facilitate various 
activities in construction claims management process. To do this, several important 
aspects of the prototype need to be further developed. For example: 
" Incorporating other legacy systems: It is expected that the MASCOT system could 
incorporate other legacy systems of the industry, such as project scheduling systems, 
costing estimating systems, documentation systems, expert systems, and project 
databases. By doing so, agents could obtain the necessary information from these 
systems to support their claims. The capability of the MASCOT system therefore will 
be considerably enhanced. 
" Improvement of the collaboration mechanism: The negotiation mechanism of the 
MASCOT system is particularly designed for construction claims negotiation. To 
make the system facilitate the whole claims management process, the most important 
work is to improve the system collaboration (negotiation) mechanism so that it can 
fulfil various complex tasks at different claims management stages. As a result, the 
collaboration mechanism should first consider agents' different requirements and 
possible strategies at different claims stages. Furthermore, the system architecture 
may also need to be reconsidered because more agents such as subcontractors may 
also need to be involved in the system. 
9.4.3 Application and Development of MAS in Construction 
MAS offer the industry a powerful tool to improve many engineering and management 
activities, such as: collaborative design, concurrent engineering, project scheduling and 
control, supply chain management, material supply management, decentralised project 
management, and so on. Agents can represent different project participants. For example, 
a few application scenarios are briefly described as follows: 
" Collaborative design, where agents represent different design groups or some related 
groups such as material suppliers. Each agent has its minimum requirements 
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determined either by technical specifications or safety regulations or cost constraints, 
whilst all the parties have a common objective to reach a design which should satisfy 
all the party's minimum requirements. Some of these issues have been addressed in 
ADLIB project (Anumba et al., 2002). 
Concurrent engineering, where agents represent the client, architect, designer, and 
contractor. Each party has its own knowledge, expertise and constraints, its objective 
is to inform the other agents of its requirements and to plan its activities according to 
the other agents' requirements. The system allows agents to break the time barrier in 
design and construction process. Therefore, in such a case, the motivation for co- 
operation is probably stronger than that of competition. In a more general sense, MAS 
can be used to facilitate the collaboration between project participants in project 
lifecycle sequence (i. e. the so-called supply chain management). Udeaja and Tah 
(2001) have developed an agent-based material supply chain integration system, 
where agents represent different parties in project material procurement system to 
facilitate their negotiation process, improve the fairness of the process, and reduce the 
bidding time. Their model addresses some of the key points, and indicates the great 
potential for the further application of MAS in supply chain management. 
" Project scheduling and monitoring, where agents represent project management 
team and site construction groups. The management agent may plan and schedule the 
project, and monitors the site groups' progress. Each site group, with its own time 
constraints, reports to the management agent on its progress. The update on the 
progress depends on the negotiation between the management agent and all the 
construction groups. Unlike the previous two cases, the management agent may play 
a dominant role in this system (i. e. the system has a hierarchical structure). 
Although the objectives (e. g. co-operation or competitive), system architectures (e. g. 
relationships between agents), and co-operation mechanisms are different, properly 
developed MAS would provide powerful solutions to improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of these activities. The development of MAS in these situations needs both 
construction expertise and computer knowledge. Since claims negotiation represents a 
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very complex negotiation in construction, the methodology adopted in this research 
project could also be used for developing other MAS for construction applications. 
Essentially, several important questions need to be answered during the development of 
the system, which include: 
" How to transfer the complex industry problems into an essential MAS conceptual 
model. This involves: analysing the particular industry activity to build a generic 
model that represents the nature and essential characteristics of the industry activity; 
identifying the key reasoning model for the MAS; and addressing the key problems 
that need to be resolved by MAS. 
" How to develop the system architecture, define agent relationships, and address agent 
architecture based on the identified industry conceptual model. This also includes 
how to formulate, describe, decompose, and allocate the industry problems and 
synthesise results among the agents. 
" How to develop the system's co-operation mechanism (e. g. negotiation protocols and 
strategies) to ensure that agents act coherently in resolving the industry problems. 
" How to enable individual agents to represent and reason about the actions, plans, and 
knowledge of other agents in order to co-ordinate with them. How to reason about the 
state of their co-ordinated process. 
" What implementation toolkit will be adopted? How to enable agents to communicate 
and interact? What communication languages and protocols to use? What and when 
to communicate. 
" How to effectively balance local computation and communication. More generally, 
how to manage the allocation of limited resources. How to avoid or mitigate harmful 
overall system behaviour, such as chaotic or oscillatory behaviour. 
" How to evaluate the developed systems and how to further improve them, and so on. 
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9.5 CLOSING REMARKS 
The continuous rise in the number of construction claims and disputes shows the need to 
improve various aspects of construction claims management. The research in this thesis 
has demonstrated how a multi-agent system could be developed to facilitate claims 
negotiation and resolve the problems that were difficult to resolve through other 
approaches. Agents' abilities of autonomy, co-operation and learning allow them to work 
as a virtual society, through a proper co-operation mechanism, to achieve a certain goal 
that may be for the group's benefit, for individual's best benefits or for both. This 
characteristic provides MAS with considerable potential in resolving the fragmentation 
problems of the construction industry. Moreover, the Internet facilitates the wide 
application of MAS. It is expected that MAS applications could enhance the industry's 
engineering and management activities and resolve many industry problems that 
traditional isolated systems fail to resolve. 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EVALUATING THE MASCOT 
PROTOTYPE 
The aim of this work is to evaluate a software prototype, the MASCOT model, which 
was developed to facilitate construction claims negotiation using multi-agent systems. 
This prototype was developed through the ZUES agent building toolkit, an engineering 
approach to the design and construction of collaborative agent systems. The completion 
of the questionnaire will follow a demonstration of the MASCOT prototype. 
Information on respondents: 
1. The respondent's experience has involved working as a: Contractor ( ), Engineer ( ), 
Architecture ( ), Client () or Others ( ). 
2. Position of the respondent: 
3. Respondent's experience in the construction industry years. 
4. Is the respondent familiar with construction claims? Yes ()/ No ( ). 
5. Does the respondent have any experience in applying information technology in 
construction management? Yes ()/ No ( ). 
Evaluation of the MASCOT Prototype 
Please complete the following questions based on the demonstration you have just seen. 
Where a scale is provided, please state the level to which you agree or disagree with the 
statement. 1 refers to a low ranking, and 5 refers to a high ranking. 
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Construction Claims Negotiation 
Item Statements Ranking 
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
disc ree a ree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Inefficiency is one of the major problems in 
current construction claims negotiation. 
2 Two factors influence a negotiators' attitude in claims negotiation: 
a) try to maximise his/her own benefits (e. g., more monetary compensation, 
or long time extension); 
b) try to avoid breaking the negotiation (otherwise, s/he has to give up the 
claim, or go to arbitration or litigation); 
within these two factors, 
" a) is more important than b) 
" b) is more important than a) 
" a) is as important as b) 
" It depends on the claim cases 
3 A negotiator can have a certain perception about 
the opponent's sham offer (exaggerated amount) 
after s/he negotiates with the opponent for some 
time in a project. 
4 Two factors may influence a negotiator's decision of concession amount: 
a) the gap between his/her current offer and his/her reservation value; 
b) his/her estimate of the opponent's reservation value and the opponent's 
current offer; 
within these two factors: 
" a) is more important than b) 
" b) is more important than a) 
" It depends on the claim case 
5 Negotiation tactics play an important role in 
deciding the outcome of the claim negotiations 
6 The involvement of the client in the claims 
negotiation will be helpful for the negotiation 
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7 In your opinion, what is the major barriers for construction claims 
negotiation: 
8I It is possible to adopt a computer-aided approach 
to improve construction claims negotiation 
Multi-agent System 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Compared with the other information 
technologies, such as expert systems and 
decision making systems, multi-agent systems is 
more suitable to solve the problems caused by 
the fragmentation of the construction industry 
MASCOT Model 
Statement 12345 
(1 is poor, 5 is excellent) 
1 How well does the MASCOT model ensure that 
all the essential perspectives of construction 
claims negotiation are represented? 
2 There are seven input information in the MASCOT model: 
" the negotiated claim item 
" the negotiator's reservation value for this item 
" the negotiator's optimum value for this item 
" the negotiation deadline for this item 
" the opponent's reservation value for this item 
" the opponent's negotiation habit 
" the confidence about these input information 
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To what extent does this input information 
represent the information needed for real 
negotiations? 
Please specify the problems if you are not satisfied with these input 
information: 
Which kind of information needs to be added or deleted? 
3 How effectively does the modified Monotonic 
concession protocol in the MASCOT model? 
4 How effectively do the listed MASCOT negotiation strategies? 
" the adoption of the maximum risk 
acceptability as the criteria to concede 
" the learning ability of agents to the claims 
otiation ne g 
" the time penalty to the claims negotiation 
" the involvement of the client agent 
facilitate claims negotiation 
" the extend solution searching facilitate 
claims negotiation 
5 To what extent does the MASCOT system 
improve the efficiency of the claims negotiation? 
6 To what extent does the MASCOT system 
improve the effectiveness of the claims 
negotiation? 
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General 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1 This study has analysed the characteristics of 
construction claims negotiation, and identified 
the problems properly. 
2 How useful is the MASCOT system to different participants? 
" Contractor 
" Engineer 
" Client 
" Others: sub-contractors, suppliers 
3 How easy is the MASCOT prototype to use? 
4 How useful is the MASCOT system to the 
overall claims management or project 
management? 
5 What is your overall rating of the system? 
6 What is the risk of application of the MASCOT system? 
Suppose you are using the MASCOT system, to what ranger will you allow 
your agent to determine the final negotiation amount? 
7 What might discourage people from using it? 
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8 In what ways can MASCOT be improved? 
Identify more clearly the characteristics of construction claims negotiation, 
such as: 
Build a more sophistic negotiation mechanism by considering more human 
aspects and claim elements 
Others, please specify 
9 In which areas can the Multi-agent systems be 
best used in the construction industry? 
a) facilitating engineering design 
b) concurrent engineering 
c) material management 
d) scheduling and control 
e) others, such as: 
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The Application of Multi-agent 
System in Construction 
Claims Negotiation 
(Evaluation Session) 
Zhaomin Ren 
Multi-Agent System 
"A kind of distributed artificial intelligence 
Characteristics: Autonomy, collaboration 
& corporation, and learning; 
" IRMAS in Negotiation: agents think locally. 
Agents, on behalf of their owners, negotiate 
with each other to reach an agreement. 
Characteristics of Construction 
Claims Negotiation 
"A bounded self-interested negotiation 
" Participant-dependent information 
" Strategy-influenced process 
" Time - an important factor 
*ý 
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Outline of Presentation 
" Multi-agent System 
" Construction Claims Negotiation 
" Negotiation Theory 
" MASCOT Negotiation Mechanism 
" Demonstration 
" Evaluation 
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Problems of Construction 
Claims Negotiation 
" Inefficiency 
. negotiation preparation 
. negotiation process 
" Involvement of the client 
" Unhealthy human factors 
r Client 
(bntractor Engine 
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negotiation 
Theory 
" Rule Based 'Theory, 
. Game theory 
" Bargaining theory 
" Behaviour Based theory 
" Learn ing model 
" Psychological Model 
" Joint Decision Making Model 
44 Process Model 
Innil 
Calculate the offer Clam 
claim cost 
items New offer t 
A c_rcrmrut 
Evaluate offer 
& make 
tf 
Expand Conflict deal 
negotiation 
searchin 
New offer 
f 
Further Work 
" Empowerment of agents 
" Encoding of domain knowledge 
" Further development of negotiation 
mechanism 
" Proper implementation software systems 
" 
MASCOT Negotiation 
Protocol and Strategies 
" Monotonic concession protocol 
" Negotiation strategies 
. Zeuthen's strategy 
. Bayesian learning 
" Time penalty 
. Involvement of client agent 
" Expanding solution searching 
Concession Mechanism 
update its belief of N tt The opponent's ew u er the opponent's utility function 
reservation amount 
Decision of 
Counteroffer 
Calculate and 
compare the 
concession (who, maximum 
how much) tolerant risk 
The Demonstration 
Terminology: 
. Reservation value 
" Optimum value 
" Time Penalty 
" Negotiation habit 
368 
APPENDIX C 
Reservation Value 
Contractor agent's 
Contractor agent's initial offer 
reservation value 
Agreement 
Engineer agent's one 
initial offer 
Engineer agent's 
reservation value 
Your Comments 
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